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RITA GUERLAC

JUAN LUIS VIVES AGAINST THE PSEUDODIALECTICIANS

A Humanist Attack on Medieval Logic

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TEXTS AND STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY

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Plate of Juan Luis Vives from Boissard, *Icones Virorum Illustrium*. (*Reprinted by permission of the Folger Shakespeare Library.*)

JUAN LUIS VIVES AGAINST THE PSEUDODIALECTICIANS

A Humanist Attack on Medieval Logic

The Attack on the Pseudodialecticians

and

On Dialectic, Book III, v, vi, vii

from

The Causes of the Corruption of the Arts

with an Appendix of Related Passages by Thomas More

The texts, with translation, introduction, and notes by

RITA GUERLAC

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To
H. G.

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PREFACE

The humanist treatises presented here are only peripheral to the history of logic, but I think historians of logic may read them with interest, if perhaps with irritation.

In the early sixteenth century the humanists set about to demolish medieval logic based on syllogistic and disputation, and to replace it in the university curriculum with a 'rhetorical' logic based on the use of topics and persuasion. To a very large extent they succeeded. Although Aristotelian logic retained a vigorous life in the schools, it never again attained to the overwhelming primacy it had so long enjoyed in the northern universities.

It has been the custom to take the arguments of the humanists at face value, and the word 'scholastic' has continued to have pejorative overtones. This is easy to understand, because until recently our knowledge of the high period of medieval logic has been slight, and the humanists' testimony as to its decadent state in the sixteenth century has, for the most part, been accepted uncritically.

Within the past two decades important work on medieval logic has recovered the brilliant achievement of thirteenth and fourteenth century logicians, philosophers, and natural scientists. New studies are constantly appearing, and the logico-semantic system of the terminists has become fruitful territory not only for historians of logic but also for students of modern linguistics and semiotics.

These humanist treatises show why the word 'scholastic' came to be identified with pedantry and quibbling. They were composed by men antagonistic to the scholastic system, whose program for replacing it focused upon the use of clear, concrete, and correct Latin. Accordingly the humanists attacked and made fun of the scholastic subtleties, distinctions, and abstractions, including the sophismata and logical puzzles that, designed in the medieval period to be unravelled by experts, offered copious material for ridicule when taken out of context, misquoted, and garbled. It is not that the humanists – Vives in particular – did not know scholastic logic. They used their knowledge to undermine it.

At the same time these translations of Luis Vives and Thomas More,

set in historical context, should be of interest and use not only to historians of medieval logic, but perhaps even more so to students of northern humanism and Renaissance culture. They set forth, in abundant detail and relative brevity, the reasons for the humanists' impatience and weariness with contemporary scholasticism. They also demonstrate, en passant, the intellectual sympathy and common purpose between these two friends of Erasmus, leaders of the humanist movement, and major figures of the northern Renaissance.

Works such as this present certain difficulties. I have not found it possible to track down all of Vives's quotations. Sometimes he quotes from memory and makes slight mistakes. In other instances his versions of the texts are not the same as ours; for example he quotes a passage from the *Second Philippic* that I could not find in the text we have today. He believed in the authenticity of Quintilian's *Declamations*, and his citations from Paul of Venice, Gregory of Rimini and others still remain to be recovered for us by present and future historians of medieval logic.

Furthermore a work that spans two disciplines confronts one with special problems. Historians of logic may feel that I have documented the obvious and skimped on humanistic information. Renaissance scholars will find terminist logic a new area in which they will need all the help they can get. To understand and appreciate these treatises requires a minimal acquaintance with the technical vocabulary of terminism, and in the Introduction I have tried to explain these terms as briefly as possible. In their way these small works may serve as a tempting introduction to terminist logic. A reader who enjoys logical and verbal puzzles may be curious to look into the serious purpose behind the sophismata that Vives and More airily misquote and ridicule. Anyone who would like to read more widely about terminist logic will find a brief list of introductory works attached to the general bibliography.

The text I have used is that of the Majans edition, Valencia 1782, which accurately reproduces the first (Selestat) edition of the *Adversus pseudodialecticos*. I have omitted the editor's marginal glosses, and the chapter headings in the *De dialectica*, and made a few small corrections in the texts only where grammar seemed to call for them, e.g., *non* for *nun*, *earum* for *eorum*, etc.

Let me acknowledge first my debt to the Libraries and Librarians who have helped me in my research and made it pleasant: to Dr Felix Reichmann of the Cornell University Libraries, and to the Libraries' staff; to

the courtesies of the Folger and Widener Libraries, the Boston and New York Public Libraries; and to the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Bodleian, and the Cambridge University Library.

I am grateful to the friends who have encouraged me in this project and read all or parts of both the translations and the Introduction, in particular James Hutton, Lisa Jardine, and Margaret Mann Phillips. Francesco del Punta has given me invaluable advice, and E. J. Ashworth and Eleonore Stump have generously helped me over a number of obstacles.

Above all I wish to thank Norman Kretzmann, who first suggested this book, has guided me through many thickets of medieval logic and the inscrutabilities of Gaspar Lax, and has been an inspiring and perceptive critic.

Finally I would like to express my gratitude to the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University. All those I have named have been associated with it either as Fellows or visitors, and I have profited from their seminars and their conversation. An earlier version of my Introduction was first read at a seminar conducted at the Society by Lisa Jardine in 1974–75.

RITA GUERLAC

Ithaca, New York
December 1977

INTRODUCTION

I

The life and work of Juan Luis Vives of Valencia (1493–1540) embraced extraordinary contradictions and tensions. Uprooted in his early youth, he spent his life among the mists and chill of England and the Low Countries, perpetually homesick for Spain. The son of *conversos*[1] who were burned as relapsed Jews by the Inquisition, he kept their fate a secret and his anguish to himself and clung fervently to his Catholic faith. He was destined, like so many of his young contemporaries, for scholastic training and probably for orders, but he rejected these for humanism and for marriage. And though he was celebrated for his work on education and psychology, a large part of his reputation must rest on the major role he played in the struggle between humanist dialectic and Parisian logic, in a kind of sixteenth century version of the Battle of the Books.

The humanists' quarrel with the scholastic logicians had to do with the role of language and the rank of the 'artes de sermone'. It was an ancient quarrel, already flourishing before the first half of the thirteenth century when Henri d'Andeli wrote his lively *Battle of the Seven Arts*,[2] in which Parisian logic won the field against Dame Grammar of Orleans. Logic – or dialectic[3] – held that field at Paris until the early sixteenth century; it was the fortune of Juan Luis Vives to appear just at the balancing point, or point of tension, between a waning late scholasticism and a rising northern humanism. In the last real battle between them, played out just before the greater wars that occupied the century, Vives threw his weight on the side of the humanists; Erasmus said that no one was better equipped for the battle against the dialecticians, in whose ranks the young Spaniard had served for so long.[4]

Vives was born in Valencia in 1493,[5] and left Spain at the age of sixteen. He was rigorously trained by scholastic dialecticians at the College of Montaigu in Paris; he embraced humanism with the fervor of a convert. In the course of his not very long life (he died at forty-seven), he wrote on a wide range of subjects, on psychology in particular, on religious and social problems, on behalf of peace, and always on subjects

related to education. Almost all the humanists wrote treatises on specific aspects of education, as did Vives;[6] in the north, Lefèvre d'Etaples, Clichtove, and Bovillus had adumbrated his program twenty years earlier. But his big work, *De disciplinis*, was the first full treatment of the subject on such a scale, with such authority and scope, since the *Institutio oratoria* of his first-century compatriot, Quintilian, with whom his contemporaries ranked him. (A later generation included him in the great triumvirate of Renaissance letters, with Budé and Erasmus.[7]) From Valla onward Quintilian was the idol of many humanists as the example of classical education in action, and one of the young Spaniard's first published works was a series of *Declamations*, for which Erasmus wrote a preface, in imitation of the spurious Orations attributed to Quintilian in the sixteenth century.[8] The emulation continued in Vives's plan of *De disciplinis*, modeled roughly on the *Institutio*; it, too, consists of twelve books, though Vives groups them in two parts. The first part, purely critical in tone, deals with the low state of learning as he saw it in his time, and it is surely no coincidence that its title, *On the Causes of the Corruption of the Arts*, echoes that of Quintilian's lost treatise on the causes of the corruption of eloquence. The second, positive part of Vives's treatise, *On Education* (*De tradendis disciplinis*), follows Quintilian in offering a comprehensive plan of education from infancy to old age. As originally published, the work was in three parts and twenty books; the last eight, *De artibus*, comprised three books on metaphysics and five on logic, in which Vives expanded his treatment of two important disciplines he had handled rather cursorily in the *De tradendis*; he also wrote a treatise on rhetoric, *De ratione dicendi*.

Vives had a wide and persistent influence in his lifetime and for a century after, in his two roles as educational theorist and as critic of both Aristotelian and scholastic logic. In England, where he was an intimate of Thomas More, his influence is evident in Elyot, Ascham and Milton,[9] and he was read and quoted by Ben Jonson;[10] on the Continent his educational ideas left their mark on Rabelais, Sturm, and Comenius.[11] But it was as a critic of Aristotle, and at the same time a relentless opponent of his contemporary scholastic dialecticians (who he felt had debased the real Aristotle), that he was read by Ramus and Gassendi and, after a period of oblivion, rediscovered and read by such scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as Lange, Renan, Duhem, and Cassirer.[12] Cassirer groups him with Valla and Ramus as representing three separate stages in which humanism was progressively accepted by

three great national cultures, though part of the same continuing development.[13]

Of his critical pieces, for which he is now perhaps best known, the two most widely read and quoted in this context were the *Adversus pseudodialecticos* and the *De causis corruptarum artium*. The first is a youthful work, a spirited attack on the logicians at the University of Paris, using as weapons his own thorough knowledge of dialectic acquired from them, and the humanistic arguments of such men as Bruni, Valla, Agricola, Erasmus, and More. Because of its brevity and force it was widely read, and because of its eloquence and acerbity, frequently quoted.

Book III of the *De causis* (*De dialectica*) is a product of Vives's maturity and a more technical work; taken with the books *De artibus* on logic, it provides a contemporary survey, by a scholastically trained humanist, of the *Organon*, the *logica moderna*, and contemporary dialecticians. Vives's biographer, Bonilla, says that Book III provided an arsenal from which most of the later adversaries of Aristotelian logic drew their arguments.[14] The *Adversus pseudodialecticos* was an early exercise in satire towards the same end. Together they serve to demonstrate why the humanists, particularly the northern humanists of the sixteenth century, were so hostile toward a decadent scholasticism.

II

What was the nature of this 'modern' logic that provoked such a strong and conclusive reaction in the early sixteenth century?[1] To understand what Vives is talking about, and the humanist antagonism towards late terminism, let us briefly review its development and technical vocabulary – 'those portentous words', as Vives called them. And let us say at the outset that the dialectic the humanists denounced and derided was the decadent stage of a movement that represented the high intellectual achievement of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The University of Paris 'whence the light of all learning should emanate', in Vives's phrase, had been preeminent in logic and absolute in theology from its inception early in the twelfth century when Abelard moved his lectures on the *logica vetus* from the Parvis Notre Dame to the Mont Ste Geneviève.[2] Around the middle of the century the rediscovery of the remaining books of Aristotle's *Organon*, the *logica nova*,

completed what became known as the *logica antiqua*, and in the next fifty years there developed the theory of the *proprietates terminorum* or properties of terms,[3] primarily *suppositio*. In the first half of the thirteenth century the summulists[4] William of Sherwood, Lambert of Auxerre, Peter of Spain, and others, working from the *Organon*, constructed an increasingly complex logico-semantic system, and this became known as the *logica moderna*.

The *logica moderna*, like the logic of Abelard, rested upon the medieval logicians' conception of their subject as the science of language, and its focus was on the meaning of words, in themselves and in relation to other words. In their view it was neither a science of reality (*scientia realis*) nor of reason (*scientia rationalis*), but wholly a science of linguistic entities, a *scientia sermocinalis*. A rival thirteenth century theory associated with the name of Albert the Great regarded the grammatical science as the sermocinal one, and steered logic, as a *scientia rationalis*, in the direction of metaphysics, a movement that, as the reader will see, drew particular scorn from Vives and More.

A striking characteristic of the modernist movement was its use of fallacies; it is not too much to say that the doctrine of fallacy was the basis of terminism.[5] The *De sophisticis elenchis*, rediscovered and translated in 1128, seized the imagination of logicians. As set forth by Aristotle, fallacies were tricks in argument intended to disconcert an adversary. He thought of them as a teaching tool in a city-state where competence in public pleading or debate in the courts or in public assembly was an indispensable accomplishment; his purpose was to teach the student to detect and refute fallacious reasoning.

The study of fallacious reasoning led to the development of bizarre examples unlikely to confuse anyone, but useful as devices for introducing a discussion of abstract issues in a concrete context. Such examples took on the designation that had originally been applied to fallacies: 'sophismata'.[6] Sophismata were faulty or ambiguous propositions that had to be grammatically or logically clarified or corrected before they could be free from ambiguity or safe from false interpretation; because of real or apparent ambiguity they could plausibly be both attacked and defended in argument; they lent themselves admirably to the medieval tradition of disputation. According to the formal rules, the sophisma was stated, defended (*probatur quod sic*), opposed (*arguitur quod non*), and a decision rendered by appeal to the principles. Topics for sophismata, like any topics for

disputation, ranged from simple logical puzzles to complex rules of reasoning and theological questions on the omnipotence of God or future contingents and divine foreknowledge.[7] John of Salisbury remarked that nothing is easier to explain to youths than sophistic because it is naturally attractive to them.[8] The next four centuries showed that it was equally attractive to their masters, and a common humanist complaint was that 'old men pass along sophismata to other old men in theology' for dialectical entertainment. But in the medieval period sophismata were not only a teaching device. Enthusiasm for the *De sophisticis elenchis* had stimulated an interest in logical and verbal puzzles and ambiguities that was to flower in France a hundred years later in the *logica moderna*. Aristotle's *Physics*, discovered around 1200, introduced to logicians the concepts of motion and change, continuity, infinities, and temporal limits (beginning and ceasing), and called forth a parallel zeal for speculative natural philosophy associated with the 'Oxford Calculators' and the Paris school of Buridan; the two disciplines of logic and natural philosophy were closely, often even indistinguishably, connected in the late Middle Ages.[9]

The *logica moderna* as developed in the thirteenth century consisted essentially of two parts, the doctrine of the properties of terms and the study of syncategorematic words. Terms, strictly speaking, are words that serve as the subjects or predicates of propositions. Words used as subjects or predicates are called categorematic: nouns, adjectives, pronouns, and most verbs and participles. Syncategorematic words, as the name suggests, occur in propositions only together with categorematic words. Thus a complete proposition can be formed of just two categorematic words, as subject and predicate terms (e.g., she sings.) On the other hand, in the proposition 'Every man is mortal', 'man' and 'mortal' are the categorematic words serving as the terms, while 'every' and 'is' are syncategorematic.

The properties of terms were variously listed and characterized. William of Sherwood, for example, recognized signification, supposition, copulation and appellation. But as the doctrine developed, signification and supposition emerged as the two really important properties. The signification of a word is its meaning regardless of context; the supposition of a word is its meaning within the context of its use in a proposition.[10]

Thus supposition theory became the pivotal doctrine of terminist logic, elaborately developed and refined. It is outside my competence to

undertake an explanation of supposition theory, which has been superbly done by experts. Renaissance scholars to whom medieval logic is alien territory, I refer to Norman Kretzmann's admirable 'History of Semantics'. But for immediate purposes the following few paragraphs will provide the barest outline of supposition theory and a minimal explanation of its various forms and technical terms.

The initial division of supposition was into *proper* and *improper* supposition, literal and figurative uses, respectively. Proper supposition was in turn divided into *material* supposition, in which a term is used to refer to itself (e.g., *man* is a noun), and the broader and more important *formal* supposition, itself divisible into *simple* supposition, when the reference is to the form itself (e.g., *man* is a species), and *personal* supposition if the reference is to individuals that embody that form.

The part of supposition theory that was of keenest interest to the terminist logicians, and therefore became the most highly developed, dealt with the most ordinary sort of meaning: the personal supposition of common terms. Personal supposition was said to be *ampliated* or *restricted* (expanded or contracted in reference) by the presence in the proposition of an appropriate modal or temporal or quantifying term.

The first division of personal supposition was into *discrete* (referring only to a single individual) and *common* supposition. Common supposition could be *determinate* (referring to some one specified individual without identifying him (e.g., some *man* is white), or *confused*. Confused supposition, finally, was divided once more into *distributive* and *merely confused*. These were forms typically governed by the inclusion of a 'distributive' sign such as 'all' or 'none'; if the confused supposition referred to each of the individuals represented by the common term (e.g., every *man* is an animal) it was distributive. If, on the other hand, the confused supposition was indeterminate as regards reference to the individuals – all, or some, or only one – (e.g., every man sees a *man*), it was called merely confused.

The distinction among these forms of personal supposition, then, typically depended upon the presence – and often the order – in a proposition of universal or particular quantifiers (or both), and of *exceptives* or *exclusives*, such as 'except' or 'only'.

In cases of confused supposition the terminists recognised that there could sometimes be *descent* from the universal (*all* men are white) to the particular (therefore *some* man is white), the indefinite (therefore *a* man is white), and the singular (therefore *this* man is white, or *Socrates* is

white), and they called such cases *mobile*. On the other hand, cases in which distributive supposition was produced by distributive signs plus exclusives or exceptives were *immobile*, for from 'only every man is white', it does not follow that 'only this man is white'. As one might suppose, the reverse process of logical descent is logical *ascent*, in which an inference can sometimes be made from the singular to the particular.

The study of syncategorematic words, which formed the second part of the *logica moderna*, complemented the study of the properties of terms and was integral to the theory of personal supposition. This study derived originally from the thirteenth century interest in the fallacies of ambiguity, since ambiguities were found to lie more frequently in syncategorematic words (or in the order of words) than in the subject or predicate. By the first half of the thirteenth century William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, among others, were writing separate treatises on the *syncategoremata* and seriously discussing the logico-semantic role of quantifiers – 'all', 'every', 'no', – and other such modifying words as 'only', 'except', 'if', 'unless', 'another', and 'begins', 'ceases', and 'immediately' – in cases of personal supposition.

Of the many logic manuals composed by the thirteenth century terminists, one eclipsed all the others and became the dominant textbook of the universities for over three centuries. The *Tractatus* or, as it came to be called, the *Summule logicales* of Peter of Spain, written probably in northern Spain around the 1230s,[11] consisted of a compendium of all the current theories together with a good survey of the *logica antiqua*; it was in fact an elementary book on logic for young students. The *Tractatus* was in twelve books or chapters (Dante, in the *Paradiso*, mentions 'Peter the Spaniard who gives light below in twelve books').[12] The first five comprised the review of the *logica antiqua*; the sixth was a section on fallacies. The century's distinctive contribution to logic was represented by the last six chapters on the properties of terms: Supposition, Relatives, Ampliation, Appellation, Restrictions, and Distribution, and these came to be known as the *Seventh Tract*, or the famous *parva logicalia*.

By the middle of the fourteenth century the *parva logicalia* had been augmented by a treatise on *Exponibilia*,[13] probably inspired by Peter's *Tractatus syncategorematum*, and entered upon its long *fortuna* of commentaries, rearrangement, additions and encrustations. De Rijk notes "more than three hundred manuscripts scattered all over European libraries, and about two hundred printed editions . . . dating from 1479

up to 1639".[14] Of the printed editions, probably two thirds were accompanied by commentaries, and the majority of these were published within the thirty years before Vives's small book, by the Cologne Dominicans and such Paris nominalists as Peter Tartaret, George of Brussels, Thomas Bricot, his student John Major, and his student Gaspar Lax who was Vives's teacher. Vives must have been familiar with many of these commentaries, and heard Lax's in the classroom. It does not take a logician to compare Peter's *Tractatus* with Lax's lengthy commentaries on each section and see how far the fifteenth century had moved to ornament this Gothic structure.[15] Thomas More's remarks on Gaetano's commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* provide an amusing parallel. (p. 195 below).

With the appearance of the Aristotelian physical treatises at the beginning of the thirteenth century scholastic logic, as we have seen, found new material. Although the *Physics* was promptly banned at the University of Paris in 1215, by mid-century it was being studied there, together with *De caelo* and the *Metaphysics*. The questions these raised, about movement and allied concepts – space, time, and the void, infinity, change, the latitude of forms[16] – attracted the best minds of the fourteenth century in Oxford and Paris. In Oxford the Mertonian school[17] was making its remarkable contributions under a constellation of scholars who applied scholastic logical techniques to mathematicophysical problems. Robert Bradwardine's treatise *De proportionibus*, William Heytesbury's *Regule solvendi sophismata*, and Richard Swyneshead's *Liber calculationum* exerted a powerful and lasting influence from Paris to Padua and Prague, as did the work of their successors, Richard Ferrybridge (Ferabrich), *De motu*, and Chaucer's friend Ralph Strode, *Consequentie*. As early as 1334 Richard de Bury, patron of Bradwardine, Kilvington and other Mertonians, wrote of the "English subtleties that the Paris masters publicly disclaim but learn in nightly vigils"[18]. In fact, the Mertonians and their followers were making a brilliant attempt to deal verbally with problems the calculus would be invented to handle more than two centuries later.[19]

Many of these men made major contributions in both logic and speculative mechanics, in a tradition begun by Heytesbury and Buridan and still followed by John Dullaert in the sixteenth century. In Paris Buridan, besides his work on logic (*Sophismata* and *Summa dialecticae*), brought a new approach to Aristotle's discussion of motion by his theory of impetus; his students, Nicole Oresme,[20] Albert of Saxony, and

Marsilius of Inghen carried on important work on mathematical and physical problems. The dividing line between logic, physics, and mathematics remained shadowy for nearly three centuries. Heytesbury, for instance, applied his skill in logic to the analysis of physico-mathematical problems, and then used mathematical and physical principles in the analysis of problems that appeared to be purely logical.[21] Neologisms and nonliterary linguistic devices – such as the use of letters of the alphabet to represent constants – employed in the study of velocity, acceleration, and the latitude of forms, increased the strangeness of a scholastic vocabulary already replete, to the humanists, with empty abstractions.

A word remains to be said about the sophismata that Vives uses as examples in both of these treatises, and a few of which Mores also cites.

Some of these are easily recognisable as standard scholastic examples. Others, either by accident or design (and one suspects design), Vives misquotes and renders uninterpretable. Still others are either deliberate burlesques, or possibly represent an extreme linguistic tortuosity that may have provided entertainment to sixteenth century logic students.

In any case, although I have translated them all, I cannot offer a specialist's interpretation of them, and the reader who is not a historian of logic cannot be expected to understand them without background material which is outside the scope of this essay to provide.[22] The text is presented as material upon which historians of logic may practice their expertise, and I leave it to them to trace Vives's sources.

Readers of good Latin will find even the authentic sophismata strange, and view the lot, as Vives and More intended they should, as examples of scholastic 'barbarity' and quibbling. But while they are meant to look like gibberish, it is not to be assumed that Vives was treating them fairly; it was not his purpose to show what terminist logic was intended to do. He was writing from a strong polemical and ideological position, and these treatises, after all, were hailed by the humanists as a cannonade against scholasticism.

III

Not that scholastic logic had ever been without its critics, from the days of its first ascendancy in the universities, and eventually it was to call forth an 'equal and opposite reaction'. As early as the twelfth century

John of Salisbury, leader of the School of Chartres, classicist, statesman and protohumanist, was making the same remarks about his old friends on the Mont Ste Geneviève that Vives and More would still be making about theirs four centuries later. It is true that logic dominated the universities throughout the thirteenth century, though Henri d'Andeli bears witness to a continuing opposition in the School of Letters at Chartres.[1] But with the rise of humanism in Italy in the mid-fourteenth century, the long contest began that was to endure for two centuries.

If the logicians liked to quote the opening definition of the *Summule logicales* that "dialectic is the art of arts and science of sciences, having access to the principles of all disciplines",[2] the order and balance of Isidore of Seville were closer to the spirit of the humanists:

> Grammar is the science of speaking correctly, and the source and foundation of a liberal education. . . . Rhetoric is the science of speaking well on civic questions, to convince an audience of a just and good cause by the power of eloquence. . . . Dialectic is the discipline invented to discover the causes of things; it is a kind of philosophy that is called logic, that is, a rational discipline, capable of definition, investigation, and discourse. It teaches us, with respect to many kinds of questions, how to distinguish the true from the false through disputation. . . . And for that reason dialectic follows after the rhetorical discipline, because in many respects both have a common function.[3]

Presumably Isidore meant the function of convincing or persuading an audience, a definition that goes back to Aristotle and was to assume central importance in the humanistic dialectic of Agricola and his followers.[4]

In Zeno's neat metaphor, dialectic is the hand contracted to a fist, rhetoric the hand with open palm. For both the scholastics and the humanists language was the essential material of their disciplines. With language the logicians created the *scientia sermocinalis*, the humanists restored the *ars disserendi*. The logicians made their language into a fine and precise instrument to express complex abstract ideas; the humanists used language as literature and oratory to form character and shape events. Shunning the abstract, artificial *scientia verborum*, they turned their attention to the *scientia rerum*, knowledge of the world and of human affairs. They held that grammar was the foundation of language and therefore of all culture. With Valla they followed Quintilian: language is based on "reason, antiquity, authority, and usage. Usage, however, is the surest guide in speaking, and we should treat language as currency minted with the public stamp."[5] If, as Isidore would have it, grammar was the source and foundation, it was put to its noblest use in

rhetoric, the trained and skillful use of discourse for civic and moral purposes, the practice of eloquence in speech and writing, in oratory, poetry, and history, in education and jurisprudence. Successors to the medieval *dictatores* who taught the art of writing and composed letters and state documents for courts and chancelleries, the Italian humanists developed their rhetorical discipline on the models of the rediscovered classics, and established a broad cultural program based on literature, scholarship and oratory.[6] With their strong impulse toward moral and civic training and the utilitarian function of education, it is not surprising that they looked with scorn on the logicians' *quisquiliae suiceticae*,[7] whose apparent frivolity offended their sense of seriousness and their classic ideal of *gravitas*.

What became known as 'British logic and Parisian physics' had taken early root in Italy. The English 'calculatores' had been established there well before the death of Petrarch in 1374, and by 1400 were completely and widely accepted, not only in the universities that were the stronghold of scholasticism, but in the cultural milieu of city life. Garin has shown that 'suicetical' books were included in the libraries of Florentine convents in the late fourteenth century; and that, in the library of Lorenzo Ridolfi, jurist and younger friend of Salutati, "small treatises of terminist logic alternated with commentaries on Seneca, and citations from Albert of Saxony with praises of Petrarch and Boccaccio"[8]. Petrarch and Salutati looked with distaste and antagonism on the British 'sofisti' from the outset, as did Leonardo Bruni; but other adherents of classical culture were fascinated by the new vogue. Boccaccio praised Ockham and recommended the study of the *modi significandi*. P. P. Vergerius, who wrote a humanist treatise on education, as well as the first modern introduction to the study of Quintilian, also taught logic for a time. He advised a friend, if he wished for a peaceful life, to read Seneca and Cicero; as for himself, he was "wasting day and night in garrulous debate, preparing dialectical traps and weaving nets in which to catch the subtleties of the sophisters"[9].

In Quattrocento Italy there were two paths to education. One, the court schools such as those of Vittorino da Feltre at Mantua and Guarino da Verona at Ferrara, were intended mainly to train the aristocracy, although they opened their doors to boys of talent without rank, and thereby produced many distinguished humanists as well as educated young noblemen. Guarino not only taught at the court of the Este family but also served as the first professor of rhetoric at the new (1436) University of

Ferrara, and helped direct it along the humanist lines that set it apart from the older scholastic Universities of Bologna, Padua, and Pavia.

The humanists – Vergerius, Alberti, Aeneas Sylvius, Vittorino and Guarino – who drew up or put into effect programs to educate the well-born, gave short shrift to dialectic while they emphasised grammar, poetry, rhetoric, oratory and ethics, which could be put to political and social use. Of these writers, only Aeneas Sylvius gave logic some consideration – and only in a few lines:

> Logic, indeed, has no profit except it serve as a direct aid to clear and precise thinking and expression, enabling us to recognise in our reasonings the fundamental difference between certain, probable, and manifestly false steps in argument. But beware of logicians who waste time and ingenuity in mere verbal subtleties, in whose hands logic is a thing not of living use but of intellectual death.[10]

It was the court schools and the University of Ferrara that inspired and influenced the northern humanists who knew Italy – Fichet, Gaguin, Agricola, Lefèvre d'Etaples, Erasmus, and the English humanists. They carried on the Italian humanist tradition of liberal education for moral and civic ends; both Erasmus and Budé wrote treatises on the education of a prince, Vives wrote the *De institutione foeminae Christianae* for the Princess Mary, and Elyot's *Book of the Governor* was directed to all public servants of whatever capacity. Moreover, the strong rhetorical tradition of the University of Ferrara formed and developed the humanistic dialectic of invention that Agricola (who studied there with Guarino's son, Battista) was to popularise in the sixteenth century.

The alternative educational route, generally followed as the way to the professions, was through the older universities, and these were the stronghold of the *logica moderna* and its concomitant sciences. The center of logical and physical speculation had shifted in the last quarter of the fourteenth century from Paris to Padua, "the real heart of the study of English and French natural philosophy in Italy in the early fifteenth century, followed closely by Bologna and later by Pavia"[11], which became for a time in mid-century the center of 'suicetical' studies. It was not uncommon for a professor, like the celebrated natural philosopher Blasius of Parma, to teach at all three universities in the course of his career.

At Padua two famous logicians exercised an influence that dominated Italian (and European) university studies for well over a century. Peter of Mantua (d. 1400) wrote a *Logic* that depended upon the Paris

nominalists, Buridan and his followers, but multiplied and subdivided their syllogistic formulae with a Gothic refinement that embodied all the formalistic techniques, the cavillings and calculations that called forth the attacks of Bruni and Valla. (The humanist Ermolao Barbaro called Peter "that Mantuan philosophaster, but otherwise a noble sophister.")[12] Peter also wrote a treatise *De Primo et ultimo instanti* about one of the major preoccupations of the scholastics.[13] Paul of Venice (d. 1429) represented a link with Oxford and Paris; his *Summa naturalium* and *Logica* were strongly influenced by Heytesbury, and his fifty *Sophismata* included all but three of Heytesbury's thirty-two. As in Oxford and Paris, logic and natural philosophy went hand in hand, and the subtleties of the English 'calculatores' held an especial appeal for the Italians. In 1465 the revised University Statutes required candidates for a degree in 'sophistria' to read the *Regule* and *Sophismata* of Heytesbury and the *Quaestiones* of Ralph Strode, as well as the *Logic* of Paul of Venice and the *Dubia* of Paul of Pergula.[14] In 1487 the Venetian Senate decreed that no other work than Heytesbury's *Sophismata* should be assigned in logic without consultation of the Senate.[15] Before the end of the century Padua had a chair of 'sophistria' in the Faculty of Arts.[16]

A significant aspect of the intellectual climate of Padua was the link between medicine and natural philosophy.[17] Problems of heat, acceleration, intensity, change, held an understandable interest for medical doctors. To name only two distinguished Paduan physicians, Jacopo da Forli, whose career straddled the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, wrote, in addition to his medical books and his translation of Galen, a long treatise *De intensione et remissione formarum*, which demonstrated a mastery of the new physics. His younger colleague Gaetano di Thiene, also a theologian and student of Paul of Venice who succeeded to Paul's chair, wrote lengthy commentaries on the required texts as well as on Ferabrich. The books of the Paduan masters and those of the medieval natural philosophers, published towards the end of the century by the famous Venetian house of Octavius Scotus and Bonetus Locatellus, soon found their way to Paris; Jacopo was studied at the College of Montaigu, and it is easy to identify the edition of Gaetano's commentaries in the opening lines of *De causis*, III, vi.[18]

The humanists in the courts, chancelleries, and academies, the 'antiqui' who cherished classical culture, saw in the 'modern' dialecticians the embodiment of all they detested in the Middle Ages: scholastic formalism, the domination of dialectic with its endless

abstractions, now further refined and subtilised by the British thinkers; and the corruption of Latin and consequently of all the other disciplines based upon language. In a famous letter to Tommaso Caloria da Messina, Petrarch contrasted these modern sophisters with Aristotle. They call themselves Aristotelians, he said, because Aristotle used to dispute. But he disputed and wrote *de rebus altissimis*. Petrarch defended dialectic as it was taught by the Stoics, "a strong and manly sect". Dialectic has many uses, but on our life's journey it should be the means not the end, the *pars matutina, non serotina*. By contrast these moderns were *senes pueri*, a characterisation that would echo through all subsequent humanist criticism of the scholastics.[19] Petrarch was also the first to broach a complaint that Salutati and Vives would repeat, that the dialecticians did not confine themselves to logic and physics, but pretended that all the arts and the moral disciplines could be reduced to their own scholastic, terminist rules and fitted to their framework; they had taken over theology, said Petrarch, and reduced the sacred science to dialectic "and I hope not to sophistry"[20]. Vives would accuse them of doing the same in medicine and law. Coluccio Salutati, the great Chancellor of Florence, in his book on poetics (*De laboribus Herculis*, 1383) spoke scornfully of the

> philosophers of our time who, when they boast that they rise above the pinnacles of logic and philosophy and are prepared to discuss the whole range of knowledge in garrulous disputation, do not depend upon the Aristotelian texts, but seek out I know not what treatises from the British – 'cut off from all the world'[21] – as if our own native erudition were not enough.[22]

In the wake of Petrarch, Italian voices rose and fell throughout the fifteenth century, as Salutati, Bruni, Valla, Ermolao Barbaro, Politian, and others bent their efforts to restore and maintain the purity and correctness of the Latin language, to rediscover classical texts, to rescue the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric and defend the arts of poetry and eloquence against the dialecticians, and thereby restore the balance and establish the interdependence of the 'artes sermocinales'. And with persistence and wit they continued to upbraid the scholastics for the barbarity of their Latin and the abstruseness of their arguments. Leonardo Bruni complained that the whole of dialectic was thrown into disorder by the British sophisters, "whose very names make me shudder – Ferabrich, Buser (Heytesbury), Occam, and others of the kind – names that seem to me to have been drawn from the legions of Rhadamanthus"[23].

But it is worth noting, as Italian scholars have recently reminded us,[24] that for all the humanists' antipathy to scholasticism, as symbolised by the 'barbari britanni', the two worlds were not separated by an insurmountable barrier as they were in the north a few generations later. Italian scholastics, unlike their counterparts in the north, were often men of the world, physicians and jurists who took an active part in the political and cultural life of their cities.[25] In Venice, and especially in Florence, an intercourse went on between scholastic learning and the liberal culture of statesmen and patrons of the arts. There was an exchange, a dialogue, between the two sides, sometimes polemical, sometimes merely barbed, on occasion marked by respect. The *Paradiso degli Alberti*[26] shows Blasius of Parma conversing with such humanists as Niccoli and Salutati. Salutati, himself one of the most outspoken critics of scholasticism, addressed a letter to Peter of Mantua in terms of respect and esteem. He urged the Paduan logician to "strip away the appearances of fallacies; give us back the knowledge of *things*, that we may not always toil among the extremes and ambiguity of significations and suppositions . . . that no one may deceive and confuse us with appellations". And he hopes that when Peter has learned "whatsoever grammar (i.e., the great authors) can relate, logic prove, and rhetoric persuade of, then he will reflect upon poetry, which holds a place above all that can be known, and which alone can speak about God"[27].

Apart from the court schools, the scholastic training of the *studi pubblici*, or universities, formed part of the intellectual baggage of all educated young Italians, who accepted it as a matter of course, discarded much of it, and retained an intellectual agility and acumen acquired from scholastic disputation that, combined with their rhetorical studies, served them well in their careers in law-court or chancellery. For many of those who became humanists, 'suicetical' exercises retained a certain appeal. Ermolao Barbaro, polemicist against the jargon of the 'Parisian nominalists' in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, wrote to a friend[28] an account of his sojourn at Pavia, where he immersed himself briefly in calculatorial matters. In the first place, he said, subtleties delighted him. And as a humanist and philologist he wished to try whether he could not turn even suicetical subtleties into a clear and intelligible Latin. Barbaro's experiment was undertaken as a sport – a joke or challenge – but it tells us something of the fascination Oxford and Paris logic and natural philosophy held for the Italian humanists. Francesco Landino, for example, wrote a long Virgilian poem in praise

of Ockham,[29] and Lorenzo Ridolfi set forth in verse the theory of supposition.

And while the humanists exalted poetry and rhetoric, they did not underrate dialectic; they simply wanted to restore it to its rightful place in the hierarchy of the trivium, retaining the Isidorean balance. Leonardo Bruni, in his *Dialogue* to Petrus Paulus Vergerius, urgently commended disputation as indispensable to the training of an orator, and himself used the dialogue form to teach rhetoric, dialectic, and argumentation.[30] His was an elegant example of the double discourse that the 'antiqui' opposed to the dialectic of the 'moderni', using the Ciceronian argument *pro et contra* to discuss, in a humanistic manner, literary, moral, and political topics.[31]

The most forceful advocate of pure and correct Latin and the reform of dialectic was Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457),[32] who laid the foundation of humanist dialectic in his *Dialecticae disputationes* (1439). Valla was at once restorer and innovator; he sought to reestablish the rhetorical culture of Quintilian in place of the technical, abstract dialectic derived from the *Organon*, and to build a humanist dialectic on a foundation of clear and concrete Latin, the *usus communis loquendi*. This dialectic would be stripped of formal, metaphysical Aristotelian concepts, a rhetorical – or, as he preferred, oratorical – discipline designed to be of practical use, to teach and to persuade.

Such a program called for a systematic demolition of Aristotle and the scholastics, and the *Dialecticae disputationes* is an open polemic against the whole Aristotelian corpus.[33] Valla was an impetuous man whose lifelong relish for attacking entrenched groups in Church and state, in law and letters, made him enemies in high places and several times exposed him to danger. In the case of the *Dialecticae disputationes* he was arraigned for heresy on the grounds of denying Aristotle's ten predicaments. He withdrew his book, rewrote sections of it, and withheld publication; it did not appear in print until 1509. But from the beginning its influence was felt; Agricola used the book as source and inspiration for the *De inventione dialectica* in 1479, and Valla has always been the acknowledged architect of humanist dialectic.

Vives's own program for the reform of dialectic drew, as we shall see, upon Valla as well as Agricola, and like Valla, Vives was known as a critic of Aristotle. But in view of the deference with which he mitigates his strictures of Aristotle, it is hard to account for Vives's acerbic tone in speaking of Valla. It might be argued that the taint of heresy that clung

to Valla's works, including the *Dialecticae disputationes*, would make a Catholic wary of praising him. But Vives seems to have been singularly uncoerced by ecclesiastical censure; his judgments and opinions were determined by his own moral, intellectual, and religious convictions. He objected to most poets not because of the Church but because he thought they were a dangerous influence on young minds. One of his own books, the *Commentaries on the City of God*, was on the *Index Expurgatorius*.[34] But for whatever reason – perhaps a purely personal reaction against that 'impetuous man hasty in making judgments' – his appraisal of Valla at the end of *De causis*, Book III, seems ungratefully harsh.

IV

At the University of Paris there was one college that was notable, in Vives's phrase, for "valiantly defending the fortress of ignorance". Let us look for a moment at the College of Montaigu in the early decades of the sixteenth century because it serves as a background for Vives's *Adversus pseudodialecticos*, and because of its prominence in the history of thought of this period, both in dialectic and in natural philosophy.[1]

Within a span of forty years, between 1483 and 1523, Montaigu went through two distinct phases and acquired two distinct reputations. The first concerns us little except as background and for purely literary reasons, but it is interesting enough to merit a brief digression.

Situated on what is now the site of the Bibliothèque Ste Geneviève, the College had been founded in 1314 by Gilles Aycelin de Montaigu, Archbishop of Rouen, for the benefit of students from Auvergne, as one of those foundations that were established to house the throngs of students pouring into Paris from all over Europe; in the early fourteenth century they already numbered fifteen thousand.

By the end of the fifteenth century the College was crumbling with age, and without revenues; of its early endowment only enough remained for the masses to be said for its benefactors. In 1493 it was placed in the charge of a new Principal, one Jan van Standonck,[2] a Flemish student of theology. And so began the history of the notorious 'Lowsy college'.

Standonck was a man of harsh discipline, for himself and for others. He had received his early training at the hands of the Brethren of the Common Life at Gouda, but had carried away from them, along with the rudiments of grammar, only a taste for penance and a zeal for souls. He

was accustomed to poverty, and his mission soon became clear: to educate the poor, train them in mortification and a frugal and sanctified life, and acquaint them with letters only so much as was necessary, sending them forth to replenish the clergy and reinvigorate the Catholic faith. Standonck was a prereformer, and one of the more noteworthy, akin in rigor and spirit, if not in doctrine, to that later student at his College, John Calvin.

Standonck's rule, or Institute, was based on the regulations of the Brethren of the Common Life, and also on penuriousness. His students observed a perpetual Lent; their meatless diet cost him little, consisting of herrings and eggs, often spoiled. The boys were hauled out of bed at midnight to pray; the rising bell was at four. They were weakened by fasts and vigils, flogged for their errors, encouraged to report the derelictions of their fellows. Cold, tired, hungry, verminous, they made few intellectual demands on their masters; it was enough if they memorized their lessons, and prayed for their benefactors.

In 1495 Erasmus came to Montaigu, recommended by Henry of Bergen, the Bishop of Cambrai. Erasmus also had studied with the Brethren of the Common Life, but he was appalled by the College of Montaigu. Thirty years later his wrath and disgust quiver through his account of Standonck and his school. He complains that students' lives were lost or ruined by maltreatment. For himself, "I brought nothing out of it but my Body full of gross humors, and my Clothes full of lice"[3]. And, he might have added, his lifelong hostility to scholastic theologians and dialecticians.

The lice, or 'verminhawks', became a virtual symbol of Rabelais' 'Colliège de pouillerie'[4]. In the poor and crowded university quarter they were as inescapable as cold, filth and disease. Only a few of the more prosperous and better run colleges seem to have kept them under control; Montaigu invited them, with its poor students crowded together in dormitories, sleeping on straw pallets in the grey robes they never shed, with compulsory haircuts only twice a year. Such a torment did the lice become that the new Statutes of the College in 1503 prescribed measures for their control.

But Montaigu flourished. Within ten years Standonck, by parsimony and careful management, made the College not only solvent but prosperous. He had turned it as nearly as possible into a monastery where more than two hundred boys observed his harsh, thirteenth-century curriculum. Across the street from this feudal bastion stood the

comfortable College of Ste Barbe, the 'Athenaeum of Paris', famed for its humanistic studies and enlightened teaching.

Standonck was exiled for political reasons in 1489, and left Noel Béda as his successor; though he returned the following year, his mission henceforth was to extend the rule of Montaigu, for the benefit of poor boys, through numerous congregations he founded in Paris and the Low Countries. Despite Erasmus's harsh judgment of him, Standonck had qualities of greatness, and was sincerely mourned by his brethren when he died in 1504. He had a real concern for his 'poor boys'. He strove mightily for reform within the Church. He had drawn up Articles on the Reformation of the Clergy in 1493, and his new Statutes for the Congregation of Montaigu in 1503 remained "one of the chief monuments of Catholic reform at the beginning of the sixteenth century"[5]. He would have supported the program of still another, later student of his College, Ignatius Loyola, for reform and renewal within the Church as a defense against Protestantism.

Standonck's rule did not long survive him at Montaigu, and within five years the College had taken on a wholly new character. Béda neglected the *pauperes* and had no taste for either austerity or religious reform, but turned his own attention to theology. From a small congregation committed to the training of poor students, Montaigu rapidly doubled in size and grew rich from a flow of gifts and bequests. The only aspect of the College that persisted unchanged was its virtual suppression of humanistic studies. Béda's new statutes of 1509 prohibited the reading of the poets as a corrupting influence; the study of neither Greek nor the classical civilizations was countenanced. As in Erasmus's day at Montaigu, "the very walls taught theology"[6].

But in the same brief period the College rose to intellectual eminence and earned a reputation to rival the 'grandes écoles'. During the next twenty-five years it saw a strong resurgence, what Pierre Duhem calls a 'renaissance of nominalism', expressing itself in a burst of scholastic activity and an outpouring of books and treatises on logic and natural philosophy, especially medieval French dynamics and Oxford kinematics. Renaudet called it 'the greatest terminist school in Europe'. With few exceptions, all of this activity centered upon problems raised by fourteenth century scholars. Logical studies focused upon Buridan, Peter of Mantua, Paul of Venice and particularly Peter of Spain (known to the men of Montaigu not through his thirteenth century *Tractatus* but through later commentaries). In dynamics, the great masters of the

'School of Paris' – Buridan again, and his followers Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen – were reedited and closely studied, notably by Thomas Bricot and Peter Tartaret, who transmitted their interest in studies of impetus to John Major and his circle. The kinematics of the Mertonians – Heytesbury, Swyneshead, and Bradwardine – came under careful scrutiny, spurred and stimulated by the work of fourteenth and fifteenth century Paduans. Thus the bright but brief ascendancy of the College of Montaigu brought together the strands of Oxford, Paris and Padua, discernible in the teaching and writings of John Dullaert and Gaspar Lax, and in the acerbic comments of their student Luis Vives.[7]

The central figure in this last great period of nominalism was the Scottish theologian John Major,[8] a regent of Montaigu and the leader of the nominalist school at Paris. The university in those years was a center for Scottish, Flemish and Spanish students as well as French, and Montaigu in particular became known as the 'Spanish-Scottish school'. Major, who had taught at the Colleges of Navarre and Ste Barbe before coming to Montaigu, attracted around him a large number of able and disputatious colleagues and students, many of them his compatriots, like George Lockert, the commentator of Albert of Saxony, Gavin Douglas, David Cranston, and Gilbert Crab, to name a few; among his students were Jacques Almain, Pierre Crockaert, John Dullaert of Ghent, probably his ablest student, and among many Spaniards, the brothers Luis and Antonio Coronel, Gaspar Lax of Sariñena, Juan de Celaya, and Domingo de Soto. Peter Ramus later recalled that in philosophy he had listened to Spaniards and Scots.[9]

John Major was a prolific writer, a man of firm opinions who had little use for literary style. His own was barbarous. "Science has no need for fine language", he said. He early set himself to the task of reediting with care the old nominalist texts of Ockham, Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini. He commented on the *Physics* of Aristotle, on Buridan, the *Summule logicales*, and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard; his work was a veritable encyclopedia of the learning of his time, and he could have kept the Paris presses busy all by himself. He had been a student of the Spaniard Jerome Pardo,[10] whose course of logic, the *Medulla dialectices* (1500, reedited by Major in 1505) showed the strong influence of Heytesbury that was to pervade his own work.

Major's student, John Dullaert,[11] shared his contempt for humanist trends. He told his student, Vives, that "the better grammarian a man

was, the worse theologian and dialectician he would be". Dullaert, perhaps the outstanding natural philosopher of his day, lectured and published on the *Physics* and *De caelo*. His ablest colleagues were the Spaniards Luis Coronel, Juan de Celaya of Ste Barbe, and Domingo de Soto. De Soto, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* in 1555, "specifically applied the Mertonian rule for determining distance in a uniformly accelerated motion (uniformly difform motion) to the motion of freely falling bodies . . . which preceded the use of the medieval formula by Galileo by more than half a century"[12].

The scholars at Montaigu appear to have divided their time and labor almost equally between their two fourteenth century disciplines, English and French studies of motion, and terminist dialectic and philosophy. In the tradition of Buridan and Heytesbury the two disciplines remained closely related. But for all their activity, the men at Montaigu produced little of lasting value in natural philosophy, with the possible exception of Dullaert and the Spanish scholars, and most historians of science today agree that Duhem's claim that the Paris masters were the precursors of Galileo and Descartes was an exaggerated one.[13]

Even in dialectic they contributed little or nothing original, despite their numerous and lengthy commentaries and refinements. Most of the great work in logic had been completed by the end of the fourteenth century, and by the sixteenth the Paris masters were simply editing or commenting on the medieval texts as the Italians had done with the classics. Vives does refer to the work of several of his contemporary compatriots, without naming them, and only to make light of them and show that he is aware of the latest theories. His remarks on *incipit* and *desinit* probably reflect the lengthy commentary of his teacher Gaspar Lax, and his sarcastic words on the powers of *a* and *b* were based on work by Antonio Coronel, Domingo de Soto and Fernando Enzinas.[14]

To Vives these abstract speculations were the essence of futility. They were invented, he says (quite inaccurately), to fill the gap left by Arabic Aristotelian arguments, with which the scholastic world was bored. To find new material for disputation

> . . . the schoolmen hit upon *cavillationes* of the most stupid subtlety and called them *calculations*. The Englishman Roger [*sic*] Suiceth gave the greatest impulse to these, which is why John Pico [de Mirandola] used to call them appropriately *quisquiliae suiceticae*. They contribute absolutely nothing either to usefulness or learning. As for usefulness, not even their professors claim it. And what *scientia* can there be in subjects so remote and divorced from all intelligence and common sense? From these, founded

on some void, there arises a vast edifice of assertions and contradictory opinions about intension and remission, about the rare and the dense, about uniform motion, difform motion, uniformly difform, difformly difform. Cannot countless questions be raised about things which never happen and could not happen in Nature?[15]

He complains about the quibbles and perplexities of Jacopo da Forli in medicine, "no less thorny or useless, no less prolix or boring, than those of Swyneshead, whom John Dullaert used to quote to us so frequently in physics lectures"[16]. Despite his complaints, Vives demonstrated in his treatise on metaphysics that he had absorbed Dullaert's teaching, and the theories of Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. In his discussion of violent as opposed to natural motion, he agrees that when an arrow is shot upwards, at the moment when the violent motion is spent the arrow is at rest for an imperceptible instant before the natural motion takes over and it falls back down.[17] His compatriot Luis Coronel – a more speculative philosopher – asserted that "one can imagine a case where a stone thrown into the air could stay there at rest for an hour, two hours, or three hours; sometimes it may be thrown so far that we cannot see it; of course it may be that the stone rests immobile for an imperceptible moment of time"[18]. Vives was famous for his common sense; to him Coronel's was a case that "could never happen in Nature".

The purely logical exercises he found no less stifling and exasperating, with their lack of content, empty formalism, combing over of sophsimata. Of his three years at the university the first two were devoted exclusively to dialectic, which spilled over, he tells us, even into the third year which was intended for moral and natural philosophy and metaphysics. Humanistic studies were not encouraged, and we have no reason to believe that Vives had any real contact with more liberal colleges such as Lemoine, where Lefèvre d'Etaples and his 'Fabrists' were exploring humanistic subjects and ignoring, according to Renaudet, the new life breathed into scholastic subjects under Pardo, Major, and their followers.[19] The perennial complaint of the Fabrists was that 'Les Goths ont ruiné les lettres latines'[20].

At Montaigu Gaspar Lax was lecturing on Peter of Spain and publishing his courses. In a spurt of activity in 1511–12 he published no fewer than nine logical treatises. Here we find much of the material Vives uses against the scholastics. In keeping with the mathematico-physical tendencies at Montaigu (Lax was to publish an *Arithmetica speculativa* in 1516) he devoted much attention to Heytesburian questions relating to time and space and extension as, for example, *de maximo et minimo*, and

the word *immediate*, which Peter of Spain had touched on only casually in a discussion of *incipit* and *desinit* in his treatise on syncategoremata.

To give the reader some flavor of the logic Vives was hearing at the College of Montaigu, a passage or two from Gaspar Lax's *Exponibilia* will be found in Appendix II: four columns, out of the eighteen devoted to 'Immediate'. Lax was a copious writer, though one could hardly call him fluent. His works defy translation, at least by this writer, in any way that makes sense. But these passages may be of interest to historians of logic as an example of the state of the discipline in the early sixteenth century, and possibly as a challenge to puzzle solvers. For students of the Renaissance they provide a sample of the Latin the humanists decried.

While Lax's students were hearing that *immediate* could be taken nominally, adverbially, non-exponibly, categorematically, syncategorematically, prepositionally or conjunctionally, the humanist printer Ascensius Badius was pouring out editions of the classics and the Italian humanists, and the *Praise of Folly* was circulating through a delighted Europe.

The revival of nominalism at Montaigu was a bright sunset. Vives knew it at its peak, from 1509 to 1512. John Major's regency at the College began about the time of Standonck's departure in 1499; before his twenty years at Montaigu were over he was to see the discipline he had fostered fade and decline. It is true that logicians continued to discuss new refinements of the theory of supposition for at least another century, especially in Spain. But as an intellectual movement it had spent itself. Moreover, too many forces were operating against it. Its arid, abstract theology had sent many of the best minds to find human and religious solace in German mysticism and Ficinian Platonism with Lefèvre d'Etaples,[21] or the Devotio Moderna and the study of the Scriptures with Erasmus; the mood of the approaching Reformation encouraged this tendency. Students were abandoning the dry and sterile study of dialectic for literature or more worldly practical disciplines, particularly the law, leaving the field to the theologians. Major complains that they no longer want to apply themselves to the perusal of the *Sentences*. By 1515 four of his best students, including Dullaert, were dead. Lax and the Coronel brothers returned to Spain. In 1519 John Major himself returned home; though he remained at St Andrew's only a short time and came back to Paris, the great days were gone, and in 1530 he retired permanently to Scotland.

By 1523 Ulrich Zasius could write about his own University of

Freiburg, "some are reading St. Matthew, others St. Paul. The books of the *Sentences* lie unread, if not indeed rejected. . . . They have demoted Aristotle. . . . Peter of Spain has departed, and the whole of logic has taken itself off. . . .[22]

A different aspect of the contest between humanists and nominalists in the north, apart from the cultural one, was philosophical and religious. In the Padua of the Quattrocento, under Paul of Venice, Gaetano di Thiene and Vernias, the cast of scholastic thought was Averroistic, and while Petrarch, Barbaro, and their followers attacked Averroes, and many humanists exercised their wit upon the 'sofismi dei barbari britanni', there was often, as we have seen, an easy intercourse between university or academy and chancellery.

In the north the theologians, and especially the Dominicans, followed Aquinas in his resolute opposition to Averroes, an opposition marked by animosity and intransigence. Scholastic dialectic became a symbol of religious reaction against the movements towards either reform or counter-reform. Outside Paris, as well, the Dominicans of Louvain and especially of Cologne, where editions of Peter of Spain kept rolling from the presses of the Bursa Montis, represented the most narrow and reactionary theology. Resistant to culture, scholastic in thought and method, speaking barbarous Latin, they are immortalised, as the humanists saw them, in the *Letters of Obscure Men*.[23]

In February, 1519,[24] when Vives wrote his treatise against the pseudodialecticians, the battle against the scholastics was effectively won. He himself had heard, before he left Paris, his teachers Dullaert and Lax express their doubts, and regret the years of their lives they had devoted so exclusively to dialectic. That the victory was not yet apparent is shown by the enthusiasm with which More and Erasmus greeted the work as a strong blow against their opponents. More wrote Erasmus that in particular what Vives wrote against the pseudodialecticians filled him with a kind of personal pleasure, because he not only expressed ideas More had long held, but almost in his very words.[25]

V

When Vives left Paris in 1512 he settled in Bruges where, except for periods in Louvain and England, he was to spend the rest of his life. Here, at home among the Spanish colony of cultured merchants and

professional men, and befriended by such Flemish humanists as Barland and Craneveldt,[1] his spirit expanded and he became, in Vocht's words, "an eager neophyte in humanistic studies". He immersed himself in the 'reading of authors', and before long his knowledge of scholastic dialectic and philosophy was matched by his learning in history, literature, and the moral and natural sciences. As a teacher he was praised for "stirring up our somnolent Latin studies"[2]. He also began to publish brief works drawn, in subject and style, from a deep knowledge of the classics and the Italian humanists.[3]

In 1515 Erasmus went to Louvain to help launch Busleiden's College des Trois Langues;[4] the following year Vives also was there, attending Erasmus's lectures, and himself lecturing in the University or in his rooms, on Pliny, the Georgics, on Cicero (de *De legibus* to law students, and the *De senectute*), on Mela and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.[5] The association with Erasmus he wove into the texture of his life. Erasmus was then nearly fifty years old; Vives was twenty-three. In the older man Vives found not only the revered humanist and scholar, both of the classics and the Scriptures, but the articulation and confirmation of his own fervent and undogmatic piety; the 'philosophia Christi' became his own. His pedagogical and moral writings, notably those in behalf of peace, would bear the imprint of Erasmus's personality and thought. But in 1520 Erasmus was both amused and impressed by the younger man's passionate conversion to humanism. "Our Vives will restore splendor to his Spain", he wrote in a prefatory letter to Vives's *Declamationes Syllanae*.

> While he was busying himself with those subtle but infantine arts, no one was a keener disputant, no one better acted the sophister. Now he is wholly absorbed in more civilised studies, and absorbed to such effect that I know scarcely anyone in our century with whom I would venture to compare him. . . . And he is still young.[6]

Apart from Erasmus, probably the single most important influence on Vives in those years was Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*. Inspired by Valla's rather speculative and intellectual *Dialecticæ disputationes*, Agriçola's urbane and eloquent text-book answered to the need of the times for a humanistically oriented education, and within two decades, Agricolan dialectic had replaced the *Summule logicales* in the schools and universities. Its traces are to be seen in Vives's attack on the Paris logicians, and it helped shape his concept of dialectic in the *De disciplinis*.

In the same year as his *Declamationes* Vives published, in a different genre, the *Adversus pseudodialecticos*.[7] His purpose in writing it was threefold. The ostensible one was to discredit the nominalist theologians, and in fact to deal a mortal blow to a system he saw was tottering. The second was to appeal to the Spanish scholars in Paris to join the new century. Vives's touchy national pride was embarrassed by the reputation of the Spaniards among the humanists as the most reactionary group in Paris, and by the criticism of his friends in Louvain, including Erasmus, Barland, Latomus and Dorp. So he cast his treatise in the form of a letter to his Aragonese friend Juan Fortis[8] who was still teaching at Paris; and its target, fittingly enough, was also a fellow-countryman, Peter of Spain.

His third, implicit purpose was to announce what he seems to have decided upon as the main course of his career, to develop a new humanistic pedagogical program based upon a sound use of classical Latin and a utilitarian dialectic.

The piece against the pseudodialecticians is strongly polemical and rhetorical, designed to persuade the Spanish scholars to turn away from scholastic dialectic and take up the study of humane letters, so that they might distinguish themselves in erudition "which, if it becomes any nation, surely becomes ours". Vives was highly serious but he uses satire deftly. To ridicule the scholastics was mock-serious entertainment for the northern humanists, as witness the *Praise of Folly* and the *Letters of Obscure Men*. Gaguin, Lefèvre d'Etaples, Clichtove and Bovillus had been chastising the sophisters for decades, as the Italians had before them. When Thomas More says Vives used almost his very words, he had in mind the letter he had written to Martin Dorp of Louvain in 1515, defending Erasmus and the *Praise of Folly*. To the contemporary reader all the material in this satire was familiar. He could catch every nuance of exaggeration and burlesque, for he too had been brought up on the *Summule logicales* of Peter of Spain and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.

Vives uses all the familiar humanist themes and arguments and epithets from Petrarch and the Italian chancellors to Gaguin and Lefèvre, Erasmus and More. Garrulity. Lack of 'gravitas'. Time wasted on logic. Old men playing dialectical games they should have left behind them in the schools. The arrogance of dialecticians who claim all fields of knowledge as their own. Corruption of language, first by the 'barbari britanni', into a jargon for initiates; by Pico de la Mirandola's time the

British barbarism had become the 'style of Paris'. The abstract, sterile speculations, unrelated to any use in daily life. And many more.

He also refers to controversies current at the time, such as the Trinitarian arguments going back to Roscellinus[9] and revived by the Reformation. He refers to Standonck's *Articles on the Reformation of the Clergy* in his garbled sophisma about parish priests. He mentions current theories of supposition in his ridicule of the powers of *a* and *b*.[10] And in a memorable passage he examines the doctrine of the *Sentences* on baptism in the light of Heytesbury's Chapter V of the *Regule, De maximo et minimo*.[11] Of the sophismata he employs, some are well-known, passed down from William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, Paul of Venice, and others, and some of these he gives in straight form. Others he garbles, and still others, the most tortuous, he seems to have made up.

Behind the satire, of course, is an urgent call for reform of education, the serious purpose he promises to pursue at another time, and does in the *De disciplinis* and particularly in the *De artibus*. He proposes to reestablish the Latin language on a firm base of the *usus communis loquendi*, the clear, correct usage of the great classical authors. He would restore dialectic to its rightful function as, in Valla's phrase, *res brevis prorsus et facilis*,[12] and to its place as one of the three inseparable and interdependent arts of speech, and propaedeutic, as it were, to the other arts. He quotes Peter of Spain, speaking "less ignorantly than was his wont"[13], to the effect that dialectic should be as a handmaid to the other arts. He wants to detach dialectic from the metaphysical speculations of the pseudodialecticians and make it a tool for learning the arts that serve a moral and civic purpose; and he emphasises its pedagogical function. He ends on a note of typical humanist optimism that these reforms are already under way.

These points manifestly echo the arguments of Valla and Agricola. It can be argued that by 1520 Valla's antimetaphysical approach to dialectic, his insistence on the historical and philological foundation of language based on *consuetudo*, and the interrelation of the three arts of speech had become common-place among the humanists, especially since the diffusion of Agricola's more readable book.

But Cassirer notes the century's humanistic progress from philology to a broader pedagogy, the turn away from *verba* to *res*.

If we look at the development of humanism a century after Valla, in Ludovicus Vives, this change is clearly apparent. Polyhistorical learning is by now established on a firm

philosophical basis, inspired and bound together by a tendency to thoroughgoing reform in educational method. In Vives's piece against the pseudodialecticians it is not only from a grammatical, but also from a pedagogical position that he passes judgment on the scholastic ideal of learning.[14]

VI

In the twelve years between the *Adversus pseudodialecticos* and the *De disciplinis*, Vives composed, at the urging of Erasmus, Commentaries on Augustine's *City of God*,[1] which accompanied most of the thirty editions of that work to 1701. He spent the better part of five years in England, "an amphibious animal", as Erasmus put it, "at one time swimming amongst the Britons, at another making a nest among the people of Bruges"[2]. (In 1524, during his stay in Bruges, Vives had married Margaret Valdaura, of an old Valencian family related to his own.) In England he enjoyed the company of the great English humanists, Thomas More and Thomas Linacre, the translator of Galen (lawyers and doctors being always among his friends), John Fisher, Mountjoy, Elyot, and others. In this circle he was exposed to reforming currents in education influenced by Erasmus and Colet, and by Vittorino and Guarino, and began to address himself to problems of a social and political nature. It was during this period that he wrote his original and important work on the relief of the poor, which he dedicated to the city of Bruges.[3] He taught for a year at Oxford, at Corpus Christi, which kept a pleasant memory of the 'mellifluous doctor', associated with the bees that swarmed above his door. 'The learned Spaniard Mr. Vīvēs', as the English call him, left his mark upon Oxford. He is credited with changes and improvements in the curriculum; his report to Cardinal Wolsey, in March of 1525, urged that the "useless abstractions of degenerate scholasticism" be abandoned in favor of "more fruitful studies and pursuits"[4].

The divorce of Henry VIII from his Spanish queen ended Vives's association with the English court, and he went home to Bruges to devote the last twelve years of his life to writing. The *De disciplinis* was published in Antwerp in 1531, followed in Basel in 1538 by the *De anima et vita* which had, however, been written earlier.

Ethics, pedagogy and psychology were the three closely related, inseparable concerns of Vives's life. Learning, teaching and using his knowledge to serve the common welfare were, for this devout Catholic,

his vocation and his way of serving God; an understanding of the human mind and emotions was indispensable. Because of the Fall, the mind was hampered, fettered, clouded by emotions and passions; these were responsible not only for our personal vices, but for the corruptions of the arts that ensued from them. A knowledge of how the soul worked (the empirical Vives did not attempt to define the soul) could help the Christian to strive for perfection and the teacher to design an educational program suited to the capacities, talents, and weaknesses of his pupils. Vives's study and analysis of emotions, based in part upon the Galenic humors, takes up almost half of the *De anima*; it was of enormous importance in his pedagogy, based as that was on his humanistic respect for individual talents and dispositions; his theory of the 'choice of wits' was an influence on Ascham and Mulcaster and many other teachers.[5]

This is not the place to discuss Vives's encyclopedic educational program at any length.[6] In some respects it had been adumbrated by Lefèvre and Bovillus twenty-five years before,[7] but while their impulse had been towards a heightened mysticism, Vives's practical conviction was that "the fruit of all studies is the common good". His was a program designed to reorganise the curriculum and method of teaching in order best to transmit both culture and a solid moral and civic training. Both parts of the *De disciplinis* fall roughly into three corresponding sections.[8] Vives begins with *verba*, since language is fundamental, and discusses grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. He moves on to *res*, or natural philosophy – nature study, physics, medicine, and law, the disciplines dealing with human life and affairs. Finally to *mores* – moral philosophy, history, jurisprudence, theology. These categories are not, of course, exclusive; law and jurisprudence fall both in *rebus* and in *moribus*, and serious logical disputation comes with the study of metaphysics.

Characteristically as a humanist, Vives gives exhaustive critical bibliographies for each discipline, ranging from the ancient writers to his contemporaries, Erasmus, Melanchthon, and More. Uncharacteristically – I think uniquely – he recommends observation, *experientia*, constantly checking books against life and nature. Hence we have the recommendation to consult farmers and artisans, to botanise, study weather, question huntsmen and shepherds. And as a postgraduate program, as it were, to study "all the arts and inventions of men", husbandry, architecture, travel and conveyances, navigation and even domestic

economy, without books, but from observation, out of a humanist's abundant curiosity and interest in all aspects of life.[9]

Vives fell very much within the skeptical camp as far as demonstration and the possibility of certain knowledge is concerned. Here the influence of Cicero is evident, as it is in Valla and Agricola.[10] His skepticism did not, of course, extend to religion; like Valla, he was a committed Christian, withholding assent from human, not divine knowledge. He was able for the most part to put religious truth and human knowledge into two separate boxes. For all his piety he was undogmatic and Erasmian, but fundamental doctrines like the Fall of Man were unquestioned, and in fact formed the basis for his doubts about certainty in human knowledge.

Where he had trouble was in an area that seemed to fall between divine and human knowledge, and here he was wary. In natural philosophy or physical science, where it seemed to merge with 'the first philosophy' or metaphysics, he drew back from excessive speculation. "The first precept in the contemplation and discussion of nature, is that since we cannot gain any certain knowledge from it, we must not indulge ourselves too much in examining and inquiring into those things that we can never grasp . . . the contemplation of nature is unnecessary and even harmful unless it serves the useful arts of life" or conduces to worship.[11] "Everything that merely serves to stir curiosity must be firmly cast aside", as should be everything meant for empty show, like the *suicetica*. "A philosopher is not one who talks subtly about instants and about regular and irregular motion, but one who knows the origin and nature of plants and animals, and the reasons why, as well as the way in which natural events happen"[12]. The empirical Vives cites Dioscorides as the example of such a natural philosopher.

Vives was an eminently rational man with a strong skeptical tendency; he was known among his contemporaries and later readers for his sound judgment, his common sense. He believed in the open-endedness of learning. "Nature is not so effete and exhausted", he wrote (in a passage appropriated and made famous by Ben Jonson), "that she is unable to bring forth new wonders. . . . Much of truth has been left for future generations to discover"[13]; and he cited the exploits of 'our countrymen' in that new world they had recently discovered. He advocated observation, *experientia*, the empirical method as a balance to the reading of authors, and his own criticism of those authors shows an acute and discriminating intellect.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in his cautions against purely speculative philosophy he was revealing a distrust and even fear of the conclusions to which his skeptical mind might lead him. In one place he remarks that persons who are weak in religious convictions should not be introduced to natural philosophy, except under certain well-defined conditions.

He had a problem not shared by many of the Christian humanists who were his contemporaries and friends. Erasmus cared not a whit about physical science. Budé was a philologist, More a lawyer; Lefèvre, who did write commentaries on the *Physics*, was safely wrapped in clouds of mysticism. Vives, with his matter-of-fact, probing mind, trained by men absorbed in these questions, was vulnerable to doubt, which may be why he attacked the natural philosophers so vigorously.

VII

In the last, decisive contest between the scholastics and the humanists, Parisian logic confronted the sister of her old adversary, and this time it was Dame Rhetoric who carried the day. Scholastic logic, as Agricola and Erasmus and Vives had known it in Paris, was dry and abstract, metaphysical and even mathematical, dealing with the demonstration of certain truths and with problems in kinematics. It was a discipline for theologians and natural philosophers, like the masters of Montaigu, but useless for men who would be called upon to play an active role in a turbulent, rapidly changing society.

The humanists' achievement was to redefine dialectic, associate it with rhetoric, and assign to it a utilitarian role. They effectively eliminated Aristotle's distinction between logic, the science of demonstration, and dialectic, the art of persuading of the probable; there were few, if any, demonstrable truths, and all dialectic was directed to the same goal, persuasion. Quintilian had been the inspiration for Valla and Agricola and the real source of the humanists' strength in the defiance of scholasticism. His Orator, high-principled, eloquent, trained to use discourse "to teach, to move and to delight"[1], was at once a classical model and a contemporary ideal.

In pursuit of this ideal, humanist dialectic shifted its focus from reliance on syllogistic logic to 'invention', the investigation and arrangement of a store of Topics for discourse. The ancient texts were

the *Topics* of Aristotle and Cicero and Boethius;[2] the modern handbook was the *De inventione dialectica* of Rudolph Agricola (1444–1485) that appeared in 1515, thirty years after its author's death, edited by Martin van Dorp of Louvain; promptly and widely circulated, and admired by Erasmus, it became the standard expression of contemporary humanist thought on dialectic.

Agricola was born in the Low Countries and trained in the law in Germany; his travels brought him for at least a short time to Paris.[3] Around 1469 he went to Italy, where he spent ten years, first at Pavia where Valla had studied in the 1430s, and then at the court and new University of Ferrara; here he studied with Battista Guarino, then carrying on the teachings of his illustrious father. Spiritually Agricola was a son of the Italian renaissance, an accomplished orator, artist and musician, conversant with the classical writers, fluent in Greek and Latin. In 1479 he returned to Germany as an apostle of humanism, and continued to miss Italy for the rest of his short life. He left few written works, notably his *Oration in Praise of Sound Philosophy and Liberal Learning*, presented at the Court of Ferrara, and the *De inventione dialectica*, which was to transform the teaching of dialectic.

Agricola's dialectic was in the philological tradition of Cicero, Quintilian, and Valla, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Dialectic for him was not only the *ars disserendi*; it was primarily the *ars docendi*; it consisted of logical demonstration of a probable proposition *to a listener*, and therefore relied upon at least some rhetorical devices depending upon the listener and the circumstances.

Agricola succeeded in rhetoricising dialectic; though he claimed the whole realm of invention for his dialectic, balanced by 'disposition' (or judgment), and assigned only *elocutio* or oratorical delivery to rhetoric, it will be seen that in fact he blurred the boundaries and ended up with a rhetorical dialectic, substituting 'places' for predication. He rejected as insufficient Cicero's definition of dialectic in the *Brutus* as the science of judging what is true, false or neutral. To him dialectic was the art of 'speaking with credibility on any subject' in order to 'teach something to a listener'[4]. He quoted with approval the formula to teach, to move, to delight. He set forth the pragmatic, humanist aim for the use of such persuasive dialectic for those who teach – law, medicine, oratory; for those who help rule the state by counsel; for those who, arguing on war, or peace, or civic matters, either before the Senate or the people, must make a convincing case. His three books *De inventione dialectica* are

devoted mainly to a list and discussion of topics to be called upon in discourse, but part of the third book deals with techniques of persuasion, arrangement of arguments, and even a discussion of the emotions and how to move them, which seems more appropriate to a handbook on rhetoric than to a treatise on dialectic.

Agricola's book, in effect, put into readable text-book form the arguments of Valla's more speculative and polemical *Dialecticae disputationes*. Valla was strongly influenced by the skeptical works of Cicero – the *Academica, De natura deorum*, and the pedagogic oratorical works – as well as by Quintilian. It can be argued that in transmitting these, and the Boethian treatises on the Topics, Agricola was not simply demolishing scholastic logic, but offering an alternative dialectic based upon 'a renaissance of classic skepticism . . . and the recovery of the topics theory which had so intrigued Boethius'[5]. The *De inventione dialectica* appeared at the right moment, as if in answer to a cultural and pedagogic need; within a generation it had replaced the *Summule logicales*, to hold sway in the schools until it, in turn, was dispossessed by Ramism.

In his own preoccupation with topics and invention, Vives was in the vanguard of the humanist movement, in close agreement with Agricola on the aims, material and techniques of dialectic; it is also likely that Agricola's passages on the role of the emotions in persuasion, following Quintilian, were of especial interest to Vives the psychologist. He based his dialectic, like his psychology and his pedagogy, on a secure foundation of empirical analysis. It should serve as a guide for the organisation of experience, and the elaboration of a knowledge easily adaptable and transmissible. Its purpose was the humanistic aim of teaching, for use in law, medicine, and oratory; these had no use for metaphysical concepts but only for arguments applicable to cases.

Vives starts from the premise that there is no certain proof of anything. There is no certain truth in metaphysics, only approximate truth. In natural philosophy it is the same: "We cannot gain any certain knowledge". In his treatise *De instrumento probabilitatis*[6] he discusses the three paths we have to knowledge: the senses, faith in authority, and reason based on experience. The senses are our only source of knowledge of the world. But they are fallible; they suffice for proof only to the ignorant masses: 'I saw it with my own eyes', 'I heard it with my own ears'. For our senses are affected by accidents, by circumstances, by the state of the body, fatigue, fever, torpor, etc.; he cites the custom of

witnesses in ancient Rome who, even when stating the most manifest facts, always added, '*ut credo* (so I believe)'. Faith in authority is also fallible, because our authority may be wrong or mistaken, as Aristotle often was. (Religious belief is of course, outside the realm of demonstrable knowledge, and is in any case unquestioned.)

Reason, our third path to knowledge, depends upon the senses, and must organise the facts gained from them on the basis of experience. The only perfect instrument reason has developed is the syllogism, which is convincing, demonstrable truth. But it applies only to a certain small class of evident, incontrovertible arguments. All modal propositions are open to doubt or question, and depend for persuasion on arguments from probability, and our method of investigating these is the invention and disposition of topics.

Vives's most mature and positive writing on dialectic is to be found in the *Libri de artibus*[7] which demonstrate, incidentally, that he did write treatises on logic that were not purely critical, not to say censorious. These books, originally published as Part III of the *De disciplinis*, are an organic part of that work. It is here that Vives discusses in detail the subjects he considers critical, but which he merely blocks in to his pedagogical system in the *De tradendis disciplinis*. And it is here that he develops, with more mature understanding, the program already set forth by Agricola.

The *De artibus* include five books on logic; a book on disputation, in which he discusses argumentation and its techniques and terms, and ends with another attack 'still fresh for the combat' on the sophisters. Next come two books on standards of demonstration, that is to say on the *Topics* and the invention of arguments: *De instrumento probabilitatis*, and *De explanatione cujusque essentiae*. Then two books on judgment, *De censura veri*, the first on the proposition, the second on argumentation and the syllogism. Finally, the last three books are the *De prima philosophia*, on Aristotle's physics and metaphysics from a Christian viewpoint. No one has recently done more than dip into these for arguments and examples,[8] but they should be seriously studied to assess the importance of Vives in the humanist dialectical movement. Along with the rest of the *De disciplinis*, they were almost certainly studied by Ramus.

Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) completed the movement in dialectic begun by Valla; Vives's name now takes its place on a new register in the history of ideas: Valla, Agricola, Vives, and Ramus. Ramus is beyond the scope

of this essay;[9] it is enough to say that he acquired his first fame by his attacks on Aristotle; and that his Dialectic, built around the concept of 'method', while not very different from the topical dialectic of Agricola and Vives, reflected and contributed to a movement in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that culminated in Descartes. Ramus's dialectical text-book quickly took over and dominated Western education as completely and for about as long as had the *Summule logicales* in their time.

Ramus's antagonists and subsequent critics, and they were numerous, scored him for failing to acknowledge the sources of his ideas. His bitterest opponent, Carpentarius, was only one among many who charged that Ramus "puts forth as his own simply what he learned from his masters, Valla, Agricola, Agrippa, and Vives"[10]. Most of these indignant critics are now lost in the shadows of time, but one must mention the great Gassendi, a faithful reader and admirer of Vives. In his *De logicae origine*[11] he notes that Laurentius Valla, two hundred years before, and Ludovicus Vives less than a century later, had demonstrated that one could disagree with Aristotle. Guided by these two, he says, Ramus first wrote his *Animadversiones* against Aristotle's *Organon* and then put together his *Dialectic*, which brought him a great troop of followers. A great many people have written special *Dialectics*, says Gassendi, but "none has turned out to be more successful than Ramus's (Nulla evasit Ramea celebrior)".

VIII

The treatise on the *Causes of the Corruption of the Arts*[1] is arranged in seven books. The first and longest, which begins with a lofty proemium in high humanist style, describes the origin, rise and corruption of all the arts, and amounts to a history of culture as well as an account of the decline of learning, as Vives saw it, in his day. The next three and next longest books are devoted to the arts of speech, grammar, dialectic and rhetoric; the fifth and sixth to the natural and moral sciences respectively, and the seventh to the law, an order and balance that clearly show the importance Vives placed on the 'artes de sermone'.

Of these, Book III, *De dialectica*, in the canonical seven chapters, is the longest one devoted to an individual art. Vives says at the outset that he must discuss this subject at length and with care because, since it has

been handled, not to say trampled, by so many, it has become the most cheapened and corrupted, whereas it should be the most unspoiled and sound, since it is the access to and instrument of the other arts. Instead, the corruption of the dialectical art has contaminated the other disciplines, such as philosophy, medicine and theology. It is hard to say whether ancient or modern writers have contributed more to its debasement.

The first four chapters, then, are devoted to the ancient writers. Vives quotes, and like Agricola rejects, Cicero's definition in the *Brutus* of the function of dialectic:

> . . . that art which should teach us to divide a whole into parts, to reveal by the use of definition what is hidden, to explain by interpreting it what is obscure; first to recognise, and then to distinguish, what is ambiguous, and finally to form a rule by which to judge what is true and false, and what exists on what assumptions, and what is not consequential.[2]

Here, he says, Cicero left out the most important part of dialectic, which is the instrument of *invention*; following the Stoics, he confined dialectic within the bounds of *judgment*, and made it the science of true, false, and neutral.[3]

But judgment, Vives continues – to define, divide, explain what is obscure – belongs to all the arts. Who has a rule for judging about geometrical angles except a geometer? About music, unless he is a musician? Dialectic has no instrument or, as Cicero calls it, *regula*, of its own. Cicero was not unaware of this, but since he was a free spirit (*solutus et liber*) he was never consistent; in the *Academica* he says that dialectic judges only what is consequent, what contradictory.[4] So defining, dividing, etc., belong not to dialectic but to the experts in each art; and dialectic, as Boethius said, is not a part of philosophy, but a tool or implement of the other arts.

In chapters ii and iii Vives reviews the *Organon*. It must be remembered that his reputation among his contemporaries and later readers rested in large part upon his role as critic of Aristotle. By Vives's day it was not an unusual accomplishment to read Aristotle in Greek. Agricola had read him under Theodore Gaza back in the 1470s. The Aldine edition of 1495–98 had made the Greek Aristotle available to scholars, and any humanist worthy of the name read Greek. Lefèvre translated most of the Aristotelian canon, but Lefèvre's translations were tinged with his own Platonism. It is doubtful if any of the humanists read

all of Aristotle, including the physical treatises, and brought to them as wide-ranging erudition and clear-eyed objectivity as Vives did.

Towards the end of his life Vives wrote a short critical survey of Aristotle's works, *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (1538),[5] which was attached to many subsequent Latin editions of the Stagirite, listing the treatises, his opinions on their attribution, and brief critical remarks on each one. But in the *De disciplinis* he argues with Aristotle almost as with a contemporary. His most severe strictures appear, appropriately, in the *De causis*, which is one long, almost unrelieved complaint. In the *De tradendis* and *De artibus* he discusses Aristotle's opinions objectively and compares them with other writers'. And he has little use for men too timid to go beyond Aristotle. To be sure, Aristotle was the greatest genius who ever lived.

Whatever he undertook to transmit, whether concerning ethics or natural science or speech and discourse, he reduced to the form of an art. . . . He was, at least in my opinion, easily the most outstanding of all writers of any age, in keenness of intellect, judgment, adroitness, discretion, diligence and zeal, trained over a long period by the leading teacher of all Greece.[6]

But Vives the psychologist knew more than most men about human fallibility. The faults he charged Aristotle with were personal human failings, vainglory and ambition.

Our Aristotle, who, in the diligence of his discoveries and in acumen far surpassed all former men (I wish he had been a little more moderate in seeking glory, which surely would have come to him in the fullest degree), could have left us many things acutely and wisely thought out by ancient writers devoted to learning. But he, in his own tireless zeal, took whatever was written by all the writers before him, unrolled it all, read it, cast it aside; so he passed over no one whom he did not diminish, thinking he would derive for himself as much honor as he took away from others, and be so much more exalted above the rest.[7]

Moreover, he affected a needlessly obscure style.

In the first place, when he had plucked apart all the writers who preceded him, this man of artful and subtle genius, fearing retaliation in kind, used ambiguous expressions that could be turned to either side, so that no one could tear his work to pices. Thus he always kept safe for himself an exit by which he could slip away if he were caught, and not be prevented . . . from denying that that was ever his meaning.[8]

But these were petty failings when we consider the vast heritage he left us. Vives's considered judgment of Aristotle is best summed up in his image of the miner.

When I see how many things Aristotle brought forth into the light, some, to be sure, imperfectly refined and clarified, I admire him no differently than I would any hard-working miner of gold and silver who, by the great power of his sinews has dug huge masses from the veins of the earth. Moreover I grant that no one man could melt down and purify all the things, so many, so various, so difficult, which he had mined . . .

All this I say so that no one may think that I either disparage the genius and teaching of Aristotle because of some few errors, since to err is the very mark of our mortal nature; or that I should beget ingratitude for such an abundance of discoveries, for such usefulness and benefit to all the arts and disciplines, because of anything not accurately enough thought out, as I think, by him – or perhaps by ourselves.[9]

It is in this spirit that Vives approaches the *Organon* in the *De causis*. His first complaint has an Agricolan ring: Aristotle's work, in his usual manner, is obscure and prolix, and of little use in finding arguments or judging argumentation. No amount of toil over Aristotle's logic can provide an instrument by which to find arguments for discourse on any subject.[10]

The *Categories* he finds too obscure and metaphysical for young students, and yet that is the first book that confronts beginners. The *De interpretatione* he assigns rather to grammar than to dialectic. He thinks Aristotle included it chiefly because of his interest in modalities, in which he took especial pleasure. But Vives wonders why he has only four modals. Buridan, he says, added *true* and *false*; other scholastics made modals of *credible, probable, conjectural, certain, uncertain*, etc.[11]

The *Prior Analytics* is useful, the product of a high and excellent talent, but its usefulness, writes Vives, is buried under many superfluities such as, for example, the modals which have no more to do with the subject than other adverbs; for negation, affirmation, universality and particularity can be determined as well by these; *impossible* is no different from *never, necessary* from *always, possible* from *sometimes*. But Aristotle discusses everything with such subtlety that it is more laborious to understand his *Organon* than to use it. And so he has made a very beautiful instrument almost unmanageable for its users by burdening it with superfluities, and breaking it down into so many minutiae.

The *Posterior Analytics* follows, a work both learned and full of good things. But of what use are they? What has dialectic to do with

discussions of opinion, error, and ignorance? These are not topics of the dialectic art, but discussions about the soul, that is, of psychology.

Demonstration does not appear to belong to dialectic, since dialectic explores only probable and contradictable statements, according to Aristotle himself. But demonstration is concerned with the certain and indubitable, so that it too seems to belong rather to metaphysics than to dialectic. Aristotle wants demonstration to be from first principles and necessity, from proximates, from causes, which is fair enough. But how are we to know these? Universals, Vives objects, are known to us only through an inference from the particulars, which are almost infinite; and if one particular remains unknown, the universal cannot be established. First causes, he insists, are equally beyond our reach; because we cannot know the intimate secrets of nature, this whole tradition of demonstration is futile and useless.

Vives goes on to point out that what knowledge we do have is relative.

> If you wish to teach men, you will not have one continuous demonstration. Some things are immediate and primary to some men; other men are persuaded only by verisimilitude. Some, like the Academics, do not trust what is quite evident and attested by the senses; others, such as the Epicureans, trust only in the senses; for still others, the authority of the speaker suffices. Thus demonstration is like the Lesbian level that fits itself to the building, and not the building to itself.[12]

Finally Vives takes up the *Topics*, around which humanist dialectic developed. The examination of the probable is identified with the invention of arguments, and only through the systematic arrangement of an exhaustive set of topics is it possible to organise completely some form of discourse. Aristotle's *Topics*, Vives says, are a thesaurus of arguments rather than arguments themselves; they are not apothecary jars, but lists of jars that contain remedies. Aristotle's work is long and varied; many things in it are excellent; but he discusses them like someone who collects scattered facts, not one who hands on precepts of an art conducible to some end, as Rudolph Agricola has already rightly complained. For no one, however diligently and carefully he reads Aristotle's work, can feel that he has discovered how to find one argument. Vives criticises Aristotle's inquiries into genus, difference, property, accident and definition, on which his classification is founded, as loquacious and obscure, difficult and, though he hesitates to say it of so great a man, sometimes even quite absurd, and certainly unfruitful.[13] He finds more useful, despite its tautology and irksome style, Porphyry's *Isagoge* to the

Categories, in which, drawing upon the *Topics*, he composed his *quinque voces*.[14]

So much for Vives's criticism of the *Organon*. For his own dialectic he has retained the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *Sophistical Refutations*, which he finds not unuseful. The *Categories* and the *Posterior Analytics* he has consigned to metaphysics (the latter also to psychology), and *De interpretatione* he has sent back to the grammar school. He concludes with a bow to Aristotle, whom he reveres, and with whom he respectfully disagrees.

Chapter iv deals with the first Aristotelians, both Greek and Latin. Vives's complaints have chiefly to do with the problems of rendering Aristotle's Greek into a Latin that does not fit it, and the misunderstandings that inevitably ensued. He also takes Boethius to task:

> Boethius, in teaching the *Topical Differences*, a work he put together out of Cicero, Aristotle and Themistius, was misled by some saying or other of Aristotle's to assign *Maxims* to individual places; the result was simply to contract an infinite possession of topics into very narrow straits. For who could use topics reduced to these Maxims?[15]

The last three chapters of Book III are the ones translated here. They discuss the 'new' dialecticians, beginning with the terminists and coming down to Vives's contemporaries (traditionally he 'spares the names of the living'). This section provides a sequel, as it were, to the *Adversus pseudodialecticos*, and in fact Vives does refer back to his letter to Fortis.

His comments on the *parva logicalia* are more detailed and technical here than in the piece against the pseudodialecticians, with examples and comments on its various terms. He appears to be dealing with actual logical problems that were being discussed during his years at Montaigu, in contrast to the sophismata he burlesques in the early treatise, but with the same impatience. It is evident that nearly three centuries of what he saw as static and sterile disputation had worn away whatever the *parva logicalia* had held of intellectual content and vitality. Reading these chapters, even with today's better understanding of the problems the early logicians were trying to solve (and even though Vives may have chosen extreme – and perhaps mischievous – examples, such as the universal sign used triply), it is easy to understand why the humanists were weary and disgusted with a jargon that seemed "to make no sense and was certainly of no use".

Two things come to mind in reading these chapters. One is that, in

Zasius's words, "Peter of Spain has departed". The unique villain of the *Adversus pseudodialecticos* is all but ignored; Vives mentions him only twice in Book III, with grudging respect in chapter i, and again in chapter vi in passing reference to Peter's barbarous Latin – which supports the theory that Peter was the target of the earlier piece partly, at least, because he fitted the nationalistic theme. Instead, Vives turns his attention here to the other 'more recent' dialecticians whose work so intrigued the logicians and natural philosophers at Montaigu.

Not surprisingly these turn out to be the Paduans, because despite the annual commentaries on the *Summule logicales*, the creative work at Montaigu, if there was any, was being done, as we have seen, by the natural philosophers. The masters, absorbed by problems of physics and metaphysics, found much to study in the Italian commentaries on the Mertonians, and Vives provides interesting documentation on the extent of the Paduan influence at Montaigu. Five times he refers to Peter of Mantua. The name of Paul of Venice occurs four times; Gregory of Rimini is cited, and Gaetano di Thiene and Alexander Sermoneta who, along with Richard Ferabrich, had commented upon the *Consequences* of Ralph Strode. These names were all plainly bywords at Montaigu.

Secondly, it will be clear to historians of medieval logic that the sixteenth century had not even a superficial knowledge of the origins of terminism and its purpose and value in the thirteenth century, nor of the intellectual achievement it represented. Logic was known only as far back as the fourteenth-century schools of Oxford and Paris; Vives credits Buridan, for example, with innovations introduced by his predecessors a century earlier. His knowledge of the *logica moderna* derived necessarily from the available commentaries on Peter of Spain, from fourteenth-century logics, from what had percolated through the masters at Montaigu from Bricot and Tartaret to Pardo and Major, Dullaert and Lax; and from such Spanish colleagues as Antonio Coronel and Domingo de Soto, who were still refining theories of supposition. The thirteenth century was closed off to the sixteenth; of the three great logical summulists of the thirteenth century, William of Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre are never mentioned, and Vives appears to group Peter of Spain with the fourteenth-century Peter of Mantua and Paul of Venice, since he knew his illustrious compatriot largely from a century and a half of commentaries. De Wulf leaves open the question whether the sixteenth-century humanists, in their harsh judgments on contemporary scholastic logic, were "unwilling or unable to go back to the


thirteenth-century documents".[16] It seems clear now that they were unable to, since so much of what we know today of high medieval logic has been discovered within the past hundred years, no small part of it from manuscripts lost in obscurity for centuries.

But even if the earlier manuscripts had been available, the humanists had no antiquarian interest in the source and original purpose of the terminist system they were bent on demolishing. They were busy replacing that system with an attitude, as it were, pedagogical and utilitarian, and a program of education based on a dialectic applicable to a rapidly changing lay society. Terminist dialectic had developed in a society that reserved education for a small and learned class, primarily clerical and ecclesiastical. In the sixteenth century, in response to greater population and potent social and economic forces, a secular education was within the reach of a lay society of merchants, professional men, and diplomatists, many of whom, like Busleiden, became important patrons of the arts and of learning. It was to this worldly clientele that Agricola directed his urbane and eloquent text-book of "persuasion of the probable". And it was this clientele Vives had in mind when he outlined his program of education based on psychology and the needs of individual students.

In his own day, and to subsequent generations, Vives was noted for his forceful attacks on scholastic dialecticians. Renan and Duhem both singled him out for the power of his eloquence and even for invective: Renan for his tirade (in *De causis* V, 192ff.) against Averroes, and Duhem for his scathing remarks about the natural philosophers at Montaigu. But by contemporary humanist standards Vives was a restrained and moderate critic. Invective had a long if not honorable tradition among the humanists,[17] beginning with Petrarch and his *Invective contra medicum*; Vives's forceful but moderate language pales against that of a roster of distinguished and highly verbal Italians such as Bruni, Niccoli, Valla, not to mention Poggio and Filelfo, down to Mario Nizolio and his *Antibarbarus . . . contra pseudophilosophos.* And nearer home he had models in Erasmus, Lefèvre, Bovillus and Hutten.

For Vives, his castigation of the pseudodialecticians and his serious discussion of the corruption of the art of dialectic were only the first steps in a larger plan. It was, in Bacon's phrase, a "clearing of the ground", to prepare the way for the sound humanistic educational structure he planned to erect. The basic tenet of his theory of education

was its utility: "The fruit of all studies is the common good". Dialectic, as the 'instrument of the arts', was the key discipline in his program, and its reform had a practical purpose. Based once more upon a humanistic respect for language, in balance and harmony with its sister arts of grammar and rhetoric, and restored to its Ciceronian role as the art of discourse, dialectic would be the practical and indispensable instrument for the teaching of all the arts that would put sound learning and eloquence to use to enrich individual lives, promote the common welfare, advance the cause of peace, and redound to the honor of God.



IOAN
NES LODOVICVS
Viues, Valentinus, aduerſus
pſeudodialecticos.

EIVSDEM POM
peius fugiens.

Seleſtadij apud Lazarum
Schurerium.
M. D. XX.

Title page from '*Lodovicus Vives, Valentinus, adversus pseudodialecticos, 1520*'. (*Reprinted by permission of the Folger Shakespeare Library.*)

JOANNES LUDOVICUS VIVES
IN PSEUDO-DIALECTICOS.
JOANNI FORTI SUO
S. D.

QUum existimarem futurum brevi, mi Fortis, ut Te Parisiis viderem, quo ire quotidie constituebam, credebam etiam me hæc eadem Tecum coram acturum, quæ (quoniam per occupationes meas non licet mihi Lovanio egredi, neque sat scio, quando istuc ibo) litteris sum modo necessario commissurus; neque enim duxi diutius differendum, quo minus redderem Te certiorem, quid jampridem expostulant mecum homines doctissimi, et amantissimi mei, quibus cum familiariter dum commentor, incidimusque in mentionem renascentium litterarum, et simul cum illis, hoc est cum suo seminario disciplinarum omnium meliorum; id enim fere agimus, ut gratulemur nostro seculo maxime queri illi solent Parisiis, unde lux totius eruditionis manare deberet, mordicus homines quosdam fœdam amplecti barbariem, et cum ea monstra quædam disciplinarum, velut sophismata, ut ipsi vocant, quibus nihil neque vanius est, neque stultius; quæ cum exactius homines nonnulli ingeniosi consectantur, tum sua bona ingenia perditum eunt, tum tamquam fertiles agri, sed incul-

AGAINST THE PSEUDODIALECTICIANS

JUAN LUIS VIVES TO HIS FRIEND JUAN FORTIS, GREETINGS:

When I supposed, my dear Fortis, that I should see you presently in Paris, where I was daily planning to go, I thought I should also discuss these matters with you in person, but since my affairs prevent me from leaving Louvain and I am not sure when I shall go there, I am from mere necessity entrusting them to a letter. For I thought I should no longer delay to inform you of the complaints that learned scholars and loyal friends have for a long time now been making to me. When, in casual conversation, we happen to speak of the revival of letters and all the better branches of learning of which literature is the seed-plot – as we often do, thanks to our times – their chief complaint is that at Paris, whence the light of all learning should emanate, some men are obstinately embracing a detestable barbarism, and with it certain educational monstrosities, such as sophismata, as they call them, which are utterly empty and foolish.[1] When men of considerable talent pursue these subjects with close attention, then not only do their own high talents go to waste, but, like fertile yet uncultivated fields, they produce a

culti, magnam inutiliam herbarum procreant copiam, somniant et confingunt sibi ineptias ac novam quandam linguam quam ipsi soli intelligant.

Pars maxima doctorum hominum totam hujusce rei culpam in Hispanos, qui istic sunt rejicit, qui ut sunt homines invicti, ita fortiter tuentur arcem ignorantiæ, et optima ingenia, ubi intenduntur, valent, tradunt se se his deliramentis, fiunt in illis summi, siquidem in re infima et despicatissima quisquam summus esse potest, ita eos pessime mereri ajunt de toto studio Parisiensi, ut qui illud infame apud gentes omnes reddant, quod enim est tam tritum hominum sermone proverbium, quam illud: ¿*Parisiis doceri juventutem nihil scire, atque adeo insane et loquacissime delirare*? reliquis omnibus in studiis, etsi sunt vana et futilia nonnulla, esse tamen solida multa, in unis Parisiis vix esse nisi nugacissimas nugas, debere Hispanos ejusmodi simul cum aliis omnibus qui eos sectantur, aut cogi ut aliis melioribus se se dederent disciplinis, aut edicto publico expelli tamquam corruptores et morum et eruditionis, nam per Gallos non stare quominus finis aliquando tandem fiat desipiendi; ita et me quoque increpant, qui pro mea parte vos, quis istic estis, meliorum non admoneo. ¿Parum putas, mi Fortis, me plerumque hisce verbis commotum? Non quod eos falsa dicere crederem (¿quis enim rem ipsam ita se habere non videt? quam ipse tacita tua cogitatione satis agnoscis, non est opus ut quenquam nominem) sed quod ad eum modum de civibus deque conterraneis meis existimarent, de quibus omnibus patria quadam caritate nollem nisi quam optime ab omnibus et sentiri et prædicari; tum etiam quod ad me quoque partem illius vituperationis attinere existimarem, qui aliquando ex isto numero fui, nec sunt mihi adhuc asini omnes, et portentosa illa vocabula, *tantum*, *alter*, *alius*, *uterque*, *incipit*, *desinit*, *immediate*, obliterata, quæ una est atque ea præcipua causa, quare de hac ista re loqui audeo; nam si hæc quibus homines inepti gloriantur, nota mihi non essent, ne hiscere quidem in his auderem, novi enim quid confestim solita sua insolentia jactant: *Damnat quia non intelligit.*

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*Note: The page numbers of the Latin pages have been printed in square brackets in order to avoid confusion with the original pagination.

great, useless crop of weeds.[2] They dream and devise for themselves absurdities and a kind of new language that they alone understand.

Most scholars blame all of this on the Spaniards there who, with characteristic stubborness, are valiantly defending the fortress of ignorance; and when, capable as they are, they give their attention, talents and zeal to these absurdities, they excel in them, if indeed anyone can excel in what is low and contemptible. And so my friends say that of the whole University of Paris these deserve most ill, for bringing discredit upon it before all other nations. What remark is more commonly heard than that "at Paris the young are taught to know nothing, but rather to babble windy nonsense"? In all the other universities, even if some studies are empty and futile, many still are sound; in Paris alone there is almost nothing but shallow word-play.[3] The Spaniards of this kind, with all their followers, should either be forced to devote themselves to other, better branches of learning, or be expelled by public edict as corrupters of both character and learning.[4] For it will not be the fault of the French if some end is not finally put to this folly.

And my friends also chide me that I do not, for my part, recall you who are still there to better studies. Do you think, my dear Fortis, that I am quite unaffected by their reproaches? Not because I disbelieve them (for obviously they are right, as you know well enough deep in your heart; there is no need to mention anyone), but because they hold such an opinion of my fellow citizens and countrymen, of all of whom, through a kind of patriotic loyalty, I would like only the best to be thought and expressed by everyone. Then, too, because I consider that a part of this censure attaches also to me, since I was once of their number. I have not to this day forgotten all those 'donkeys', and that portentous vocabulary – *only, the one or the other, the other, both, begins, ceases, immediately*[5] – and that is the principal reason why I dare to speak out on this matter. For if I were not familiar with these things that foolish men are proud of, I should not dare even to mention them; for I know what they quickly say, with their usual arrogance: "He condemns it because he does not understand it".

Verum Tu es ipse testis, sunt et alii condiscipuli mei, me non degustasse solum has insanias, sed etiam intima pæne illarum penetrasse, modo intimum esse possit in re, quæ utpote vitium, in immensum protenditur periculum si quis non credit: non hæc gloriandi gratia dico, neque enim gloriæ materiam ullam video; utinam non tam in illis promovissem, quæ quoniam tenero adhuc animo accepi, summoque cum studio, ideo tam tenaciter herent, ut elui nulla a me arte queant, et mihi vel invito occurrant, obversenturque præsenti in cogitatione! Sentio quanto sint plerumque impedimento, quum ad res meliores pergo, cogunt me interdum in gravissimis ludere, atque ineptire, et si quemadmodum magistri sunt qui illa docent, ita essent qui dedocerent, ut Timotheus ille musicus faciebat, ad hos ego me quam primum magna cum mercede conferrem, et sum modo in ea conditione, in qua olim princeps Græciæ Themistocles, qui Simonidi artem memoriæ tradenti respondisse fertur: *Malle se oblivisci quàm recordari*, ita et sunt mihi nonnulla quæ tanti facerem dediscere, quanti alia addiscere permulta; utinam ut pecuniam, vestes, libros, merces, et alia hujusmodi, ita et hæc commutare donareve liceret! Sunt qui magno emunt hæc scire, ego magno emerem ut his me illi exonerarent, ut sibi acciperent; ita facerent, ut ipsis quidem videretur, triplex emolumentum, et pecuniæ quam daturi essent, et quam acciperent, et istius ineruditæ eruditionis, quæ quid habeat dignum propter quod, non dico ut amplexari debeat, sed ut ne rejici ab omnibus publice tamquam pestis aliqua et ingeniorum corruptela debeat, quæso ipsi vos perpendite, et intra se se unusquisque ferat sententiam.

Ego, et in epistola, et quæ ad Te tam prudentem virum scribitur, prolixus esse non possum, ac neque debeo, solum rei summas et capita colligam; Te et alios, si qui sunt, qui hæc legent, precor, ne vos perturbatione aliqua rapi sinatis, sed advocata in consilium ratione, hæc omnia æquis auribus et animo accipiatis, judicium, sententiamque nec voce nec tacita cogitatione ad finem usque feratis. Hoc igitur primum docemus in dialectica puerum, esse hanc viam ad reliquas disci-

pli-

But you yourself are witness, together with other fellow-students of mine, that I have not merely toyed with these insanities; I have virtually plumbed their depths – if there can be depth in anything that, since it is wrong, spreads into boundless danger unless one recognizes it. I say this not to boast, for I see no cause for boasting. I wish I had not so much as entered upon these subjects that, because I received them with all eagerness into a mind still young, cling there so tenaciously that no skill of mine can expunge them, and come to me unbidden and hover before my present thoughts.[6] I often feel how great an impediment they are when I proceed to better studies; they sometimes prompt me to make sport of serious matters and talk nonsense. And if, just as there are masters who teach these things, there were also those who unteach them, like the famous musician Timotheus,[7] I would betake myself to them with all speed and a heavy purse. As it is, I am like the ancient Greek commander Themistocles; he is said to have replied to Simonides, who taught the art of memory, that he would rather forget than remember.[8] Thus, too, there are some things I would do as much to forget as I would to learn many others. If only it were possible to give away or barter them like money, clothing, books, goods, and other such things. There are those who pay a good price to know them; I would pay a good price if they would relieve me of them and take them to themselves. If this were possible, it would really appear to them a triple gain – of the money they would have paid, of that which they would be paid, and of this inerudite erudition.

However much this training deserves, I do not say to be accepted, but not to be openly and generally rejected as a pest and corrupter of minds, I ask you yourselves to consider carefully and let everyone decide for himself. In a letter, and one written to a man of your good judgment, I cannot and should not be verbose; I shall simply bring together main points and headings. I beg you, and any others who may read this, not to let yourselves be carried away by any emotion but to rely on your reason, hear all these opinions with unbiased ears and mind, and refrain from judgment or decision, whether spoken or silent, until the very end.

Well, then, the first thing we teach a boy about dialectic is that it is the path to the other branches of learning; but in what discipline does anyone

plinas, at qua in disciplina utitur quisquam sana mente istis tam insuavibus et fatuis ineptiis: *Tantum cujuslibet hominis præter Sortem quilibet non asinus c. et alterum c, ipsiusmet hominis nigrum contingenter incipit esse*: *desinit Angelus non a quodlibet a, et b, Angelus non esse*: Ne in illis quidem vocabulis quæ quidam pro his substituunt: *Tantum cujuslibet presbyteri et alius alterius presbyteri quodlibet sacerdotium non curatum præter quam canonicatus necessario non est*: ¿Tum dialecticam quis non videt scientiam esse de sermone? quod ostendit ipsa Græca nominis ratio διαλεκτικὴ καὶ λογικὴ uti est rhetorice, uti et grammatice, ¿jam de quo quæso sermone est ista vestra dialectica? ¿De Gallico'ne an de Hispano? ¿an de Gothico? ¿an de Vandalico? Nam de Latino certe non est; dialecticus enim iis uti debet verbis, iis enuntiationibus, quas nemo non intelligat qui sciat linguam illam, qua is loquitur, velut Latinam, si latine se dialecticus profitetur disserere, Græcam, si græce; at isti non dico non intelliguntur a doctissimis latine, cum se latine dicant loqui, sed interdum ne ab hominibus quidem ejusdem farinæ, seu ejusdem potius furfuris.

Sunt enim pleraque, quæ nosse nemo potest nisi is qui confinxit, multa, quæ tamquam Apollinis oracula mire contecta et convoluta, explicatore aliquo et interprete divinæ mentis egent: tunc omnia fere, quæ in syllogismis, in oppositionibus, in conjunctionibus, disjunctionibus, explicationibusque enuntiationum, tractantur, aliud non sunt, nisi quæstiones illæ divinandi, quas sibi invicem pueri et mulierculæ inter lusus proponunt: ¿*Quæ res est, quæ ex alto decidens non rumpitur, in aquam si ceciderit, dissolvitur*: simile prorsus est illud, quod isti semper habent in ore: *Da casum*: quid enim aliud id sibi vult, nisi, dic mihi: ¿*Quæ res est, quæ est hominis quilibet asinus, non tamen est quilibet asinus hominis*? quod si tu divinaris quid illud sit, quod sub illis verborum involucris contectum latet, quid alter mutire possit non habet, ut ille, qui cum proposuisset: ¿*Quid esset terrigena, tardigrada, domiporta, sanguine cassa*? dictumque ei fuisset esse cochleam, obticuit, neque enim aliquid illi erat quod adjicere suæ quæstioni valeret; quare præclare agitur

cum

in his right mind use such unpleasing and clumsy absurdities as these? 'Only any non-donkey *c*, belonging to this same man, begins contingently to be black'[9]. 'Not by any *a* or *b* does an angel cease not to be an angel.' Or even in the terms which some persons substitute for these: 'So long as any parish is lacking the ministration of any priest whatever, and of any other priest, it necessarily is no more than a canonry'.

Then, clearly, dialectic is a science having to do with language, which is apparent from the very root of the Greek name, *dialektike, kai logike*, just as rhetoric is, and grammar. But with what language, pray, has this dialectic of your to do? With French, or Spanish? With Gothic? with Vandal?[10] For certainly it has nothing to do with Latin. A dialectician should use words and propositions that no one can fail to understand who knows the language he speaks, Latin, if he claims to discourse in Latin, or Greek, in Greek. But these persons are not only unintelligible to men expert in Latin, though they say they are speaking Latin; they are sometimes not understood by men of their own grain – or rather bran.[11] For many of their utterances no one can understand but the man who devised them; many, as wonderfully interwoven and involved as the Oracle of Apollo, call for some exegete and interpreter of superhuman intellect. Consequently, almost everything that is treated in syllogisms, oppositions, conjunctions, disjunctions, and explications of propositions, amounts to no more than the riddles that girls and children pose to each other in play. 'What falls from on high, but does not break, and if it falls into the water is dissolved?' These are always saying very much the same: 'Propose the hypothesis'[12]. For how does this differ from saying, for example, 'What is it that is a man's every donkey, yet is not every donkey belonging to a man?' But if you guess what answer lies buried under those wrappings of words, the questioner has nothing to mutter. It is like the man who propounded, 'What is earth-born, tardy-paced, dwelling-bearing and bloodless'[13] When he was answered, 'A snail', he fell silent, for he had nothing to add to his question.

cum istis hominibus, quod disputant, licet corruptissime, licet pessime, aliqua tamen specie sermonis latini, nam si a vulgo tales dementiæ intelligerentur, tota opificum turba illos e civitate supploderet, sibilis, clamoribus, strepituque suorum instrumentorum ejiceret tamquam stupidos quosdam homines, et carentes sensu communi, quales sunt omnes fere, qui istis in rebus versantur: ¿an putat quispiam Aristotelem suam dialecticam ad sermonem, quem ipse sibi confinxerat, et non potius ad vulgarem illum Græcum, quem totus populus loquebatur, accommodasse?

Mira profecto istorum dialectica, cujus sermonem, quem ipsi latinum esse volunt, Cicero, si nunc resurgeret, non intelligeret; quod non minus profecto vitium in dialectica est, quàm si in grammatica, si in rhetorica, sermone quisquam utatur, quem ipse sit commentus, non quo ceteri homines utantur; sunt enim hæ tres artes de sermone, quem a populo accipiunt, non ipsæ tradunt; nam prius fuit sermo latinus, prius græcus, deinde in his formulæ grammaticæ, formulæ rhetoricæ, formulæ dialectices observatæ sunt, nec ad illas detortus est sermo, sed illæ potius sermonem sunt secutæ, et ad eum se se accommodarunt, neque enim loquimur ad hunc modum latine, quia grammatica latina ita jubet loqui, quin potius e contrario, ita jubet grammatica loqui, quoniam sic Latini loquuntur; res eodem modo se habet in rhetorice et dialectice, quarum utraque in eodem sermone versatur, quo grammatica: unde est illud verum et falsum præsupponere congruum: dialectica itaque in hoc vulgari, et qui est omnium in ore sermo, verum, falsum, probabilitatem invenit, rhetorice vero ornatum, splendorem, gratiam, quæ qui ignorat, is profecto imperitissimus est, et in portu impingit, ac velut Cantherius ille Sulpitii Galbæ, longum ingressus iter, in porta cadit, quumque in exordio suæ disciplinæ fallatur, necesse est ab illa eo longius aberret, quo magis promoverit; quod si quisquam fuerit qui hæc pertinaciter et verbis et animo pernegarit, huic ego consulo, quisquis tandem fuerit, ut ne horulam ac ne momentum quidem moretur, quo minus quamprimum navim cons-

Therefore it is clearly a good thing for these men that they still dispute, no matter how corruptly or how badly, in some resemblance to Latin. For if such ravings were understood by the people, the whole crowd of workmen would shout them from the city, and with hissing and catcalls and clanging of their tools,[14] drive them out as stupid men lacking in common sense, like virtually all who are busied with these things. Does anyone believe that Aristotle fashioned his dialectic to a language he made up for himself, instead of to the common Greek that all the people spoke? Astonishing, surely, is the dialectic of men whose speech, which they intend to be Latin, Cicero would not understand if he were to rise again today.[15] Surely it is just as wrong in dialectic as in grammar or rhetoric to use a self-invented speech instead of that which other men use. For these are the three arts having to do with a language that they receive from the people, and do not themselves transmit. For first there were the Latin and Greek languages, and then in these the rules of grammar, of rhetoric, of dialectic were observed; language was not twisted to adapt to them, but the rules followed the language and accommodated themselves to it. We do not speak Latin in this manner because Latin grammar bids us speak so, but on the contrary, grammar bids us speak so because the Latins speak this way. The same holds true in rhetoric and dialectic, each of which depends upon the same language as grammar; so it is that the true and the false presuppose the grammatically correct. And so dialectic discovers what is true, or false, or probable in this common speech which everyone uses, while rhetoric discovers in it ornament, splendor, and grace. Anyone who does not know these facts is ignorant indeed; he dashes his ship against the harbor[16] or, like the famous gelding of Sulpicius Galba, setting out upon a long journey, falls down at the city gate.[17] Any man who is misled at the starting-point of his subject must inevitably wander farther astray from it the more he proceeds. If there is anyone who persistently denies this in word and thought, I advise him, whoever he is, to delay not a moment, not a second, but to climb aboard a ship with all possible haste

cendat, et ad cerebrum helleboro ab insania liberandum, recta naviget Anticyras.

Quamvis miror aliquem esse, qui hæc ignorare possit, modo paullulum cogitationi de harum artium ratione velit intendere; nam ut in grammatica, non idcirco hæc est latina oratio, *Homo est albus*, quòd illa sic præcipit, nec in rhetorica schemata illa eloquutioni nitorem et cultum afferunt, quòd rhetorica jubet, sed potius quòd illam orationem populus Romanus, qui vere latine loquutus est, latinam judicavit; ideo grammaticus non jubet eam esse latinam, sed docet, et quia pulchra illustriaque videbantur illa schemata loquentibus, idcirco rhetorica diligentia ea observata tradidit: ad eundem modum in dialectica usu venit, non enim quia præcipit ipsa enuntiationem eam esse veram vel falsam, quæ est de indicativo, eam non esse, quæ est de aliis modis, continuo ita est, nec quia vult hanc esse conjunctionem sive conjunctivam, *Homo est animal, et animal est corpus*, aut hanc esse disjunctivam, *Tu es albus, vel tu es niger*, protinus et ita res habet, nam antequam ulla dialectica inveniretur, ea erant, ut dialecticus esse docet, quæ idcirco docet, quoniam loquentium sive Latine sive Græce consensus approbat, quapropter præcepta dialectices non minus, quam grammatices atque rhetorices, ad usum loquendi communem aptanda sunt. Verum isti qui sophistæ nominantur, quoniam ingenium eis deerat, et eruditio, qua quidvis auditori et contra disputanti verisimiliter probare possent, idque vulgaribus notisque vocabulis atque orationibus, quibus unusquisque uti debet tamquam numis quibus publica forma est, quod erat verum dialectici munus, confinxerunt ipsi sibi nescio quos vocabulorum significatus, contra omnem hominum consuetudinem et usum, ut tunc vicisse videantur, cum non intelliguntur.

Nam cum intelliguntur, tunc plane nihil frigidius, nihil dementius fieri posse omnes vident: ita turbato eo, quicum certant, mira et inusitata vocabulorum forma atque ratione, miris suppositionibus, miris ampliationibus, restrictionibus, appellationibus, ipsi tunc sibi ipsis nullo publico consilio atque sen-

and, to free his brain from madness with hellebore, sail straight to Anticyra.[18]

And yet I wonder how anyone can fail to perceive this, who is willing to devote even a little thought to the structure of these arts. In grammar, for example, 'Homo est albus' is a Latin sentence not because grammar makes it so (any more than rhetorical figures impart splendor and refinement to speaking because rhetoric decrees it), but rather because the Roman people, who spoke true Latin, judged that sentence to be Latin. Therefore the grammarian does not decree that this is Latin, but he teaches that it is; and it is because certain figures of speech seemed beautiful and fine to speakers that rhetoric diligently observed and handed them on. Usage plays the same role in dialectic; it is not because dialectic teaches that a statement in the indicative is true or false, and one in other moods is not, that this is necessarily so; nor is it because dialectic decrees that 'Man is an animal, and an animal is a body', is a conjunctive statement, while 'You are white, or you are black', is disjunctive, that it is so forthwith. For before dialectic was ever invented, those distinctions already existed as the dialectician teaches them, which is why he teaches them, because the consensus of speakers, whether Latin or Greek, approves them. Accordingly the rules of dialectic, as much as those of grammar and rhetoric, must be adapted to common usage in speaking. But these so-called sophisters lack the innate talent and learning by which, with any appearance of truth, they could prove any proposition to a hearer and opponent with common and familiar words and discourse (which everyone should use like coin that has a public form),[19] which was the true function of the dialectician. Consequently they have invented for themselves certain meanings of words contrary to all civilized custom and usage, so that they may seem to have won their argument when they are not understood.

For when they are understood, it is apparent to everyone that nothing could be more pointless, nothing more irrational. So, when their opponent has been confused by strange and unusual meanings and word-order, by wondrous suppositions, wondrous ampliations, restrictions, appellations, they then decree for themselves, with no public decision or sentence, a triumph over an adversary not conquered but

sententia decernunt triumphum de hoste novis verborum præstigiis turbato, non victo: etenim ¿quis Cato, Lælius, Cicero, Cæsar, Salustius, Livius, Quintilianus, Plinius, et qui primus de dialectica scripsisse latine fertur, M. Varro non hæreat, *Si quis istorum cum sit ebrius, Jovem lapideum juret, se vinum non bibisse, quia vinum quod est in India non biberit*? ¿Si cum videat regem Galliæ maxima famulorum manu stipatum, alter ajat, *Regem hunc famulos non habere, quia non ejus sint illi, qui Regi Hispaniæ famulantur*? Tum etiam si asserat, *Varronem cum sit homo, hominem tamen non esse, quia Cicero non ipse sit Varro*; *caput nullum hominem habere, cum tamen nullus homo capite careat*; *plures esse non Romani quam Romani in hac aula, in qua sunt Romani mille, Hispani duo*; *omnesque homines, qui sunt in orbe esse non videntes, quia sunt cæci nonnulli*; *cujusvis hominis asinum et animal non esse, et non esse animal, ne asinum quidem, quum adhuc nullus sit visus asinus, qui non sit et animal et asinus*; si dicat quoque *meretricem in lupanari multis prostratam annis, virginem fore*, et e diverso, *virginem castissimam jamdiu prostrasse, et scorteum fuisse*; et, *non vendi piper Parisiis et Romæ, quum nec Parisiis, nec Romæ piper gratis quisquam accipiat, sed bona bene numerata et bene appensa pecunia emat*; *Socratem quoque in carcere clausum, unumque aliquod sidus videntem, videre omne sidus, quum non omne sidus videat*; et hoc axioma, sive ut Cicero transfert pronuntiatum, esse verum, *Omnis homo qui filium habet, est pater*, quum hoc sit falsum, *Omnis homo est pater, qui filium habet*; *Socratem et hunc asinum esse fratres*; *duas enuntiationes contradictorias, etiam in sensu contradictorio veras esse*; ita ut nemo sit tam imperterritus et confidens, qui quum videat hæc monstra, non ilico Herculis illius monstrorum depulsoris opem cogatur implorare.

Transeo illa, quæ magis ad risum faciunt ex sua tanta fatuitate; *Antichristus et Chimæra sunt fratres*; nihil et nemo mordent se in sacco; *Asinus Antichristi est filius Chimæræ*: atque hæc quidem viderent utcumque latine esse dicta, illa vero ausim dejerare in toto Latio, et antiquo et novo, neminem unquam fuisse qui latina esse putasset: *Omnes duo Apostoli Dei, et alii duo*

confused by new feats of verbal legerdemain. Truly, would not Cato, Cicero, Sallust, Livy, Quintilian, Pliny, and Marcus Varro (recognized as the first Latin writer on logic) be utterly at a loss to hear one of these sophisters make statements like these:

When he is full of drink, swear on the stone Jove[20] that he has not drunk wine, because he has not drunk wine that is in India.

When he sees the King of France attended by a great retinue of servants, say, This King does not have servants because he does not have those who wait on the King of Spain.

Though Varro is a man, yet he is not a man because Cicero is not himself Varro.

That a head no man has even though no man lacks a head.

There are more non-Romans than Romans in this hall, in which there are a thousand Romans and two Spaniards.

All men are sightless because some men are blind.

Any man's donkey both animal is not, and is not an animal, not even a donkey, since no donkey has yet been seen which is not both animal and donkey.

A harlot in a brothel, for many years a prostitute, will be a virgin, and conversely, the most chaste virgin has long been a wrinkled prostitute.

Pepper is not sold in Paris and Rome, because neither in Paris nor in Rome does anyone receive pepper for nothing, but buys it with good money, carefully counted out and well weighed.

Socrates, confined in prison and seeing any one star, sees every star, although he may not see every star.

This *axioma* or, as Cicero translates it, *pronuntiatum*, is true: Every man who has a son is a father; but this is false: Every man is a father who has a son.

Socrates and this donkey are brothers.

Two contradictory statements are also in a contradictory sense true.

With the result that no one can be so dauntless and confident that he can see these monstrosities, and not fly to invoke the help of Hercules, Repeller of Monsters. I pass over these, more laughably foolish:

The Antichrist and the Chimaera are brothers.

Nothing and Noman devour each other in a sack.

The donkey of the Antichrist is the son of the Chimaera.

Even these propositions may have seemed to be expressed in some kind of Latin, but I would venture to swear that in all the Latin world, ancient or modern, there was never anyone who would consider the following to be Latin:

Every two apostles of God and another two apostles of God are twelve.

Apostoli Dei sunt duodecim: *Omnes omnes Apostoli Dei sunt in hac aula*; *non non homo non possibiliter non currit*; negationibus aliis super alias in pronuntiato inculcatis et infartis, tamquam in cophino caricis aut uvis passis: tum accedunt hæc non minus egregia: *Quodlibet qualelibet de quolibet tali scit ipsum esse tale, quale ipsum est*; *ipsiusmet hominis quilibet asinus*, *non asinus et non asinus est*; *ipsemet homo est quilibet homo*; *tantum homo et alter alius homo sunt g. ipsiusmet hominis et a. quilibet asinus hominis est*; *sortis et alterius f. materia ipsiusmet f. et quilibet homo sunt*; *quilibet homo non præter non Sortem non currit*; *Sortes non inquantum non homo non est animal*; ¿quid illa? *c. hominis quasi quilibet asinus est b. non animal*, *a. homo et quilibet qualislibet non Sortes uterque alter homo et d. p. necessario sunt*: ut a. b. c. d. faciant illas suppositiones confusas, determinatas, et ex his mistas.

Adde etiam commistiones majores, quam ullus unquam pharmacopola facit, e. f. g. h. i. k. ita ut nonnulli ad decimam usque litteram secundi alphabeti jam recurrerint, mira suppositionum genera somniantes et confundentes; inviderunt scilicet isti homines mathematicis, quod illi soli litteris uti viderentur, ideo et ipsi quoque totum alphabetum suos in usus transtulerunt, ut nemo sit cum hæc videat, qui possit negare ejusmodi homines esse litteratissimos. Verum cum ad mathematica pergunt, si hoc unquam deus illis tribuit, offenduntur nonnihil, quòd quid sibi elementa illa velint, parum sciunt; audio quendam ex his, cum se se geometriæ studio dedisset, putasse lineam, quæ signabatur per b. positam determinate, quæ vero per a. eodem modo se habere, quo ipse, videlicet, confuse tantum, nam a. et b. tantarum sunt virium, ut totum confusum et indiscretum ordinem, aut infernorum, aut illius antiqui chaos, unicum b. præpositum possit reddere discretum et determinatum, et e contrario, rectissimum cœlorum ordinem solum a. possit invertere atque confundere; verum hæc ipsi quum audiunt, ilico dicunt: *Ego sic mente concipio*: hoc est plane, quod in reliquis quoque faciunt, lutum luto purgare; primum, ¿quis, nisi eorum stultitia et perversitas, jubet

All all apostles of God are in this hall.
No no-man does not possibly not run –

with negatives crammed and stuffed in one upon another in a proposition like dried figs and raisins in a basket.[21] Then occur these equally distinguished examples:

Everything of any kind knows concerning that kind, that it is what it is.
Any donkey belonging to the same man is not donkey and not-donkey.
The self-same man is any man.
Only a man and any other than another man are *g* of the same man and *a* is any donkey belonging to a man.
The substance of Sortes and another man *f* is of the same man *f* and they are every man.[22]
Any man not except not Sortes does not run.
Sortes not inasmuch as he is not a man, is not an animal.

And what about these?

Any donkey as it were of a man *c* is *b* not an animal.
A man *a* and any man of any kind not Sortes are necessarily both another man and *d p*.

So that *a, b, c, d* can make those suppositions confused, determinate, and a mixture of both.

Indeed you can add more commixtions than any quack pharmacist ever made – *e, f, g, h, i, j, k* – so that some of these men already have recourse to letters down as far as the tenth letter of the second alphabet, dreaming up and combining wonderful kinds of suppositions. It is clear that these men envied the mathematicians, because they alone seemed to use letters. Therefore these, too, have taken over the whole alphabet for their own use, so that no one who observes them can deny that men of this kind are extremely 'literate'. But when they proceed to mathematics (God save the mark!) they are much dismayed, because they do not quite understand what those letters mean. I hear that one of them, having taken up the study of geometry, decided that a line designated as *b* was posited determinately while the one marked *a* was in the same state as himself, to wit, merely confused. For *a* and *b* are of such potency that one misplaced *b* can render separate and determined the whole confused and inseparable order of the lower regions or of the ancient Chaos. And on the contrary, a single *a* can invert and confuse the perfect order of the heavens.[23]

But when the sophisters hear these objections they promptly say, "I conceive of it this way"[24]. This is just what they do in other matters

bet eos ad eum modum intelligere contra omnem usum rationemque loquendi? Deinde, quamvis ita concipiant, insolenter, atque adeo parum humane agunt, si sermone sibi solis noto proferant, et non aliorum more.

Tum etiam, ¿quis non videt artes, quæ de sermone sunt, non ea tractare, neque curare, quæ unusquisque vel delirans, vel ineptiens, sibi confinxit, sed ea quibus homines omnes utuntur, qui sermonem illum loquuntur? ¿An si ignarus aliquis, per pronuntiatum hoc, *Tu es flavus*, intellexerit hominem esse leonem, protinus illud falsum erit, et non potius verum, quia ex suo vero significatu ita significat quemadmodum est in ipsa re? Nam sicut præclare in libro de Legibus primo inquit Cicero: *Vera et falsa et consequentia et contraria, sua sponte, non aliena dicantur*: id ni ita esset, ¿quid superest, nisi ut sunt isti latinæ linguæ imperitissimi, si quis ursum intelligat per aprum, et per galerum navem, velint quoque vocabula ad eum modum significare, quo ille prave intelligit? Mihi, inquit, ita notat: tibi vero quia ignarus; at alii docto, et ex sua vera significatione, secus: quæstio est de verbis, inquiunt: et vere de verbis, quæ quia non capiunt, corrumpere volunt, nos defendimus; quòd si legem unusquisque de verbis feret ut apud se significant, quid attinet, non dico latinam linguam, sed ne ullam prorsus addiscere, quum illud facilius sit verba id demum significare, quod unicuilibet visum fuerit, et quot erunt mente concipientes, tam varios habebunt significatus, ita tandem, ut nemo alterum intelligat, quum unusquisque verbis suo more utatur, non communi.

Tunc quoque si quis conqueratur, de verbis erit quæstio, quam vos gravissimi philosophi, quum de dialectica disputetis, contemnere vos dicitis, perinde ac dialectica, naturalis, vel moralis esset philosophia, quæ modo rem, et sensa teneat, negligit verba, et non potius sit ars, quæ non de rebus aliis quàm de verbis disputat, quasi vero tota vestra Sophistica illa disciplina aliud quicquam sit, quàm captiones ex depravatis verborum significationibus; ¿quòd si de his vos curare negatis, non videtis totam vestram Sophismatum nebulam uno verbo

too – clean away mud with mud. First of all, what but their own fatuity and obstinacy make them understand it that way in the face of every usage and rule of speech? Then, however much they conceive of it thus, they behave arrogantly and with very little courtesy if they express it in a language known only to themselves and not in the manner of others.

Moreover, is it not obvious that the arts which have to do with language have no business or concern with meanings that any deranged or incompetent person has made up for himself, but only with those all men use who speak that language? If some ignoramus should take the statement, 'You are tawny', to mean that a man was a lion, that would be patently false and not true, because its real meaning represents the thing as it actually is. For as Cicero says quite clearly in the first book of the *Laws*, "Truth and falsehood, the logical and illogical, are judged by themselves and not by anything else"[25]. Otherwise we can only say that these men are abysmally ignorant of the Latin language if, when a man takes 'boar' to mean 'bear', and 'cap' to mean 'ship', they would be willing to have the words bear meanings according to his wild understanding of them. 'To me', he says, 'it means this'; to you, yes, because you are ignorant, but to an educated man, and according to its real meaning, it does not. 'It is a question of words', they say. Yes, truly of words, which they, because they do not understand them, are willing to corrupt, but which we defend. For if everyone makes his own rules about words, according to his notion of their meaning, what is the use of learning any language at all, even Latin? It would be easier to have words mean what each person decides they mean, and they will have as many different meanings as there are minds to conceive them. So that in the end no man will understand another, since everyone will use words in his own way and not the common one.

Then too, if anyone should complain, it will be just a question of words, which you serious philosophers, while you dispute about dialectic, say that you value little. As if dialectic were natural or moral philosophy, which looks only to content and meaning and is indifferent to words, instead of an art built entirely on words! As if, indeed, all that sophistic discipline of yours were anything but fallacious argumentation based on distorted meaning of words. But if you deny any concern for these, do you not see that your whole cloud of sophismata has been

bo discussam esse? Verum hoc ipsi non jactant quousque verborum corruptiones quas ex sua ignorantia faciunt, aliquis deprehendit. Adde quòd si hæc, quam ita concipiunt, volunt dialecticen docere, imponant etiam eandem legem grammaticæ, et rhetoricæ, ac sua stulte excogitata in has quoque artes transfundant, jubeant grammaticum more suo loqui, ut ea quæ dicunt, latinitati congrua esse videantur, nam alioqui non video quî possint ea defendere dialectica, vera, vel falsa, cum hoc isti in principio suæ artis affirment, verum et falsum congruum sermonem exigere, id est plane sine solœcismis, ut de barbarismis taceam: ¿quid? si concipiunt eum, qui sit vino inebriatus, vinum quod est in India non bibisse, ¿cur non proferunt simplicius, et ad hominum sensum accommodatius? *hic homo vinum quod est in India non bibit*, aut sic, *vinum aliquod est, quod hic homo non bibit*, aut, *hic homo non omne vinum bibit*, sive, *nonnullum vinum non bibit*: similiter ¿cur non dicunt? *Tu nonnullus homo non es*, aut, *non es omnis homo*, potius quam, *tu homo non es*, per quam nemo est, qui non intelligat, eum non esse hominem, de quo id dicitur.

Tum si volunt dicere esse hominem omnem animal, non tamen hoc unum animal, aut illud, sed singulos homines esse singula animalia, ¿quid attinet litterulas exquirere, *animal est omnis homo*, potius quàm sic rectius efferre, *omnis homo est animal*? ¿Quid? ¿quærunt'ne meliorem panem quàm triticeum? Scio, quid dicent: ¿non esse in illo simplici, genuino, vero ac recto loquendi modo locum cavillo, qui ab ipsis in primis quæritur: ¿ita ne? Vos ergo ut cavillum inveniatis totam sermonis rationem parati estis diruere, ut illi qui ut murem unum, pressi obsidione, invenirent, magnam muri partem demoliebantur; sed attendite quàm id prudenter a vobis fiat: ¿quæ' nam quæso potest patere occasio cavillationi in verbis, quæ tu tibi arbitratu confinxisti tuo? ¿Si enim hominem aliquem appellares, et ea vox asinum tibi significaret, putas illum injuria affectum iri? Cavilli, joci, scommata, dicteria, contumeliæ, injuriæ, si verbis fiant, non dico ab eo qui dicit confictis, nemini notis, nam hoc stultissimum est, sed si obscuris jacten-

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dispersed by one word? But of course the dialecticians do not make this pronouncement until some one catches the verbal corruptions they perpetrate through their ignorance.

Furthermore, if they want to teach this, as they thus conceive of it, as dialectic, let them impose the same rule also on grammar and rhetoric; let them pour their foolish inventions into these arts too, and bid the grammarian speak in their manner, so that what they say may seem to conform to Latinity. For otherwise I do not see how they can defend that dialectic, true or false, since they state in the very beginning of their art that both true and false require a suitable language, that is, wholly free of solecisms, not to mention barbarisms.[26] If, for example, they 'conceive' that a man drunk with wine has not drunk wine that is in India, why do they not say so more simply in accord with common sense? 'This man did not drink wine that is in India'. Or, 'There is some wine that this man did not drink', or 'This man did not drink all the wine', or 'He did not drink some wine'. Similarly, why do they not say, 'You are not some particular man', or 'You are not every man', rather than 'You are not a man', by which everyone will understand that the one of whom this is spoken is not a man.

Then if they want to say that every man is an animal, yet not this particular animal or that one, but that individual men are individual animals, what good does it do to invent verbal quibbles like 'An animal is every man', rather than say more correctly, 'Every man is an animal?' Why do they do this? Are they asking for bread better than the flour it is made of? I know what they will say: that in that simple, natural, true, and correct manner of speaking there is no place for quibbling, which is what they are primarily looking for. Is it not so? Therefore, to invent quibbles, you are prepared to break down the whole order of language, like the men in a besieged city who demolished a great part of the city wall to find a single mouse. But mark how sensibly you go about this! For tell me, what opportunity can there be for quibbling in words you have arbitrarily made up for yourself? If you call anyone a man, and that word means 'donkey' to you, do you think he will be insulted? If quibbles, jests, gibes, *bons mots*, invectives, insults are expressed not in words invented by the speaker and unknown to anyone else, for this is foolish, but merely in unintelligible words, they are empty and flat and

tur verbis, frigida et insulsa sunt, nihil plane valent; Daphyta, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, et reliqui olim qui cavillabantur, vocabulis, orationibus, quibus utebantur omnes, subdola quadam et latenti ratione ludentes, fallebant versabantque respondentem; Aristoteles ipse, quum duobus elenchorum voluminibus sophisticas præstigias tractet, viamque illarum vitandarum aperiat, non earum modo quæ jam antea fuerant, sed etiam quæ inveniri postea poterant, ut fuit vir ille divino ingenio, indefesso, et singulari, redactis omnibus more suo in præcepta, formamque artis, nullius tamen unquam adeo ridiculi, seu potius impudentis, sophistici elenchi meminit, qui novis inusitatisque vocabulis excogitatis, aut veterum verborum significatione mutata, eludere ac fallere tentaret; et hoc loco subinde illud detortis nutibus magno cum fastidio objectant: *Nomina significant ad placitum*: sane ita est: sed videndum est tamen ex quorum placito et voluntate nomina significent, non enim arbitrio Parthorum, aut Indorum, significant nomina Romana, nec e contrario pro Romanorum libito significant Parthica vel Indica, sed pro arbitrio Romanorum Romana, pro arbitrio Parthorum Parthica.

Si ego dialecticam Vivicam, Tu Forticam, ille Laxeam, alius Dullardiam profitemur, certe ut nobis collibitum fuerit, vocabula significabunt, sin vero latinam dialecticam pollicemur omnes, ex instituto moreque latinorum significabunt voces, non ex nostro, indignumque et stultum est in dialectica latina nominibus uti Geticis, aut Sarmaticis, ac ne iis quidem, sed verbis nullarum gentium a nobis exominiatis; nam ex istis ipse pervellem audire, si dialecticam vel hispane vel gallice essent tradituri, quod tam fieri potest, quàm latine, aut græce, ¿num regulas suo ipsorum arbitratu, et non potius ex ipsius sermonis ratione formarent? ¿An quemadmodum in latina lingua duæ negationes unam affirmationem reddunt, ita et esse vellent in hispana, in gallica, in græca, apud quas, uti et apud reliquas fere omnes, negatio geminata majorem habet negandi vim quàm simplex? Quod si in dialectica, aliis linguis tradenda, leges accipere ab ipso usitato sermone, non

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simply ineffectual. Daphyta, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and the other sophists of the past used to trick and disconcert an opponent by playing in a subtle and sly manner on the expressions everybody used.[27] Aristotle himself, when he discusses sophistical tricks in the two books of the *De sophisticis elenchis*,[28] shows the way to evade not only those which already existed, but even those that might be invented in the future (for he was a man of divine, unique, and tireless genius, who reduced the whole subject, in his usual manner, to the precepts and form of an art). Yet he never mentions any such absurd or shameless sophistical refutations as these which try to delude and deceive by extraordinary words newly made up, or by an altered meaning of old words. And at this point the dialecticians always say, with sidelong nods and haughty air, "Words take their meaning by convention"[29]. Perfectly true, but still we must understand from whose will and convention they take their meaning. For Roman words do not mean what Parthians or Indians decide, nor do Parthian or Indian words take their meaning at the Romans' will, but Roman words from Roman authority and Parthian words from Parthian.

If I were to profess a Vivist logic, you a Fortist, he a Laxean and another a Dullardian one, it is certain that words would then mean to us whatever we please. But if we all profess a Latin logic, words will have the meaning established by Latin practice and usage, not our own. It is unbecoming and foolish in Latin logic to use Getic or Sarmatian words,[30] or not even those, but words belonging to no nation, which we have conjured up ourselves. Indeed, I should very much like to hear from these men: if they were to teach dialectic in Spanish or French, which is as feasible as in Latin or Greek, would they make up rules as they please rather than take them from the structure of the language itself? In Latin, for example, two negatives make an affirmative; would they wish this to be true also in Spanish or French or Greek where, as in almost all other languages, a double negative has greater negative force than a single one? But if they would not be willing to accept rules from conventional discourse to teach logic in other languages, why do they want to exercise

ferrent, ¿cur in lingua liberrimi populi Romani hanc volunt exercere tyrannidem, ut cogant ipsam a se hominibus infantissimis, et barbarissimis, loquendi leges accipere? Huc pertinet illud quod passim jactant, *de rigore*, ut quòd hæc enuntiatio, *Tu homo non es*, ad bonum quidem sensum sit falsa, ad rigorem autem vera: idcirco ab eis conceditur, quia carent bono sensu, et cum solo rigore loquuntur quavis glacie frigidiore: ac volunt quidem rigorem hunc a solis dialecticis et intelligi, et peti, et quamlibet nihil magis habeant in ore quàm rigorem, moriar tamen, si ullus illorum scit quid est hic rigor, et ubi situs est; sed ut intelligant quod ipsi omnes ignorant, prudentiusque posthac et aptius uti possint ipso rigore, docebo eos quid sibi velit rigor hic, quem toties in ore habent.

Est in unaquaque lingua sua loquendi proprietas, quod a græcis ἰδίωμα dicitur; sunt et vocibus sua significata, suæ vires, quibus nonnunquam indoctior ipsa multitudo abutitur, doctiores indulgent utcunque plebi in sermonis usu, ipsi inter se et aliter sentiunt, et loquuntur, quamvis hæc non usque adeo multa, et fere in philosophicis abditisque sint rebus, quas ipse populus non ita exacte callet ut a philosophis intelliguntur: dabo unum ex Cicerone exemplum, quo ipsa tota res intelligatur, qui in libro de Fato ad hunc loquitur modum: *Communi igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, quum ita dicimus velle aliquid quempiam, aut nolle sine causa, ut dicamus sine externa et antecedente causa, non sine aliqua; ut cum vas inane dicitur, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet, sed ita ut, verbi causa, sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus*: hæc ille: quibus ex verbis apparet in rigore, id est in vero ac germano sermonis sensu, hoc pronuntiatum falsum esse, *hæc amphora est vacua*, similiter et hoc, *tu aliquid vis sine causa*, sed ad sensum vulgarem vera illa nonnunquam esse: est ergo hic rigor ipsa exacta et inflexa loquendi norma, nam tamquam res dura, infracta, et semper recta, appellatus est rigor, quàm bene, illi viderint qui primi sic appellarunt: est ergo, ut apertius eloquar, ipsa proprietas, ipsa expressa, nativa, ac germana vis, ipse rectus, verusque sensus orationum latinarum: at hunc

this tyranny over the language of the free Roman people, and force it to accept rules of speech from men as uncultivated and barbarian as themselves? This brings to mind an expression they are always flinging about, and that is 'rigor'. For example, they say that the statement, 'You are not a man', is indeed false according to good sense, but 'rigorously' true; therefore they concede it, since they lack good sense and speak only with rigor, colder than ice. Moreover they want this rigor to be understood and required by dialecticians alone. And though they talk of nothing but 'rigor', yet I would stake my life that none of them knows what this rigor is nor where it is to be found. But so that they may know what they all now ignore, and be able to use this same rigor more suitably and wisely in the future, I shall teach them what this rigor, which they talk about so often, really means.

Every language has its own appropriateness of speech, which the Greeks call *idioma*. Words have their own meaning, their own force, which the uneducated masses sometimes misuse. The better educated make some concessions to the common people in the use of language; among themselves they think and speak in a different manner, though not to any great extent and mostly on abstruse and philosophical subjects which the people would not be in a position to know as precisely as the philosophers understand them. I shall give one example from Cicero to illustrate this. In *De fato* he says: "We therefore misuse the common manner of speaking when we say that a person wants or does not want something for no reason, since we mean without an external and antecedent reason, not without any reason at all; or when we say that a vessel is empty, we are not speaking like natural philosophers who hold that no absolute vacuum exists, but we mean by the word 'empty' that the vessel has, for example, no water or wine or oil in it"[31]. From what he says it is plain that rigorously, that is in the true and real sense of the word, the sentence, 'This vessel is empty', is false; and so is this one, 'You wish something for no reason'; but in the everyday sense these are often true. This rigor, then, is an exact and inflexible pattern of speech, like the hard, unbroken, and always straight quality after which it was well named by those who first called it so. To state it more plainly, rigor is this very appropriateness, this distinct, innate, and genuine force, the right and true meaning of Latin discourse. But from what authors do

hunc abs quibus auctoribus petunt homines ignari? Non a Cicerone, non a Quintiliano, non etiam a Boëtio, hominibus latinis, quibus credi latinis in rebus oportet, sed a Petro Hispano, seu si quis fuit alius ante ipsum, nam de hoc parum video constare, qui confinxit eis suppositiones, ampliationes, restrictiones, appellationes, exponibilia, ex quibus rebus, tamquam ex equo Trojano, totius sermonis et omnium bonarum artium incendium atque ruina exorta sunt.

¡O miserum Ciceronem! ¡miserum Quintilianum! ¡miserum Boëtium! ¡miserum Capellam! ¡si vim sermonis latini melius novit Petrus Hispanus, quàm ipsi omnes! ¿Quis quæso est iste rigor, quo hæc enuntiatio est vera, *Tu homo non es*, hæc falsa, *Animal est omnis homo*, hæc vera, *Antichristus qui fuit, erit*, falsa hæc, *Antichristus erit, qui fuit*, ista falsa, *Astrum videns est omnis homo*, quum sit illa vera, *Omnis homo videt astrum*, ut alia taceam his pejora? ¿Quis unquam ejusmodi rigorem tradidit, qui latine scierit? ¿An quia Petrus Hispanus, qui latine inscientissimus fuit, somniavit, idcirco et verus erit? ¿perinde ac posset aliquis διάλεκτον alicujus sermonis, unde dicta est διαλεκτική, docere, qui sermonem illum ignoret? Jam et de *Incipit* ac *Desinit* pudet loqui: ¿quis hunc tradidit tam subtilem rigorem, tam subtilia instantia, tam obtusa nugamenta? ¿qua in lingua hæc excogitata sunt? ¿an in græca? ¿an in latina? ¿an in hispana? ¿an in gallica? ¿Quis unquam negavit puerum una hora, posteaquam ad scholas ductus est, incipere discere? at isti negant, quia multa præterfluxerunt instantia post primum illud quo discere incœpit; tum et hanc falsam esse ajunt, *Fons iste nunc incipit apparere, duabus tribusve horis posteaquam aqua primum manare cœpit*; neque hanc concedunt, *Hæc arbor desinit florere, paullo antequam finem omnino faciat flores emittendi, et fons desinit fluere, una semihorula antequam exiccetur*, atque ita in angustum illorum verborum *incipit* et *desinit* significationes contraxerunt, ut jam nullus eorum possit usus esse, credamque ad istorum legem de nulla prorsum re dici posse, quod aut incipiat aut desinat quicquam vel esse, vel agere, hæc omnia propter adverbium illud, *Immediate*, quod ex media bar-

ignorant men seek this quality? Not from Cicero, or from Quintilian, not even from Boethius, the Latin writers in whom trust should be reposed in matters of Latin, but from Peter of Spain, or whoever preceded him – for I find it very little established who invented for us these suppositions, ampliations, restrictions, appellations, exponibilia, from which, as from the Trojan horse, sprang the torch and destruction of all speech and all the liberal arts.

Ah! poor Cicero, poor Quintilian, poor Boethius and poor Capella, if Peter the Spaniard knows the meaning of the Latin language better than they! What, I wonder, is the particular rigor by which this sentence is true, 'You are not a man', and this is false, 'An animal is every man'; this true, 'The Antichrist who was, will be', and this false, 'The Antichrist will be who was'; this false, 'Seeing a star is every man', while this would be true, 'Every man sees a star' – not to mention worse examples. What man who knew Latin ever taught rigor of this kind? Because Peter of Spain, who did not know his Latin, dreamed it up, does that therefore make it true? Could anyone in the same way teach the discourse (*dialekton*) of any language (from which we have the word 'dialectic' (*dialektike*)) who did not know that language? By now one feels ashamed even to mention 'begins' and 'ceases'[32]. Whoever taught us such subtle rigor, such subtle 'instants', such dull frivolities? In what language were these thought out? In Greek, or Latin? In Spanish, or French? Who ever said that a child cannot begin to learn an hour after he is brought to school? But the dialecticians deny that he can, because many instants have flowed by after the first one in which he began to learn. Then they also say this statement is false, 'That spring now begins to appear two or three hours after the water first began to flow'. And they do not concede that 'This tree ceases to bloom a short while before it finally stops producing flowers', and 'A fountain ceases to flow half an hour before it dries up'. And in this hair-splitting the meaning of the words 'begins' and 'ceases' has shrunk until now they can be of no use at all. I think that according to their rules it can be said of absolutely nothing that it either begins or ceases either to be or to act. And all of this by reason of that adverb 'immediately'[33] which, barbarously derived from 'media', has

barie productum, non est minus admirabilium virium, quàm illa in quibus conclusum ipsum esse volunt.

¿Nonne hoc est ex pulcherrima lingua latina facere sermonem tam alienum ab omni ratione et sensu humano, quàm illi ipsi sunt, qui hæc faciunt? ¿Tantumne barbaris istis licere in alieno sermone? Et protinus atque identidem (si diis placet) illud objectant: *Loquamur in rigore*: loquantur potius in frigore, et in ipsa etiam glacie, quæ una satis esset ad maximas illas thermas Neronianas frigefaciendas; quasi vel scirent ipsi quid sit rigor, vel ipsorum esset, etiam si scirent, diffinire rigorem, et veram germanamque vim illius linguæ cujus sunt prorsus inscii: cedo isti universi cum suo toto ferreo et gelidissimo rigore, qui latinis hominibus præscribere volunt leges loquendi, intelligant mihi folium unum vel Ciceronis, vel Quintiliani, vel Plinii, vel Livii, vel cujusquam alterius Latini Scriptoris, ne suorum quidem Theologorum, Hieronymi, Ambrosii, Hilarii, Augustini, Cypriani: verum obsecro vos omnes, quotquot estis hujus notæ homines: ¿dicat Cicero, per enuntiationem hanc, *Socrates homo non est*, significari Socratem nullum penitus hominem esse, dicat sive Petrus Hispanus, sive quis alius ex sophistis eo quoque indoctior, significari esse aliquem hominem qui Socrates non sit, utri potius fidem haberi par est? ¿An est aliquis tam effrictæ frontis, tam perditæ impudentiæ, qui dicere audeat credi magis debere Petro Hispano in vi sermonis latini, quàm principi totius eloquentiæ Romanæ? Ergo rigor hic ab hoc petendus est, non a Petro Hispano, atque aliis sophistis: quod si hi Ciceroni contraveniunt, ¿quibus sit potius assentiendum in sensu verborum latinorum, quis non videt? Quod quum semper faciant, nusquam enim non invertunt ac depravant omnia, illi profecto frigide cum sua insania deserendi, deridendique sunt, Ciceroni vero, et aliis latinis auctoribus, parendum; etenim si non a peritissimis latinæ linguæ petitur hic rigor, sed passim confingere indoctissimo cuilibet licet, nec ullus erit rigor, et quilibet suo arbitratu, atque adeo libidine, logicam nobis afferret.

Quod et satis isti faciunt, quum sensa verborum diversi di-

powers no less admirable than those assertions in which they want to couch it.

Does this not make of the beautiful Latin language a speech as foreign to all human order and sense as those who perpetrate these things? To think of such license being allowed to those barbarians with regard to a language not their own! Promptly and repeatedly, if you please, they object, 'Let us speak rigorously'. Let them speak frigorously, if they wish, and even with ice enough to chill by itself the great warm baths of Nero. As if they knew what rigor is or, even if they knew, had the right to define rigor and the true and genuine force of that language of which they are wholly ignorant. Come, let the whole crowd with all their iron and icy rigor, who would like to dictate the rules of speech to Latin-speaking men, construe for me one page of Cicero or Quintilian, or Pliny or Livy, or any other Latin writer, or even of their own theologians – Jerome, Ambrose, Hilary, Augustine, Cyprian. Come, I challenge all you men of this stamp: if Cicero were to say that the sentence, 'Socrates is not a man', means Socrates is no man at all, and if Peter of Spain or some other of these sophisters even more uncultivated than he, were to say it means there is some man who is not Socrates, which one ought we to believe? Is there anyone so barefaced or incorrigibly impudent that he dares to say that on the meaning of the Latin language more credence should be given to Peter of Spain than to the prince of all Roman eloquence? We must look for this rigor, then, in him and not in Peter of Spain and the other sophisters. Because if these contradict Cicero, is it not plain with whom we should concur on the meaning of Latin words? And since they always do contradict him, for they pervert and debase everything, certainly we should leave them with their frigid folly and laugh them to scorn, and conform to Cicero and other Latin authors. For if we do not seek this rigor in the most accomplished Latin writers, but allow any untrained person anywhere to invent it, there will be no rigor, and any person can offer us a logic to suit his own will and fancy.

This is what they are certainly doing, when different men interpret

diverse explicant, unusquisque pro suo ignaro captu; nam hi hoc genus suppositionum asserunt, alii negant, hi sic explicant implicitas enuntiationes, quas exponibiles vocant, alii non item, sed contratio modo; quippe cum res pro insciorum hominum libito et intemperiis jactetur, unusquisque sua vult inventa ostentare, alienisque præferre; ¿in quo quæ ars esse potest? quum unus quivis, quod inter potandum aut balneandum ipsi in mentem venit, extemplo asseverat, et chartis illinit atris, vultque pro lege haberi, atque pro eo digladiatur, tamquam pro aris et focis; citius hominem interficias, quàm pravam opinionem ab eo avertas: et quia dixi inter potandum et balneandum, ne quis putet id a me per lusum per jocumque dici, librum ostendere possum syllogismorum (cujus auctorem Tu optime nosti) quorum secundi ordinis tertia forma, quæ *Festino* vulgo nuncupatur, inter pocula, in thermis sancti Martini, me, Arnoldo, et Rocca præsentibus, ac de industria cantillantibus ut auctori perstreperemus, ut ex nomine rem sortiretur vere festino, fœda stribligine exarata, et intempestive, tamquam abortus fœtus, postridie ante lucem ejecta est; ¿quid ni hæc et pejora faciant celeriusque, quorum est tota ars, nulla uti arte, sed sibi unumquenque pro libito viam facere, qua ingrediatur.

¿Ac tum demum se rem assequutum præclaram existimare, quum ab omnibus per omnia longe discrepat, nihilque sic tradit, ut ab aliquo alio est antea traditum? Et ego nimirum, aliqua ex cogitata vanissima regula, dicam has orationes: *Animal est homo, corpus est iste lapis*, quamvis in bono sensu tamquam veræ recipiantur, in rigore tamen falsas esse, daboque hanc regulam: *Omnem enuntiationem esse falsam, in qua prædicetur inferius de suo superiore*: ut illi in gymnasio Montis acuti, quo nostra importuna fugerent argumenta, formulam sibi commenti sunt: *Omne pronuntiatum, in quo esset alter alius esse impossibile de forma acceptionis terminorum*: consuluerunt bene sibi, nam et impune id eis facere licebat; ¿quis enim rem, quæ pro libidine ab unoquovis, quamlibet inscio, vulgo fingitur, refutasset? Alia etiam stultiora ego comminiscar; reprobare certe nulla ratione poterunt, quin eadem omnia ipsorum excogitata comminuan-

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words in different ways, each according to his own ignorant notion. For some assert one kind of supposition, others reject it. Some explain in one way the intricate propositions that they call exponibles,[34] others in just the contrary way, since when a subject is talked about according to the whim and folly of ignorant men, everybody wants to show off his own inventions and have them prevail over the others'. What art can there be in this? Anyone at all promptly asserts whatever comes into his head while drinking or bathing, spreads it blackly onto paper, wants it regarded as law, and fights to the death for it as for hearth and home; you might sooner kill the fellow than deprive him of a wrong idea. And when I say 'while drinking or bathing', I am not saying it for fun or in jest. I can show you a book of syllogisms whose author you know very well, of which the third mood of the second figure, commonly called *Festino*, was composed while drinking in the baths of St. Martin; Arnold, Rocca and I were there, diligently singing to surround the author with a great noise, so that in keeping with its name he might get the thing out truly *festino*,[35] written with disgraceful solecisms and prematurely, like an aborted offspring, cast out before dawn the next day.

Why should they not do this and worse than this, and even more quickly? Their whole art is to use no art, but every man travels his own road wherever it leads, at his own pleasure, and thinks he has finally reached a glorious goal when he differs widely in every respect from everyone else, and propounds nothing as it ever was taught by anyone else before him. To be sure I, too, could make up some meaningless rules. I could say that these sentences, though common sense accepts them as true, are still 'rigorously' false: 'An animal is man', 'A body is this stone', and then give this rule: 'Every statement in which the lower is predicated of the higher is false'[36]. In the same way the dialecticians at the College of Montaigu, to avoid our troublesome arguments, invented for themselves the rule: "Every proposition in which 'other than another' appears is impossible according to the acceptance of terms"[37]. They looked out well for themselves, as indeed they could do unchallenged, for what single person would have refuted a rule arbitrarily made up by any group, however ignorant? I could make up others even more foolish, and they could not possibly reject them without breaking to pieces all those same contrived rules of their own.

tur: et videamus ¿cur mihi homini, qui utcunque latine scio, minus habebitur fidei, quàm conterraneo nostro Petro Hispano, qui ne umbram quidem latini sermonis viderat?

At fortassis inquient: Tu non habes auctoritatem faciendi regulas, ut habebat Petrus Hispanus: ridiculum profecto responsum, et vere hominum ineptissime delirantium; perinde quasi homini, in extrema Scythia nato et educato, auctoritas esse posset tradendarum in sermone, vel Gallico, vel Hispano, formularum, quem ille nunquam audiverit: ¿quis quæso auctoritatem hanc dedit Petro Hispano, ut novas ferret leges in lingua, quam ne de facie quidem norat, cujus etiam si nonnulla vocabula pronuntiabat, vim tamen cujusquam verbi non magis scivit, quàm ille, de quo modo loquebar, Scytha vim sermonis Hispani, cujus nec verbum, vel scriptum legit, vel prolatum a quoquam audivit? Quod ego sane hominis non dico fuisse vitium, sed illorum temporum; modestiam tamen ipsius, ut aliorum permultorum, requiro, qui sua placita, sua plusquàm pueriliter somniata, volebant ilico pro lege esse in lingua ipsis ignotissima, ac voluissem juxta vetus præceptum, ut *se se novissent*, nec pelliculam excessissent suam, ne in eos protinus jactatum esset illud ex trivio, quod jam fit passim: *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*

Verum ego a Petro isto Hispano, quamlibet nostrati, seu ab eo qui nobis hanc tam elegantem dialecticam peperit (nam sunt qui putent hæc primum in Britannia aut Hybernia orta, deinde Parisiis alita atque aucta) ab illo igitur, quisquis tandem fuit, pervelim audire, ¿cur cum ipse suppositiones, et expositiones illarum enuntiationum, atque horum similia, quæ traduntur in parum logicalibus, nunquam a Boetio acceperit, Aristoteles ipse non præcipiat, tam impudenter illa confinxerit, et præscripserit sensus enuntiationum contra rationem omnem sermonis latini, quem nec primis, ut dicunt, labris gustarat, nec summis olfecerat naribus? Cujus profecto leges veræ si sunt, in Cicerone, Varrone, Quintiliano, Plinio, Boetio, et aliis latinis, latinæ orationes innumeræ, in Aristotele, Platone, Theophrasto, Carneade, Chrysippo, et ceteris Græcis, græcæ, non

ex

But let us consider why I, who do know Latin to some extent, should be given less credence than our fellow-countryman Peter of Spain, who had not seen even the shadow of the Latin language?

Perhaps some will say, 'You have not the authority to make rules that Peter of Spain had'. Surely a ridiculous answer; truly the reply of absurdly raving men. As if a man born and brought up in far-off Scythia[38] could have the authority to propound rules in a language – French, say, or Spanish – which he had never heard. Who, pray, gave this authority to Peter of Spain to make new laws for a language with which he had not even a nodding acquaintance? Even if he spoke some words in it, still he no more understood their true meaning than that Scythian I just mentioned knew the meaning of Spanish, of which he had neither read a written word nor heard one spoken. Of course I do not say this was the fault of the man, but of the times in which he lived. But I do question his lack of moderation and that of many others who wished their opinions, their more than childish fancies, to be instantly accepted as laws in a language they did not know at all. And I should have hoped they would follow the old injunction to 'know themselves' and not exceed their own limits, to avoid being continually taunted – as they now commonly are – by the proverb, 'Cobbler, stick to your last!'[39]

Still, I should very much like to hear from this Peter of Spain, compatriot that he is, or from whoever begot for us this elegant dialectic (for some people think it had its origin in Britain or Ireland, and then was fostered and developed in Paris):[40] since the suppositions and expositions of those propositions and their like which are taught in the *Too Little Logicals*[41] were never taught by Boethius, nor by Aristotle himself, why did he have the impudence to invent them,[42] and dictate meanings of propositions that are contrary to the whole nature of the Latin language, which he had neither tasted, as the saying goes, with the tip of his tongue, nor sniffed with the tip of his nose? Surely if his rules are right, countless sentences in Cicero, Varro, Quintilian, Pliny, Boethius and other Latin writers will turn out to be wrong, and as many Greek sentences in Aristotle, Plato, Theophrastus, Carneades, Chrysippus, and other Greeks – not in their content, but out of their authors' ignorance of those

ex ipsius rei, sed ex istarum suppositionum, ampliationum, expositionum ignoratione falsæ invenientur; nec solum in Aristotelis vel morali, vel naturali philosophia, sed in ipsa quoque dialectica: ¿quid quòd nec Petrus quidem ipse Hispanus ad eas quas tulit normas locutus est? Nec est aliquis, non dico doctorum hominum, sed ne istorum quidem Pseudo-dialecticorum, qui ita circunspecte possit loqui, ut in suas vanissimas leges, formasque, passim non peccet; nec mirum, quippe sunt contra omnem loquendi consuetudinem et rationem ab istis somniatæ: atqui Aristoteles ne minimam quidem regulam diffinivit in tota sua dialectica, quæ non congrueret cum ipso sermonis græci sensu, quo docti homines, quo pueri, mulierculæ, plebs denique universa utebatur.

Neque enim dialecticus novam facit traditque vim linguæ, sed ex vetere et usitatissima regulas observatas docet, quemadmodum antea disserui; cujus porro philosophi logica brevibus præceptis tota constat, dictionum videlicet natura quæ docetur in libris *Categoriarum*, Enuntiationum viribus quæ in *Perihermenias*, tum formulis collectionum quæ in *prioribus Analyticis*, adjectis, et quæ demonstrant in *posterioribus*, et quæ probabili suadent ratione, quæque ad inventionem faciunt, in *topicis*, et quæ astute cavillantur, in *elenchis*; quo instrumento adjutum juvenem mox ad reliquas artes scientiasque transmittit, nam ea quæ aliarum rerum gratia discuntur, de quorum numero est dialectica, non diu occupare studia debent, sed eatenus illis opera danda est, quatenus in iis egemus artibus, quarum causa reliqua comparantur; neque intricat et detinet Aristoteles suum discipulum frigidissimis et stultissimis suppositionibus, ampliationibus, restrictionibus, litterulis, quæ si ad logicum instrumentum attinere vidisset, ¿quis credat virum et ingenio, et studio tanto, inventorem illarum formarum, syllogismorum, atque adeo totius dialecticæ, fuisse prætermissurum? Verum ipse non censuit illa tradenda præter omnem rationem artis dialecticæ, utpote quibus communis hominum et sensus, et sermo non modo non utatur, sed etiam refragetur; quòd si litterulis uti voluisset eo modo quo isti, ¿quid attine-

suppositions, ampliations and expositions; and this will be true not only of Aristotle's moral and natural philosophy, but also of his logic. Even Peter of Spain himself did not speak according to those norms he imposed. There is no one, scholar or even pseudodialectician, who can speak so circumspectly that he does not repeatedly sin against these empty rules and forms – and no wonder, since they were dreamed up by these men in defiance of every custom and propriety in speaking. And yet Aristotle did not define even the smallest rule in his entire dialectic so that it would not conform to the same meaning of Greek speech that scholars and children and women and all the common people used.

For a dialectician does not fashion and transmit a new meaning of language, but teaches rules taken from that old and familiar meaning, as I have said before. Aristotle's whole logic consists of brief precepts, namely, on the nature of terms, which is taught in the *Categories*; the meaning of propositions in *On Interpretation*; then on the principles of syllogisms, in the *Prior Analytics*, the principles of demonstration in the *Posterior Analytics*, those which convince by probability and make for invention in the *Topics*, and those which make an astute use of sophisms in the *Sophistical Refutations*. With the help of this instrument he leads the youth on directly to the other arts and sciences.[43] For disciplines that are learned for the sake of other disciplines, and dialectic is one of these, should not occupy our studies for long, but we should work on them only as much as we need, to prepare us for those other arts. Aristotle does not entangle and detain his pupil in these stupid and dreary suppositions, ampliations, restrictions, and verbal quibbles. If he had thought these had anything to do with the instrument of dialectic, who can believe that a man of such genius and zeal, the inventor of those very forms and syllogisms and indeed of all logic itself, would have failed to mention them? But he did not think them worth teaching, because they are irrelevant to the whole nature of the dialectic art, since common sense and normal human speech not only never used them but positively rejected them. For if he had wanted to use verbal quibbles the way these do, what use was there in saying that a universal proposition converts

nebat dicere universalem enuntiationem in particularem converti? ut, *Omnis voluptas est bonum*, sic, *aliquod bonum est voluptas*; ¿cur non sic expeditius vertebat Aristoteles? *a bonum est omnis voluptas*; tum cum dicis particularem negativam in se non recurrere, quòd non bene colligat quispiam, si dixerit, *Aliquod animal non est homo*, ergo *aliquis homo non est animal*, ¿quid facis?

En doctissimi isti quos Tu prius docuisti, nunc quasi ἀντιπελαργοῦντες vicissim Te docent sic convertere, *Omnis homo b animal non est*, aut etiam sine litteris in pronuntiatum ejusdem quantitatis, *Aliquis homo animal non est*: at multi ex istis non dissimulant futilia esse hæc omnia, verum illa discenda volunt quòd puerorum acuant ingenia; scilicet, ¿est hæc Arithmetica illa, qua Pythagoras et probabat, et exercebat, et excitabat suorum ingenia adolescentium? Porro si puerorum ingenia dicit rebus hisce acui, ¿cur senes senibus in Theologia hæc traditis, ut ludibrio potius habere videamini gravissimam et sanctissimam disciplinam quàm docere? et facitis quidem more vestro, nusquam non etiam in maxime seriis rebus ludentes, magnamque ubique deludentes audientium spem, ut transeam quæ quidam, etiam prava consuetudine inducti, in medicam artem ex hac juvenili stultitia inferunt maximo cum dispendio valetudinis corporum humanorum; at illud non tacebo, quanta cum jactura et animarum, et totius religionis, hæc a monachis discuntur docenturque, quos non pudet, homines, ut ipsi vocant, religiosos, et quibus disciplinis secularibus nonnunquam interdicitur, has ingeniorum corruptelas amplecti, et arctius frequenter ipsis profanis hominibus: quin et sunt nonnulli ex istis, atque ex eorum numero qui theologi nominantur, qui nihil putant acute posse dici, nisi sit hoc amarissimo condimento conditum, horrida atque inculta barbarie concinnatum, istis sophismatum ineptissimis differtum tricis.

Fuit ipsorum quidam, qui cum fama et sermone hominum accepisset Divum Augustinum magnum fuisse dialecticum, incidissetque in manus ejus libellus quidam illius, avidus legit ut aliquem inde casum, aliquam instantiam arriperet; miratum ferunt ipsum, in homine tam logico ne verbum quidem esse

de

into a particular one: 'All pleasure is good', thus 'Some good is pleasure?' Why did Aristotle not transpose it more readily this way: 'Good *a* is all pleasure?'[44] Then, since you [Aristotle] say that a negative particular cannot be converted because it would make no sense to say 'Some animal is not man, therefore some man is not animal', what happens? Behold, those same experts you once taught, now, as if to repay the favor, teach you to transpose this way: 'Every man *b* an animal is not'; or even without letters in a proposition of the same quantity: 'Some man an animal is not'.

Now many of them do not deny that all of this is futile, but they want to teach it because it sharpens the boys' wits. To be sure. It is like the arithmetic that Pythagoras used, to train and kindle the minds of his young students. But if, as Pythagoras says, these things are to sharpen the wits of boys, why do you, old men that you are, pass them along to other old men in theology, so that you seem to deride a most grave and holy discipline rather than teach it?[45] And you go on as usual, always making fun even of highly serious matters, and always disappointing the high expectations of your listeners. I shall not mention that some men, misled by this bad training, have carried over this puerile stupidity into the medical art, at great cost to men's bodily health; but I shall not keep silent about the great detriment to souls and all religion that comes from monks learning and teaching these things. Though they call themselves religious men, to whom secular disciplines are sometimes forbidden, they are not ashamed to embrace these intellectual corruptions more strongly, often, than laymen. And indeed some of these, and theologians among them, think that nothing can be intelligently said unless it is spiced with this bitter condiment, made up of rough and uncouth barbarisms, and stuffed with these silly tricks of sophismata.

One of these had learned by hearsay that St. Augustine was a great logician; when some little book of Augustine's came into his hands, he read it avidly, hoping to come upon some 'hypothesis', some 'instants'. They say he was amazed that in so logical a man there was no slightest

de *asinis*, et *alter alius*, non de instantiis, non de casibus, non de reduplicativis, de exclusivis, nec de aliqua ex iis rebus, quæ traduntur in parum seu parvis logicalibus; quin quòd homo subtilissimus acerque disputator, quum de Trinitate dissereret, nullam fecerit mentionem de distributione completa et incompleta, de particularizatione, de singularizatione completa et incompleta, de suppositis mediatis, et immediatis, quibus syllogismi illi divini fiunt, quîs sine jam olim hæretici totam nostram de Trinitate sanctissimam fidem fuissent demoliti; ex quibus etiam manant illa nostra, non tam vera et pia, quàm illa erant Stoicorum, sed certe admirabiliora Paradoxa: *Filius Dei Deus non est*: *Spiritus sanctus Essentia diVina non est*: *Omnis filius est pater, et omnis filius non est pater*: *Deus non est Pater*: *Essentia diVina generat Filium, et Essentia diVina nihil generat*: *Spiritus sanctus, Spiritus sanctus non est*: *Unus est Pater Deus, ille est suus Filius, et non est suus Filius*: et quamvis symbolum Nycenum, totiusque consensus ecclesiæ neget, plures esse Deos, plures increatos, omnipotentes, creatores, æternos, immensos, isti tamen invictis suis concertationibus tres Deos, tres increatos, totidem omnipotentes, creatores, æternos, immensos esse strenue defendunt, reclamantibus universis patribus, repugnante pietate Christiana, invitis Angelis omnibus cum ipso Deo, dæmonibus etiam confidentissimam istorum mirantibus temeritatem; quin et parturiunt jam nobis eodem ex semine et satu tres Trinitates, totidem divinas usias, profecto enim quisquis admiserit, tres Deos esse, velit nolit, tres etiam Trinitates, Essentias divinas tres concedat necesse est, quomodocumque tandem vocabulorum depravationibus luserit, quodcumque in latus illa tamquam tesseras converterit; sed ad meum Augustinianum lectorem redeo.

Tum illud pariter mirabatur, quod cum de baptismo tractaret, non disputarit de illis vere theologicis enuntiationibus, et in primis necessariis fidei nostræ, *Aqua requiritur ad baptizandum, et ad baptizandum requiritur aqua, an detur minima aqua quæ exigitur, minima quæ non exigitur, maxima quæ requiritur, maxima quæ non requiritur, maxima quæ sufficit non requiritur, maxima quæ nec sufficit nec requiritur, minima quæ sufficit nec requiritur*

mention of 'donkeys', and 'the one, the other', nothing of 'instants' or of, 'hypothesis', nothing of reduplicatives or exclusives or any of those other things that are taught in the poor or *parva logicalia*. How was it that that most subtle man and sharp disputer, when he discussed the Trinity, made no mention of complete and incomplete distribution, of particularisation, of complete and incomplete singularisation, of mediate and immediate suppositions, which make up those divine syllogisms without which heretics would long ago have destroyed our sacred faith in the Trinity?[46]. They also gave us our Paradoxes, not so true and upright as the Stoics' were, but certainly more wonderfully paradoxical:

> The Son of God is not God. The Holy Ghost is not the divine Essence. Every Son is the Father and every Son is not the Father. God is not the Father. The divine Essence begets the Son and the divine Essence begets nothing. The Holy Ghost is not the Holy Ghost. God the Father is one, He is his Son and is not his Son.[47]

And although the Nicene Creed and the consensus of the whole Church deny that there is more than one God, more than one uncreated, omnipotent, eternal, and immense creator, these men still, in their invincible disputations, strenuously maintain that there are three Gods, three uncreated, omnipotent, eternal, and immense creators, and this over the loud protests of all the Church Fathers and the resistance of Christian piety, and in spite of all the angels and of God Himself, while the very devils wonder at their impudent temerity. Indeed they have brought forth for us, from the same seed and sowing, three Trinities and as many divine Essences, for certainly whoever admits that there are three Gods must also admit, willy nilly, three Trinities and three divine Essences, however he may finally play with words in distorted meanings and to whichever side he moves them, like counters in a game.

But to return to my reader of Augustine. He was equally surprised that when Augustine discussed baptism he did not examine those truly theological propositions that are absolutely essential to our faith:

> Water is required for baptism, and for baptism water is required. Should the minimal amount of water required be administered, or the minimum which is not required? the maximum which is required, or the maximum which is not required? the maximum which suffices though not required, or the maximum which is neither sufficient nor required? the minimum which suffices though not

tur, minima quæ nec sufficit nec requiritur, et alia ejusmodi pene divina, sine quibus nostra pietas destrui non potest, construi dicere cogitabam, semper hic erro, nam reliqua destruunt, hæc, hæc sola ædificant, ita ut dubium adhuc esset, cum in sacro baptisterio deest aqua, quot et quam magnis guttis aquæ posset presbyter infantem baptizare, nisi illa doctores scripsissent, quæ quamvis sacerdos ignoret, nihilominus tamen baptizat, idque in fide doctorum qui illa tradiderunt, et ea ut sunt super sententias scripta, fulciunt cum baptismum, tum etiam totam fidem brevi alioqui ruituram, quæ a nemine nec tractari nec proferri possunt nisi sit doctor, quàm doctus ad rem non facit, doctorem esse oportet: verum ille qui ea se in Augustino haudquaquam invenisse miratus est, protinus desiit mirari, et causam cur illa Augustinus non tradidisset, bonis et admodum certis conjecturis deprehendit, quòd ille latine scripserit, hæc vero nisi pingui atque adeo barbaro modo tradi non possunt, nam hic sermo, barbarismis et solœcismis scatens, solus est quo res theologicæ magistraliter diffiniri possunt; atque in hanc stultissimam et pestiferam opinionem plerique adducti sunt, ut philosophiam, ut theologiam, ut reliquas artes incorrupto sermone tradi non posse credant.

Si quid paullo cultius scriptum est, quodcunque sit ejus argumentum, illud (tam inscii et stupidi sunt) non philosophiam, non theologiam, non jus, non medicinam, sed grammaticam vocant; Ciceronis vel Officia, vel Paradoxa, vel Tusculanas quæstiones, vel Academicas, grammaticam esse dicunt; solum id quod ipsi faciunt, quia regulis grammaticis subditum non est, omnibus sermonis sordibus mire redundans, grammatica non est; quod ego plane ita esse fateor; etenim illud nec grammatica, nec aliud est. Scotus, Ocham, Paulus Venetus, Hentisber, Gregorius Ariminensis, Suisethus, Adam Godam, Bockin Kam, non grammatici, sed philosophi et theologi, ab ipsis intelliguntur; Cicero, Plinius, Hieronymus, Ambrosius, grammatici extra scholam sunt, a grammaticis intelligantur; ¿ quî enim, inquiunt, fieri potest ut terso illo atque eleganti stilo, ne latine quidem, nec ulla propria germana, et

non

required, or the minimum which is neither sufficient nor required?[48]

and other almost godlike things of this kind, without which there could be no destruction to our piety (I meant to say structure; I always make this slip, for they destroy everything else; this, and this alone, they build up). So that there would be doubt to this day, when water is needed in the baptistery, as to how many and how large drops of water the priest should use to baptize an infant, unless the doctors had written down these things. Although the priest may not know them, he nonetheless baptizes out of confidence in the doctors who propounded them, and since they are glossed upon the *Sentences*, they are the prop both of baptism and of the whole faith that would soon fall in ruins without them. Such matters cannot be treated or even mentioned by anyone but a doctor; how 'doctus' does not matter, so long as he is a doctor.

But our man who was amazed to find none of this in Augustine soon ceased to wonder, and grasped through sound and absolutely certain conjecture why Augustine had not discussed it: it was because he wrote in Latin, and these things could not be propounded except in a heavy and barbarous manner. For this language of theirs, abounding in barbarisms and solecisms, is the only one in which theological matters can be magisterially expounded.

Many people have been persuaded by this, so that they believe that philosophy, theology, and the other arts cannot be taught in incorrupt language. If anything is written in a little more cultivated style, whatever its subject, these men in their ignorance and stupidity call it not philosophy, or theology, or law, or medicine, but grammar. Anything of Cicero's – the *Offices*, the *Paradoxes*, the *Tusculan Questions*, the *Academica* – they call grammar. Only what they teach, because it is not subject to the laws of grammar, but strangely abounding in every vulgarity of speech, is not grammar – which I readily admit to be true, for indeed it is neither grammar nor anything else. Scotus, Ockham, Paul of Venice, Heytesbury, Gregory of Rimini, Swyneshead, Adam Woodham, Buckingham, not being 'grammarians' but philosophers and theologians, they understand.[49] Cicero, Pliny, Jerome, Ambrose are nonscholastic grammarians; let the grammarians interpret them. For

non depravata, nec immunda lingua, philosophia, theologia, ceteræque artes perhibeantur? ¡Quo quid potest insanius dici! quem errorem ego, si decem annos valetudine non prorsus adversa Dei beneficio vixero, e mentibus illorum non argumentis, sed ipsa re delebo. ¿Ceterum, ut eodem redeam unde sum egressus, re falsa, re stulta, re inepta, frivola, insana, credam ego acui ingenium cujusquam? Solidis verisque rebus pascitur nostra mens, et firmum alimentum sumit, inanibus vero etiam tumet, præfertque speciem quandam bonæ valetudinis, ut tumentia in corpore membra, quum alioqui et hæc affectissima sint, et illa insanissima; atque his ita credo exacui discentium ingenia, ut cum ad alia, quamlibet parva debiliaque scindenda et penetranda, accommodantur, tota ipsorum extemplo rumpatur acies, fiatque pistillo retusior: tum etiam, ¿tantum putant nobis isti homines superesse otii et temporis ad meliora discenda, ut jacturam nullam fieri existiment ejus temporis quod hujusmodi in rebus insumitur?

¡O stultum hominem Theophrastum, quem Græcia divinum appellavit, qui brevitatem vitæ humanæ querebaris, in qua tempus non suppeteret ad veras disciplinas, quæ ad sapientiam, ad bene beateque vivendum perducerent, addiscendas, ita ut tum moriamur, cum sapere aliquid incipimus! En tibi homines tam redundantes tempore, ut etiam vacet eis multos bonos annos plusquàm anilibus deliriis impertiri, nec solum nihil agere et feriari, sed id multo labore, molestissimo et assiduo negotio construere, quod postmodum non minore destruendum sit: verum si veteres morbi sanari repente non possunt, nec assueta res uno impetu convelli, detur sane aliquid consuetudini, pessimæ licet, discantur hæc ab iis qui ea tam scire avent, pauculis tamen mensibus, ut intelligant quanta sit insania; ac videant ii qui id fecerint, ne prava loquendi consuetudine, fœda barbarie, ac inversis verborum sensis, in meliorum disciplinarum fructu capiendo impediantur, nolimque illos ita tenacis esse memoriæ, ut eluere facile nequeant hæc, semel si adhæserint; illorum tamen ego in primis vices doleo, qui decem, qui sedecim, qui viginti annos, totam

how, they ask, is it possible to present subjects like philosophy, theology, and the other arts in that terse and elegant style, in a Latin, or any particular real language, that is pure and uncorrupted? Can any remark be more foolish than this? If I live another ten years in reasonably good health, by God's grace, I will erase this error from their minds, not by argument, but by example.[50]

But to go back to where I left off, am I to believe that what is false, silly, inept, frivolous, and unsound will sharpen any man's wit? Our mind feeds upon real and substantial things and shows a certain appearance of good health, like swollen limbs in the body, though the mind is actually much affected, just as the swollen limbs are most unhealthy.[51] But I think that the wits of students are sharpened by these things only to such effect that when they apply them to dissecting or penetrating other subjects, however small or weak, their whole edge suddenly breaks and becomes blunter than a pestle. Besides, do these men think there is so much time and leisure left us for better studies that they consider time spent on things of this kind not wasted? Ah, poor, foolish Theophrastus, whom Greece called divine, who complained that human life was so short that there was not time enough to acquire the true disciplines that lead to wisdom and a good and happy life, so that we die just as we are beginning to be a little wise! Look at the men with so much time to spare that they can afford to devote many good years to ravings fit for old women. They have time not only to be idle and keep holiday, but to build, with much work and trouble and diligent pains, something which afterwards, with no less labor, has to be destroyed. But if chronic illness cannot be suddenly cured, nor customary usage overturned by one assault, surely some allowance must be made for habit, however bad. Let those who long so much to know these things learn them, but in a few short months, just to understand how senseless they are. And let those who have learned them take care lest bad habits of speech, ugly barbarisms and perverted meanings of words keep them from enjoying the fruits of the better disciplines. I would not want their memory to be so tenacious that they could not easily let go of these things once they have grasped them. I pity especially the lot of those who spend ten, sixteen, twenty years, sometimes even a whole lifetime, on this pursuit; wretched and barren souls and destined, to my mind, for the

etiam interdum ætatem, huic impendunt rei: misera atque sterilia ingenia, et mea sententia, ad paleam, siliquas, aristas, non ad frugem nata: atque his tam pulchris rebus occupatis, nunquam vacat vel Theophrastum, vel Platonem, vel Plinium, vel aliquem bonorum scriptorum legere; ¿quid hæc dico? proferant mihi duas ex vii. illis artibus liberalibus, quas ipsi universas ambitiosa *sui magisterii* appellatione profitentur, quas ipsi didicerint; nec ipsum certe Aristotelem, non dico in naturali vel morali philosophia, sed ne in dialectica quidem, vel de facie cognitum habent, quam se se tradere inverecunde profitentur, quum eam ipsi nunquam viderint.

Neque est eorum aliquis, qui difinire sciat quæ pars dialectices sit de inventione, quæ de judicio, et quo modo duobus his uti debeamus: quid quod tametsi in ipsa bona veraque dialectica versarentur, non tamen deberent tanto in ea tempore desidere; ars enim est dialectica, quæ non sua causa addiscitur, sed ut reliquis artibus adminiculum præstet, et quasi famuletur, idcirco non est in ea plus operæ insumendum, quàm satis est ad ceterarum artium ministerium, quod dialectica exercet; nam qui multam diem in dialectica conterit, nec ad alias scientias se confert, non secus facit quàm qui comparato cribro, quo farinam excernat, panesque conficiat, in eo aptando componendoque plus æquo immoratur; instrumentum comparari celeriter debet, et aliud in eo non curandum quàm ut sit operi faciendo accommodum; inepte profecto facit quisquis in eo anxie componendo longum laborem adit, et non protinus illi operi, propter quod instrumentum paratum est, se se accingit, modo instrumentum illud operam morari atque impedire suo aliquo vitio non possit, nam alioqui curandum hoc in primis esset: itaque tanta est dialecticæ artis accipienda cognitio, quantum sat est ad efficiendum ne illius ignoratio in reliquis artibus nobis officere queat: ¿jam eum, qui perpetuo intra fines illius se continet, ferre quis possit? ¿Quis ferat pictorem in componendo penicillo, in terendis coloribus, sutorem in acubus, in subulis, smiliis, ceterisque cultris acuendis, in torquendo incerandoque filo, in setis illi addendis, to-

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straw, husks, and beards of grain and not the kernels. Occupied with such splendid matters as these, they never have time to read Theophrastus or Plato or Pliny or any of the good writers. Why do I say this? They teach all of the seven liberal arts, with the ostentatious title of their 'mastership;' let them show me even two of them that they have learned. They certainly have not even a passing acquaintance with Aristotle, in natural or moral philosophy or even in dialectic, which they shamelessly profess to teach, although they themselves have never understood it.[52]

Not one of them can define which part of dialectic has to do with invention, which part with judgment, and how the two should be used.[53] Even if they were expert in the true and good dialectic, they still should not waste so much time at it. For dialectic is an art to be learned not for its own sake, but to be a support to the other arts and, as it were, to wait upon them; therefore no more effort should be spent on it than is necessary for the service that dialectic performs for the other arts. A man who spends a long time on dialectic and does not apply himself to the other branches of learning, is just like a man who, having bought a sieve to sift flour and make bread, takes overlong in fitting and putting it together. A tool should be readied quickly, and require only enough care to fit it to do its work. Only a foolish man devotes long and anxious effort to putting together a tool, and does not promptly set himself to the work for which it is prepared; his only concern should be that the tool cannot, through some intrinsic flaw, delay and impede his work. And so we should acquire only so much knowledge of the art of dialectic as to insure that ignorance of it cannot stand in our way in the other arts. Who now can bear the man who forever confines himself within its limits? Who would tolerate a painter who spent his whole life preparing his brush and grinding his pigments, or a cobbler sharpening his needles and his awls and his different kinds of knives, twisting and waxing his cord and adding strands to it? But if we would not tolerate such things even in

tam ætatem consumere? Quod si hæc etiam in bona dialectica ferenda non sunt quæ est equidem ars neutiquam aspernanda, ¿quantum erunt in illa omnium artium corruptrice garrulitate ferenda?

Si meum judicium requiris, ego profecto sic sentio: quemadmodum quod opus non est, emptum asse est carum, ut prudentissimus ille senex dicebat Cato, ita in hac inutili et vanissima dialectica vel unam consumtam semihoram esse nimis; quam quidem non esse artem, vel illo argumento manifestum est, quòd disciplina omnis, omnisque ars in aliquem usum est inventa et comparata; hæc quidem, ut agamus, transeatque in operas eruditio, cujusmodi sunt Rhetorice, Musice, Medicina, Juris facultas, et reliquæ permultæ; illa vero solum ut sciamus, velut Astronomia, velut illa pars Theologiæ quæ contemplatione divinæ illius majestatis, ut Magdalena illa, contenta est: at ista tam recondita dialectice, ¿quid quæso docet? non profecto aliquid agere, nam nemo est tam expers omnis sensus, tam a mente omni atque judicio alienus, ut prodigiis illis enuntiationum velit ullo in sermone uti, quibus, tamquam re inauspicata et infausta, audientes omnes terreret et fugaret, nisi cum apud diobolarios suos discipulos ejusmodi monstris assuefactos, angulo quopiam pediculari, fœtoris et squalloris pleno, dementit, deliratque; quo clare quivis vel stupidissimus perspiciat, quum dialectica eo inventa sit ut ejus usus alias ad disciplinas accommodetur, hæc, quam isti docent, ad reliquas disciplinas advehi, aptarique non possit, fieri ut ea neutiquam dialectica sit; at scientiam ex hac dialectica expectari, ne ipsius quidem præceptores, quamlibet sint fastuosi, quamlibet ostentatores vani et jactabundi, jubent; satis etiam indicat nullam in istis esse scientiam, quòd nec in eis habitus est ullus, neque enim hæc more ceterarum artium atque scientiarum sui firmum vestigium, quem habitum nominamus, post se relinquunt, simul enim ac primum scholas exis, nisi tenacissima es memoria, totus ille fumus, minima quaque aura discussus, evanescit; atque hæc ipsa est causa, cur isti, qui tota ætate ejusmodi rebus dediti fuerunt, quum senuere, scholasticasque

good dialectic, which I consider an art by no means to be despised, how much should we tolerate it in the case of that garrulity that corrupts all the arts?[54]

If you would like my opinion, here is what I think: If a penny is too much to spend on anything we do not need, as wise old Cato said, so even one half-hour is too much to spend on this futile and empty dialectic. The proof that it is not even an art is that every discipline and every art was invented and designed for some purpose. There are some arts, for example, – rhetoric, music, medicine, law and many others – that we practice, and translate our learning into action. There are others we can simply know, such as astronomy or that branch of theology which, like the Magdalene, is content with contemplating the Divine Majesty. But what, pray, does this so abstruse dialectic teach us? Certainly not to do anything, for no one is so bereft of all sense, so remote from all reason and judgment, that he would use these prodigious propositions in any conversation (they would frighten and put all his hearers to flight like an evil and inauspicious omen), unless he is talking wild nonsense among his own two-penny disciples used to monstrosities of this kind, in some lousy corner filled with stench and squalor.[55] Therefore even the dullest person should clearly see that since dialectic was invented to be of use to the other disciplines, and what these men teach can not be applied and adapted to the other disciplines, it turns out not to be dialectic at all. On the other hand, not even the teachers, despite their pride and boastful vainglory, bid us hope for knowledge from this dialectic. Proof enough that there is no knowledge in them is that they have no habit of it, for this pseudo-dialectic does not leave after it, as do the other arts and sciences, that firm trace which we call habit. For as soon as you leave the schools, unless you have a very tenacious memory, all that smoke vanishes, dispersed by the slightest breeze.[56] This is the reason why, when men who have devoted their whole lives to things of this sort grow old and leave behind them those sheltered scholastic disputes and contentious quarrels,

illas umbratiles pugnas, et contentiosas altercationes sunt egressi, ubique frigidissime et stultissime tacent; tunc,

Rarus sermo illis, et magna libido tacendi.

Tunc, ingenti supercilio suæ ignorantiæ sapientiæ silentium prætexunt: ¿quid facerent miseri? Scholastica illa omnia simul cum scholis relicta sunt; alia nulla habent quæ loquantur; necesse est, ut qui prius a nullis picis, a nullis mulierculis garrulitate vincebantur, ipso etiam Stentore Græcorum apud Trojam præcone vocaliores, tunc silentio pisces quoque vincant, et ex nostratibus ranis fiant acanthiæ.

Illi quidem, etiam in ipso scholarum fervore, ubi nihil potest ipsis clamosius fieri, nihil loquacius, quos citius vita deficiat quam vox, cum ad conventum prudentiorum hominum ex scholastico tecto educuntur, ita stupent, ac si essent in silvis educati; mira ibi et insueta illis facies omnium rerum, in alium quendam orbem perductos eos esse credas; ita usum vitæ et communem sensum ignorant; ita impeditos, ita implicitos eos videas, sive quid agant, sive loquantur, ut illos non esse homines jures; adeo sicut sermo, ita et mores et actus omnes ab homine abhorrent, ut nihil illis cum ceteris hominibus commune præter formam judices; hinc quoque fit, ut negotiis gerendis, legationibus obeundis, administrandis rebus, aut publicis aut privatis, tractandis populorum animis ineptissimi sint, non plus in ejusmodi rebus valeant, quàm homines fœnei; neque enim iis se se artibus tradunt, quibus hæc omnia percipiuntur, quæque et animum, et vitam humanam instituunt, cujusmodi est Philosophia moralis, quæ mores mentemque ornat; Historia, quæ mater est rerum cognitionis et usus, id est prudentiæ; Oratoria, quæ vitam sensumque communem et docet et moderatur; Politica facultas, et Oeconomica, quibus civitatum rerumque familiarium status et regimen constat; eos, non dico latine si alloquaris cum se unos vim et rigorem latini sermonis tenere jactent, sed si hispane, si gallice, si vernacula et patria quenque lingua, vix te intelligent, novitatem sermonis horrebunt, quia signis, litteris, relativis, asinis, non

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wherever they are they keep an empty and foolish silence. Then

> 'Scarce is their speech, and strong their desire to say nothing'[57].

They cloak with great haughtiness the silence of their ignorant wisdom. What are these poor men to do? All their scholasticism is left behind with the schools, and they have nothing else to talk about. Inevitably those who once surpassed magpies and women in chattering, more vocal even than Stentor, the Greek herald before Troy, now excel the very fishes in silence, and our native frogs turn into acanthus plants.[58]

Those same men who were the most clamorous, the most loquacious in the fever-pitch of the schools, whose life would fail them sooner than their voice, when brought from under the scholastic roof to a gathering of more sensible men, are as dumb-struck as if they had been brought up in the woods. There, the appearance of everything is so strange and unusual to them, you would think them introduced into some other world. So ignorant are they of practical life and common sense, you see them so hampered, so confused in whatever they do or say, that you would swear they are not men; and they differ as much from other men in their speech as they do in customs and actions, until you would conclude they had nothing in common with the rest of mankind but their shape. As a result they are quite unsuited to conduct business, to serve on embassies, administer public or private affairs, or deal with popular opinion; they are of no more use in affairs of this kind than men of straw. For they have not applied themselves to the arts from which all these things can be learned, and which govern human life and thought, such as moral philosophy, which equips and embellishes mind and character; history, which is the mother of knowledge and experience, that is, of practical wisdom; oratory, which both teaches and tempers life and common sense; political science and economics, by which are established the condition and government of civil and domestic affairs. If you speak to them (I do not mean in Latin, since they claim that they alone preserve the force and rigor of Latin speech) in Spanish or French or any vernacular and native tongue, they will hardly understand you; they will shrink from the newness of the language because it is not stuffed with signs, letters, relatives, and donkeys. There is nothing written in

est refertus, nam latine nihil est tam inaffectate, tam inelaborate, tam contemptim, tam familiariter scriptum, quod isti capiant; quam etiam causam fore suspicor, cur hanc meam epistolam, tamquam rem nimis sacram atque reconditam non multi ex ipsis attingent, cum tamen nihil a me clarius, nihil apertius scribi latine potuerit; suum vero patrium sermonem, et quem a nutrice cum lacte suxerunt, cum sint ex istis plerique qui dedicerint, ;cui mirum est eos latinum non tenere, quem nunquam acceperunt, quem etiam si optime accepissent, nihil tamen est quod non corrupisset illa omnium bonarum rerum sophistica corruptela!

Sunt enim hæc, et similia, hujus artis commoda, ut tempus, operam, linguam, mores, sensum humanum, amittas dum ista sequeris; hæc tam præpostera portenta, has animorum gangrænas et pestes, atque ingeniorum lues, adduci non possum ut credam diu duraturas; jam satis superque quingentos fere per annos multa mala mentibus hominum invexerunt; tempus est, ut simul cum lingua latina, id est cum suo seminario, reliquæ quoque artes tam diu sopitæ excitentur; *Hæc opinionum commenta*, ut inquit Cicero, *delebit dies* (1), *naturæ judicia confirmabit* (1); non semper cum hominibus male agetur; tempus ipsum prava convellet, recta veraque secum inferet: itaque non egent hæc tam inania multis magnisque oppugnatoribus ut pereant ipsa; ut sunt ficta, ut adumbrata, ut nihil habent solidi, nihil firmi, ita paullatim per se decident dissolventurque, et memoria rerum istarum simul ac in scholis homines paullo sapere melius cœperint, tota prorsus conticescet, ac interibit; neque enim fieri potest ut cæci semper mortales errent; aperientur sensim ingenia, et humanæ mentes ex tenebris in lucem profectæ, rejectis tam pravis perniciosisque nugis, suas amplexabuntur veras disciplinas; neque id procul abesse crediderim, quum jam eo magnitudinis hæ umbræ, caligines, insaniæque venerint, ut mole laborent sua, sintque et aliis et sibi ipsæ intolerabiles; ferebant olim utcunque humana ingenia gerras, et de-

Latin so simply and naturally, in such ordinary and familiar style, that they can understand it. I suspect this may be the reason why not many of them will grasp this letter of mine, considering its message too secret and abstruse, and yet I could not have written in any clearer and plainer Latin. But since many of these have deliberately forgot their native speech, which they imbibed from their nurse with her milk, who could wonder if they do not understand a Latin that they never learned? Even if they had learned it well, there is nothing that would not be corrupted by that sophistical corrupter of all good things.

These and the like are the rewards of this art, so that you can let slip time, work, language, custom and common sense while you pursue them. I cannot be persuaded that these monstrous absurdities, these ulcers and pests of the mind and corruptions of talent will long endure. It is more than enough that for almost five hundred years they have brought so much mischief upon the minds of men. It is time that together with the Latin language, that is, with their seed-plot, the other arts, too, should awaken from their long sleep. "Time will destroy these fictions of false opinions", as Cicero says, "and will confirm the judgments of nature"[59]. Things will not always go badly for mankind. Time itself will overthrow bad customs and bring with it the good and true ones. And so these inanities do not need many and powerful assailants, since they will perish of their own accord. Since they are factitious, mere outlines, having no solid or stable quality, they will gradually fall away by themselves and be dissolved, and as soon as teachers in the schools become a little wiser, the whole memory of these things will surely subside and perish. For it cannot be that men will always wander blindly. Gradually talents will unfold and human minds, emerging from darkness into the light, will reject this bad, pernicious nonsense, and embrace their true disciplines. I rather think this day is not far distant, since these shadows, this obfuscation and folly have already reached such magnitude that they labor under their own weight and are intolerable both to themselves and to others. In the past, human minds somehow put up with this nonsense and absurdity, but then these were not so full-grown; now they are more oppressive than our minds, striving

deliramenta hæc, sed non tam adulta, nunc graviora sunt quàm ut ab animis nostris, ad meliora sua sponte tendentibus ferri possint; ita ruitura brevi, quum ad fastigium dementiæ jam pervenerint, et crepitura quàm primum, cum magis intumescere nequeant, simulque cum illo sonitu perituram memoriam eorum, ¿quis non videt?

Ego sane sic a parentibus, sic a prudentissimis viris accepi, sic rerum usu ac experientiis didici compluribus, pravas consuetudines non facile in melius viribus cujusquam commutari, nisi cum ipsæ in tantam pravitatem pervenerint, ut omnibus fiant intolerabiles: ita, hominum natura tam fœdam rem aversante, brevi tota illa quamlibet radicata assuefactio revellitur, et antiquatur, unde est illud vulgare hominum sermone proverbium: *Nasci optimum ordinem ex perversissimo, bonasque leges ex malis moribus procreari*: nam mediocriter malos mores, res mediocriter turpes nostra ingenia utcunque ferunt, at vitii vehementium nimietatem refugiunt, pati nequeunt; paratum est in latina lingua exemplum, quæ quamdiu mediocriter fuit depravata, perstitit, neque vindicem sui habuit ullum, at tum demum restituta suo splendori est, cum offuscari, corrumpique magis non poterat: ita et hos homines nescio an fuerit satius precari ut suas insanias, alias super alias accumulantes, ita celeriter adaugeant, ut primo quoque tempore, non modo præclaris ingeniis, sed etiam infimis sint vilitate sua fastidio, et ab omnibus conspiretur in perniciem istius amentiæ; quod jam ego quasi ex alto fieri strenue video; erigunt enim se se apud nationes omnes clara, excellentia, liberaque ingenia impatientia servitutis, et jugum hoc stultissimæ ac violentissimæ tyrannidis ex cervicibus suis animose depellunt, civesque suos ad libertatem vocant, vindicabuntque totam prorsus litterariam civitatem in libertatem longe suavissimam, qua tot seculis caruerunt, parebuntque non his furentibus et violentis dominis, sed benignissimis, et sanctissimis illis magistris, veris artibus atque scientiis.

Ita futurum ante annos viginti spero ut opera ista, quæ tam inani stolidaque loquacitate isti ad ostentationem gloriam-

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spontaneously toward better things, can bear. And so it is clear that they will soon fall into ruin, since they are already come to the peak of dementia, and as soon as they can swell up no more they will crack, and along with that sound they will fade from memory.

One thing I heard from my parents and from wise men, and have learned from practice and wide experience: bad customs cannot easily be changed for the better by the efforts of any one man until they have reached such a state of depravity that they become intolerable to everyone. Thus, when human nature recoils from an extreme abuse, in a short time that whole habit, however rooted it may be, is plucked out and discarded; and so we have the common proverb: 'The best order is born from the worst abuses, and good laws proceed from bad customs'. For our nature somehow tolerates moderately bad customs, moderately corrupt affairs, but recoils from an extreme excess of evil and cannot support it. We have a ready example at hand in the Latin language which, so long as it was moderately debased, survived and had no defender, but was only restored to its splendor when it could be degraded and corrupted no more. And so I am inclined to think it might be better to encourage these men to increase their follies, heaping them one upon another so swiftly that their worthlessness will make them an object of aversion at the earliest possible moment, to modest talents as well as outstanding ones, and all will conspire to overthrow this madness. I already see this actively happening, as if from a distance. For excellent, bright, and independent minds are arising among all nations; impatient of servitude, they are boldly casting from their necks this yoke of stupid and impetuous tyranny, and calling their fellow citizens to liberty; they will claim for the whole republic of letters that most sweet freedom which they have lacked for so many centuries, and will be subject, not to these raving and irrational lords, but to those benign and holy masters, the true arts and sciences.

I hope that within twenty years the works that these have put together with dull and empty verbosity for their fame and ostentation will either

que congesserunt, aut in obscuro æternam noctem silentiumque agant, aut si qua forte extiterint, ad ignominiam potius, magnumque suorum auctorum dedecus videantur; atque ego quidem, mi Fortis, gratias et habeo, et ago permagnas Deo, quòd aliquando e Parisiis quasi ex Cimmeriis tenebris in lucem egressus sum, vidique, quæ essent illæ disciplinæ, quæ homine dignæ ac subinde humanæ dicuntur, neque enim tam sum demens, tam de me ipso male meritus, ut si hæc meliora magno et exacto judicio non censuissem, clareque conspexissem, fuissem vetera pro novis, adepta pro nondum adeptis, certa pro incertis commutaturus; neque enim aliquis est, qui libens resciat quæ magno labore nactus est, frivola, et nugas esse meras, et tam diuturnam molestamque operam tot dierum, tot insomnium noctium, lusisse: ita et mihi in principio id tam odiosum erat, ut sæpe a melioribus rebus cogitationem ad vetera mea averterem, ne mihi persuaderi posset me Parisiis tot annis nihil egisse; nec dubito etiam, quin nuncius hic futurus sit plurimis odiosissimus, verum eos illud considerare oportet, credendum esse expertis, et qui esse nequeunt ex illo optimorum maximeque perfectorum hominum genere, per se se qui omnia norunt, sint saltem ex illo bonorum, parent qui recta monenti, ne ex ordine pessimorum fiant, qui nec ipsi norunt, nec melius monentibus auscultant: quod si mihi credere nolunt, at senibus ipsi suisque præceptoribus fidem habeant, quos si rogent, audient damnantes furorem illum mentis, deplorantes id tempus, quod in his gerris vanissimis inutiliter contriverunt.

Dullardum ego et Gasparem Laxem præceptores olim meos, quos honoris gratia nomino, querentes sæpe summo cum dolore audivi, se tam multos annos rei tam futili, atque inani impendisse; id si ita est, ¿quæ (malum) insania est, nolle parere senibus bene monentibus? Atque illud me in hac epistola (quam non dubito juvenes imperitos, et quibusvis Citeriis loquaciores, pugnaciores quibusvis gallinaceis, vituperaturos) consolatur, quòd senes bene de his, quæ nunc dico, sentient, atque ea laudabunt, et quæ ipsi modo juvenes temerarii insipientes

be spending perpetual night in silent darkness, or if by chance they do survive, will rather do so to the ignominy and shame of their authors. As for me, my dear Fortis, I am grateful and give thanks to God that I finally emerged from Paris as from Cimmerian darkness into the light, and recognised those studies that are worthy of man and therefore called humane. Truly I am not so foolish, nor deserve so ill of myself, that if I had not weighed these better things with long and careful judgment and clearly understood them, I would have exchanged the old for the new, the tried for the untried, the certain for what was uncertain. No one likes to discover that what he has acquired with great labor is worthless, and utter nonsense, and that he has thrown away the long and difficult labor of so many days, so many sleepless nights. For me, in the beginning, this was so distasteful that I would often turn my thoughts away from better things to my old ways, so as to make it impossible to persuade myself that I had accomplished nothing in so many years in Paris. I have no doubt that this message will be unwelcome to many persons, but they should consider it carefully, and trust in men of experience. Those who cannot belong to that class of best and perfect men who have learned everything by themselves, can at least belong to that of good men who heed sound advice, and not become of the worst sort, who have neither learned anything themselves nor listen to others' better counsel. If they do not wish to believe me, then let them put their faith in the old men and their teachers; for if they question these, they will hear them condemn this madness, and deplore the time they wasted on these empty trifles.

I have often heard Dullaert and Gaspar Lax, my former teachers, whom I name out of respect, complain bitterly that they had spent so many years in such a futile and empty pursuit.[60] If this is so – alas! – what kind of folly is it to be unwilling to follow the good advice of old men? It encourages me in writing this letter (which I have no doubt that callow young men, talkier than Citerians[61] and more combative than barnyard cocks, will disparage) that old men will approve the things I am now saying, and will praise them. And while the young lightly brush them off while they are only rash and silly youths,

tes contemnunt, ea cùm per ætatem sapient (si Deus id eis dederit) et probabunt, et amplexabuntur, et quæ ego nunc eis consulo, ipsi forte, miserti sequentium, minoribus consulent seniores; Te vero, mi carissime Fortis, per amicitiam nostram, per tuum præstantissimum animum ingeniumque precor, ut quoniam tua ætas jam Te admonet meliorum, videsque aliud illa non esse quàm hominum corruptelas, quæ si non optima memoria fueris, confestim excident, sin vero optima, impedimento erunt in rebus melioribus, eruntque dediscenda non minori negotio, quam fuerint parta, vides digna non esse, in quibus vel temporis insumatur punctum, quin potius ut ambabus manibus, omnibus machinis procul rejiciantur, ne ingenio officiant, vides ætatem brevem multo satius esse veris artibus tradere, vides brevi illa qui habuerint, fore omnibus despectui atque ludibrior; hortor itaque Te et rogo, tempestive pedem ab illis dementiis ut referas, canas receptui, conferas Te ad ea, quæ sunt homine, quæ sunt ingenio tuo digna.

Quod, quoniam prudentiam animumque tuum ad optima quæque propensum novi, non dubito Te facturum, satisque magnum fecero hac tam verbosa epistola fructum, si Te talem amicum adduxero quo vides a nobili atque egregia istius mentis tuæ natura vocari: scripsi quoque ad Te eam ob causam, quoniam scio me non cantaturum surdis, tum etiam quòd cum in Te profecero, proficiam pariter in ista multitudine juvenum, quæ Te sectatur, quos omnes cum patria quadam caritate complexurus sis, et optima quæque institurus, parum satisfacies muneri tuo, quin, ut aperte loquar, magnum scelus flagitiumque committes, si illos vanissimis stultissimisque imbuerit artibus; etenim ego hujusce rei culpam in præceptores rejicere soleo, qui hæc tradunt, nam ignari rerum omnium pueri, ad eos tamquam ad tempestatem quandam casu delati, prius circumveniuntur, prius inficiuntur, prius hoc in mari submerguntur, quam liceat eis quid rectum, quid pravum sit dijudicare; quamvis non tam culpem ipsos præceptores, qui magna ex parte pueri sunt, et vix sciunt utra manus sit sua dextra, nunc primum ex ovo in scholas producti, qui potius ipsi

præ-

Translator's correction: 2nd par., line 11, read 'imbueris' for 'imbuerit'.

when they come to understand them with age (if God so grant them), they will approve and adopt them, and what I now counsel them perhaps they, as older men with compassion for the next generation, will counsel the younger ones. But I entreat you, my dear Fortis, by our friendship and for the sake of your excellent mind and talent, to recognize that your generation summons you to better things. Reflect that these present things are nothing more than corrupting influences – are things that, if you were not blessed with excellent memory would rapidly slip away; but since your memory is good they will be an obstacle to better things, and will have to be unlearned with no less industry than they were acquired. You must see that they are not worth spending even a moment of time upon, but should rather be repulsed with both hands and with every device, lest they obstruct your talent. You see that it is far better to devote this brief life to the true arts. You see that in a short time those who persist in these others will be objects of contempt and derision to all. And so I exhort and beg you, draw back your foot in good time from these insanities, sound the retreat, and betake yourself to studies worthy of a man and worthy of your talent.

Because I know your good sense, and your natural disposition to excellence, I do not doubt that you will. I shall have achieved a great and sufficient reward by this wordy letter if it persuades such a friend as you to follow the natural tendency of your noble and exceptional mind. I have written you also because I know I shall not be preaching to deaf ears, since if I have any influence upon you I shall also influence the many young men who are your students. You have welcomed them all with a kind of fatherly affection, and intend to teach them whatever is best. You will be failing in your duty – indeed, to speak frankly, you will commit a shameful crime – if you imbue them with these empty and foolish arts. I tend always to blame the teachers who transmit these things. Ignorant boys, borne to them by chance as if into a tempest, are entrapped, drenched, submerged in this sea before they are able to distinguish what is good and what is bad. Still, I should not so much blame the teachers, who are for the most part boys themselves and scarcely know which hand is their right. Now they are brought into the schools, newly hatched, themselves more in need of teacher and tutor

præceptore, et institutore, ac pædagogo, ferulaque egent, quam ut boni esse queant institutores et magistri, atque isti (si diis placet) suum nomen quum ignorent, philosophi appellationem jam receperunt; non ergo tam hos reprehenderim, quàm ipsos gymnasiarchas, quos ætate, quos longo rerum usu edoctos oportuit qualia sint ista, quæ suis in scholis maximo cum detrimento et damno totius juventutis tradi non sinunt modo, sed jubent quoque.

Credo quòd non arbitrantur alioqui se quæstum facturos, quod tamen quàm possint sine magno crimine facere, viderint ipsi, homines theologi; mihi profecto ab his maxime tañtæ jacturæ tam boni temporis et animorum juventutis, quæ illorum curæ tradita est, Deus postulaturus, acerbeque rationem exacturus videtur; ¿quis enim non credat manere graves cruciatus eum, qui innocenti, et inscio puero propter solam pecuniam imposuerit? ¿et hos qui puerorum tempus, qui vitam, qui animum perdunt, immunes fore? Et quo videas hanc rem ad summam suæ impudentiæ venisse, ut jam gravis atque intolerabilis, et Deo, et hominibus sit, quo religiosiores, quo sanctiores volunt gymnasiarchæ videri, eo magis scholas suas his furoris insaniæque clamoribus perstrepere jubent, illaque majore exercent supercilio, quàm unquam Zeno fecit rigidissima sua virtute tradenda: Te ipsum, mi Fortis, atque alium quemvis, neque enim recuso quenquam, judicem facio; ¿num non Tibi Parisiensis schola tamquam anus quædam post octingentesimum suæ ætatis annum cum tanto senio summe delirare videtur? ¿Num non eam censes, nisi arte aliqua, id est, beneficio bonarum disciplinarum, repubescat, quod Deus ipse omen avertat, horret animus dicere, brevi interituram? Ego enim id ausim persancte dejerate, fore neminem tam hebetem et crassum hominem, qui liberos suos ad eam eruditionis gratia deduceret, si intelligeret quæ in ipsa docentur.

Cedo, ¿quotusquisque ex doctis hominibus suos filios vel istuc, vel ad hos sophistas mittit? Nemo tam cæcus est, nemo tam insanit, nemo tam filios vel negligit vel odit: si quis ex iis istuc mittit, non ad sophistas mittit, sed ad nonnullos, qui

and pedagogue and ferule than capable of being good teachers and masters; and yet these (please God) while they do not know their own names, have already assumed the title of philosopher. So I should not blame them so much as the directors of schools, whose age and long experience should have taught them what kind of things these are that they not only allow but even bid to be taught in their schools, to the serious detriment and harm of all the pupils.

I suppose they think that they will not make money in any other way, but as theologians they should find ways to make money without committing a crime. It seems to me that God will demand and harshly exact an accounting from them above all, for squandering the precious time and minds of the youth entrusted to their care. Who does not believe a harsh penalty is in store for the man who imposes upon an innocent and unsuspecting boy just for the sake of money? Will those who waste the time, the life, the souls of young boys go unpunished? And that you may see that this abuse has reached the height of impudence, so that it is already oppressive and intolerable both to God and man, consider that the more religious and pious the directors want to appear, the more they make their school resound with this wild and insane clamor; and they work at this with more severity than Zeno ever showed in his inflexible teaching of moral virtue. And I call upon you, my dear Fortis, to judge, with anyone else you like, for I exclude no one: Does it not seem to you that the University of Paris, like an old woman past her eightieth year, is quite out of her wits from senility? Do you not think that unless she recover her youth by some art, that is by the help of the good disciplines, she soon will perish? (may God avert the omen, the mind shrinks from uttering it.) For I would venture to swear solemnly that no one would be dull and stupid enough to bring his children to her for the sake of learning if he knew what is taught there.

Tell me, how many scholars send their sons there, or to those sophisters? No one is so blind or demented, no one so neglects and dislikes his children. If any of them does send his sons there, he sends

melius inter tot desipientes sapiunt: si quis me cum stomacho loqui putat, is recte sentit, neque enim de ea re summo sine dolore loqui possum, quæ tam multas bonas horas me tam male collocare coegit; nolo in præceptores culpam rejicere, ne dum justo meo indulgeo dolori, alicui parum fortassis prudenti minus esse gratus videar; nec dubito quin hæc epistola si in manus istorum hominum venerit, ac poterint sibi imperare ut perlegant, fueritque ab eis intellecta, quod maxime cupio, sit plerosque ipsorum offensura; ab unoquoque tamen eorum qui offendentur, hoc me impetrare æquum est, ut credat me non esse peculiariter de se locutum, neve ipsum verba moveant, rem potius perpendat, et animum meum; quod si hæc illi omnia parum probantur, ego æqui bonique facio, et, quod sit ei faustum et felix, hæreat in complexu suorum perquàm suavium asinorum, suæque lepidæ dialecticæ: ego neminem cogo, ac neque si vellem, possem quidem; moneo atque hortor, et ut philosophum decet, libere quæ sentio, dico, quæ tamen ipsi aliquando probabunt, et me bene monuisse tunc sentient, cum nihil eis ita sentire profuerit, cumque ipsi sero sapuerint, junioribus tamen consulent ut maturius sapiant.

Quanquam testor conscientiam meam, et Deum Optimum Maximum, qui hæc omnia videt auditque, mirari me, quenquam fore qui hæc, modo intelligat, damnet; neque enim arbitror aliquem esse in toto orbe, sive doctum, sive inscium, sive ingeniosum, sive hebetem, stupidumque, cui hæc non probentur, si ita dicantur ut ipse intelligat: verum nostris hominibus parum hæc modo placent: at ego non eorum judicium, quod nullius momenti est, sed doctorum illud, non numerosum quidem, ceterum amplissimum atque gravissimum, specto, illique placere studeo, neque enim numerare sententias soleo, sed appendere; non placeo juvenibus, quibus nullum est consilium, nullum judicium, nulla mens, at senibus placebo, cum illis ætas melioris judicii nonnihil attulerit; nostros tamen Hispanos non tam moneo, et hortor, quàm per quicquid est sacrorum obtestor obsecroque, ut finem jam faciant ineptiendi, ac delirandi, et pulcherrima ingenia studio dedant

re-

them not to the sophisters but to a few who know better among so many fools. If anyone thinks I speak in anger he is right. For I cannot speak without great bitterness of that study that made me spend so many good hours so badly. I do not want to blame my teachers while I indulge my own legitimate anger, lest I should appear ungrateful to someone perhaps rather lacking in judgment. If this letter comes into their hands and they can make themselves read it, and if they understand it (which I desire above all), it will offend most of them. But I can fairly ask everyone who is offended to believe I have not spoken about him in particular, and not to let my words disturb him; rather let him consider carefully the argument and my intention. If these do not convince him I shall say, Well and good; may he be happy and lucky, and cleave to the circle of his exceedingly agreeable 'donkeys' and his witty dialectic. I compel no one; I could not even if I wanted to. But I do advise and strongly urge them and, as befits a philosopher, I say freely what I think. One day they will approve what I am saying and think I have advised them well – then, when it will do them no good to think so; except that, having grown wise too late, they may still advise the younger men to become wise earlier.

Yet I call my conscience to witness, and Almighty God who sees and hears all things, that I would be surprised if anyone could reject these opinions once he understood them. For I do not think there is anyone in the whole world, learned or ignorant, talented or dull and stupid, who would not be convinced by them if they are expressed so that he can understand them. With our Spanish scholars they now find little favor; but I look not to their judgment, which is of no moment, but to that, not numerous to be sure, yet highly respected and serious, of learned men, and I strive to please their judgment. For I am not in the habit of counting opinions but of weighing them. I do not please the young men, who have no understanding, no judgment, no discernment; but I will please them as older men when age has brought them somewhat better judgment. As for our Spanish scholars, I do not so much admonish and exhort them as supplicate and beseech them by all that is holy, to put an end now to absurdity and folly, and give their fairest talents to the study

rerum pulcherrimarum, ut quemadmodum multis dotibus sumus ceteris gentibus superiores, ita et simus eruditione, quæ si aliqua ingenia decet, nostra profecto decet. Verum hujusce rei argumentum latissimum est, idcirco prolixior opinione mea fuit epistola, et nisi me retinuissem, labebar ducente oratione multo longius; sed finem aliquando tandem epistolæ fieri necesse est, nec omnia semel effundam, ut si sæpius decertandum sit, quod futurum non dubito, novus semper veniam, quam facultatem magnitudo istius stultitiæ, tot jam annos molliter atque indulgenter enutritæ et auctæ, mihi largitur.

Illud tamen antequam finiam non admonere rursus lectorem non possum, si modo quisquam erit hujus rei, præter Te, lector, ut has ipse litteras, non a perturbatione aliqua sui animi in contrarium persuasus et raptus, legat, sed rationis examine cuncta perpendat; si ipsi bene suadere videbor, consilium sequatur meum, sin vero secus, animum prodesse cupientem laudet, verba vero consulat boni; atque ego quo animo ab aliis admonitionem hanc meam accipi vellem, eodem etiam aliorum, sive tuam, sive quis alius me admonere voluerit, capiam: ita, si quis est, cui hæc quæ dico minus probantur, ejus ego perlibenter sententiam audiero, sin vero quidpiam ex iis, quæ diximus, aliquis ambigit, si quo loco hæret, si quid eum remoratur, si aliquis etiam num urget scrupus, ei quoque publici commodi gratia, opera mea parata est, modo id non litigandi, sed inquirendæ veritatis causa fiat, nam alioqui nunquam finis contentionum inveniretur: quòd si tantus illi fuerit pugnandi ardor, ego etiam, ut per omnia meis istis amicis obsequar, vel cum fortissimo eorum Thrace comparatus, arenam et campum non refugiam. Hæc Tibi cum scripsissem, venerunt ad me Petrus Gratianus Lalous noster, et Toussanus Hocedius, Nicolausque Votonius, nunc mei, brevi quoque, ut spero, Tui; mire enim Te, etsi nunquam a se visum, diligunt, ducti iis rebus, quas illis ego de virtute retuli tua; omnes jusserunt salutem hic Tibi nomine suo adscribi, Lalous quidem, ut jam pridem communis amicus, Hocedius vero, et Votonius, ut brevi futuri: Nicolao Valdauræ consanguineo meo S. quem Tibi, quod et

of the fairest subjects, so that, just as we are superior to other nations in many endowments, so we may be in erudition which, if it becomes any native talent, surely becomes ours. But this is a very extensive subject, and for this reason my letter has been longer than I expected; indeed, if I had not checked myself I should have gone on much longer, drawn by my argument. But a letter must come to an end at some point, and I shall not pour out all my thoughts at once, so that if this issue must be fought out later, as I have no doubt it will, I shall come fresh to the combat, with material that the magnitude of this stupidity, leniently and indulgently nourished and augmented now for so many years, offers me in abundance.

But before I close I cannot help once more reminding the reader (if there is any reader besides you) not to be swept away and persuaded by any emotion to a contrary opinion while he reads this letter, but to weigh all these arguments carefully in the balance of his reason. If he feels that I have advised him well, let him follow my counsel; otherwise let him praise my intention and take my words in good part. And I shall accept suggestions from you or from anyone who may wish to advise me, in the same spirit in which I would like others to accept mine. Thus if there is anyone who is not quite convinced by what I say, I will gladly hear his opinion. But if anyone contests anything we have said, if he sticks at any point, if something holds him back or even some scruple troubles him, my time is at his service and that of the public good, provided his motive is not just to dispute, but to search for the truth; for otherwise there never will be an end to controversy. But if he has such ardor for combat I too, since I yield to my friends in all things, even if matched against the bravest Thracian they have, will not fly the arena or the field.

I had just finished this letter when our friend Peter Gratian Laloo came to see me, and Toussaint Hosey and Nicholas Wotton, now my friends and I hope soon to be yours.[62] For they like you wonderfully well although they have never met you, attracted by what I have told them of your worth; they all bid me send you greetings in their name, Laloo as long a mutual friend, and Hosey and Wotton soon to be so. My regards

sæpe alias feci, quàm possum maxime commendo, est enim mihi, ut scis, non minus carus, quàm frater: Davalum quoque pro me saluta. Vale mi suavissime Fortis. Lovanii, Idibus Februariis, M. D. XIX.

to my kinsman Nicholas Valdaura, whom I commend to you most warmly, as I have done on other occasions, for he is, as you know, as dear to me as a brother. And greet Davalus for me.

Farewell, my dear Fortis.

Louvain, 13 February 1519

JOANNIS LUDOVICI VIVIS

DE CAUSIS CORRUPTARUM ARTIUM

LIBER TERTIUS,

QUI EST DE DIALECTICA CORRUPTA.

CAPUT V.

SEd venio jam ad amicos meos, recentes, ut ipsi vocant, ***Sophistas***, in quos tamquam in navis sentinam omnia hujus artis vitia confluxerunt, et Aristotelis, et priorum, et longe plura, et fœtidiora, quæ ipsi de suo adjecerunt; itaque quæ in antiquis reprobavi, ea supersedebo hic recensere; tantum ea consectabor, quæ sunt recentiorum propria: irrumpit ad tradendam dialecticam juvenis ignarus Latini, et Græci sermonis, ignarus earum rerum, atque artium, quæ his duabus linguis sunt proditæ; primum omnium quorsum pertineat dialectica ignorat, quæ sua, quæ aliena, itaque et sua aliis cesserunt, et ipsi invaserunt aliena; nam totam eam partem, quæ est de argumentis inveniendis, occuparunt Rhetores, dialectico non invito, primum quòd quum Aristotelem, partis hujus vel inventorem, ut inquit Cicero, vel certe præcipuum præceptorem, videret illa adeo obscure edidisse, ut verti in usum aliquem

non

JUAN LUIS VIVES

ON THE CAUSES OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE ARTS

BOOK III

ON DIALECTIC

CHAPTER V

But I come now to my friends the new dialecticians, or sophisters as they call themselves, in whom all the vices of this art have collected as in the bilge of a ship, both those of Aristotle and the ancients, and the far more numerous and noisome ones they have added on their own. So I shall refrain from recounting here the faults I have already blamed upon the ancients, and concentrate only upon those peculiar to the moderns.

A young man ignorant of Latin and Greek and of the subjects and disciplines developed in those two languages, boldly ventures upon the teaching of dialectic. To begin with, he does not know the boundaries of dialectic – which areas are exclusive to it, and which belong to other arts – so that the properties of dialectic have both given way to other disciplines, and themselves usurped other fields. For example, the rhetoricians have taken over the whole part that has to do with the invention of arguments.[1] The dialecticians raised no objections, for several reasons. First, they knew that Aristotle (whether he was, as Cicero says, the inventor of this part [of logic] or at least its principal teacher) had set it forth so obscurely they could make no use of it.[2] They

non queant, Ciceronem vero accommodasse operi, et ejus traditionem Boëthum esse amplexatum, audito Ciceronis nomine, tamquam alienâ notâ inspectâ, verecundi homines manum continuerunt; videbant etiam Rhetores apertius de illis præcipere et aptius ad exercitationem; tum etiam libenter cesserunt possessione sumtuosa, ad quam tuendam magnis esset divitiis opus, legenda, tenenda, cognoscenda multa, sine quibus inventio tueri se et nomen suum nequit; nam quid de *pisce*, de *lapide*, de *republica*, de *re familiari inveniet*, qui ne nomen quidem unquam antea audierat; et adeo peritiæ hujus usum amiserunt, ut quod est inventionis argumenti ad judicium argumentationis transferant.

Nam quemadmodum argumentatio bene censetur per figuras, et modos syllogismorum, ita ipsi dicunt per locum a genere, per locum a causis, per locum a conjugatis, a majori; quasi in hoc sint parati loci, ut censuræ sint argumentationum, et non indices argumentorum: ipsi eam retinuere solam quæ est de inventione, more spinosorum Stoicorum, ad quam nec linguæ opes, nec multa rerum supellex magnopere videtur eis necessaria, sed tantum garrula quædam imperitia, et loquacitas invicta; et pro illa vetere divisione *Logicam esse aliam de inventione, aliam de judicio*, novam ipsi divisionem adduxerunt, esse *logicam veterem, et logicam novam*; cur ita nominetur, non magis scias dicere, quàm cur *digestum novum, et digestum vetus*: logicam appellant veterem (in qua de simplicibus agitur terminis, vel pronuntiatis) *Prædicabilia*, *Categoriæ*, *et de Interpretatione*: logicam novam, *Priora*, *Posteriora*, *Topica*: tum huic addunt septimum tractatum, quem recentes adjecerunt, pomœrio veterum imperium longius prolato: ipsi, tamquam vento quodam transversi acti, in metaphysica impetum fecerunt; non illinc modice repetunt, quæ videbatur ad logicam pertinere, ut Aristoteles fecerat, sed penitus se, et pueros suos immergunt in arcana illa naturæ, quæ constare, et intelligi nullo penitus modo possunt, nisi gustatis his exterioribus; nam ordo nostræ cognitionis hinc est ad illa, nec eò penetrari a nobis potest, nisi per hæc quæ sunt foris, ad incognita enim itur per cognita,

knew that Cicero had in fact adapted it for use, and Boethius had embraced his teaching.[3] At the name of Cicero the dialecticians respectfully declined to touch invention, as if it were the known and recognized territory of another. Moreover they were aware that the rhetoricians' teaching about these things was clearer than theirs and better suited for practice. And so they freely yielded up that sumptuous possession that needed great riches to maintain, in the form of reading, recollecting and knowing a multitude of things without which invention could justify neither itself nor its name. For what could anyone who had never even heard the name before *invent* about 'a fish' or 'a stone', about 'the republic' or 'domestic affairs?' And indeed they so far lost the use of this skill that they transferred what belongs to the invention of argument to the judgment of argumentation.

For just as argumentation is rightly believed to operate through the figures and moods of the syllogism, so these people say it operates in the same way through the topic *from genus*, the topic *from causes*, the topic *from conjugates*, *from the greater*, as if topics had been prepared only to be judgments of argumentation, and not lists of arguments. They have kept, in the thorny Stoic manner,[4] only that part of invention for which neither resources of language nor a copious stock of subjects seems to them particularly necessary, but only a kind of garrulous ignorance and invincible loquacity.

And in place of the old division between the logic of invention and that of judgment, they have introduced a new division, between the old logic and the new logic; why they are called so one could no more easily say than why there should be a new division and an old one. They declare that the *Predicables*, the *Categories*, and *On Interpretation* (in which simple terms or statements are considered) are the old logic; the new logic comprises the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics*.[5] Then to this they have added the *Seventh Tract*,[6] the moderns' own contribution, which stretches much further the boundaries of the old order. These newer logicians, as though driven by some cross-wind, have made an assault upon metaphysics. From it they did not seek with moderation whatever seemed to apply to logic, as Aristotle had, but immersed themselves and their pupils deeply in secrets of nature that they cannot thoroughly know and understand except through sense experience. For the order of our cognition of nature works in that direction, and cannot penetrate there except by way of exterior manifestations; indeed it moves towards the unknown by way of the known, and to intellectual judgment

et ad mentis judicium per sensuum functiones: isti contra, rudem puerum, et a grammatico recentem, statim prædicabilibus, et prædicamentis, et sex principiis proluunt, ut olim Germani pueros suos, recens natos, rapido et gelido flumine: sunt qui perpetuo ibi detinent, ut qui maxime sunt reales; quasi vero ad nugandum in illis commentis inventa sit dialectica, et non ad recte disserendum: ibi nascuntur mira monstra quæstionum, de *natura communi*, qua miror non interdum eos terreri insomniis, aut de illa in tenebris audere verba facere; adeo res est monstrosa.

Antisthenes (ut puto) primus universalia quædam finxit in rerum natura a singularibus sejuncta; Plato Ideas posuit; Porphyrius, cum hæc aliena esse a suo instituto videret, consulto se vitaturum hanc, et similes quæstiones, est præfatus; isti non abstinent; quamquam ipsa et absurditate sui et argumentis nominalium jam est eò deducta, ut si apertius velint utrique eloqui, appareat eos idem sentire: hinc de compositione generis, et differentiæ, ad constitutionem speciei; ¡Quomodo sudatur cum velint *genus* esse pro *materia*, *differentiam* pro *forma*! ideo ponunt *compositionem physicam, et metaphysicam*, ut hæc conflata sit ex quiditate generis, et quiditate differentiæ, et alia quæ siquis legat vir cordatus, et opinionibus antea, partibusque non infectus, facile exclamet, ¡O nugas accuratas! ¡o eruditionem imperitiam! jam in *prædicamenta* infarciunt quidquid tractari vel solet, vel debet in prima philosophia, de *omni rerum genere*; attigerat quidem nonnulla ex his Aristoteles, sed leviter; Gilbertus Porrectanus longius movit sex principiis conscriptis; Albertus Grotus, et deinceps alii, navem in altum deduxerunt, ut nullæ jam,

Terræ apparent; cœlum undique, et undique pontus:

prætereo quæstiones illas ridiculas, *utrum res ponantur in prædicamento, ¿an nomina?* quum disertis verbis Aristoteles de vocibus loquatur; quasi vero res possint prædicari, aut nomina prædi-

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through the function of the senses. These men, on the contrary, instantly immerse a young boy just out of grammar school into predicables and predicaments and the *Six Principles*, [7] just as the ancient Germans used to plunge their new-born sons into an icy swift stream. Some men linger perpetually at this stage (especially, for example, the realists) as if dialectic were in fact invented to play about with those fabrications instead of to discourse properly. And so marvellous, monstrous questions arise about universal nature; I wonder these do not sometimes wear our moderns out with sleeplessness, or that they dare talk about them in the dark, so monstrous are they.

Antisthenes[8] was the first, I think, to conceive of certain universals in nature as distinct from particulars. Plato put forward his Ideas; Porphyry,[9] since he considered these inconsistent with his own teaching, announced he would deliberately avoid them and any similar questions. The moderns have no such qualms; and yet this question [of universals], by its own absurdity and the arguments of the nominalists, has now reached the point where, if both sides want to speak quite frankly, it must be apparent that they think the same, from the composition of genus and differentia to the constitution of a species. How they sweat when they want *genus* to stand for *matter*, *differentia* for *form*! In the same way they represent *composition* as *physical* and *metaphysical*, to produce it out of the quiddity of genus and the quiddity of differentia. Any judicious man not already bemused by fancies and factions, who read things like this, would surely exclaim, 'O elaborate trifles, O ignorant erudition!' They now stuff into the *categories* whatever is customarily taught, or ought to be taught, in metaphysics concerning every genus of things. To be sure, Aristotle touches upon some of these, but in passing. Gilbert de la Porrée made a great advance with the composition of his Six Principles;[10] and Albert the Great and his followers launched the ship upon the high seas, so that now

"No land appears, but on all sides sky, and on all sides the deep."[11]

I pass over such ridiculous questions as whether things or names are presented in a category, since Aristotle spoke in explicit terms about words. As if, indeed, things could be predicated, or as if names will be predicated unless they stand for some things. 'Is God set in a category?' They are fearful of course, being pious men, lest the infinite end in a

centur nisi res aliquas significent; ¿*An Deus collocetur in prædicamento*? timent, scilicet, pii homines, ne infinitus finito concludat loco. Tum ascendunt supra prædicamenta, et faciunt sex transcendentia ex Sophista Platonis male intellecto, *ens*, *res*, *unum*, *bonum*, *verum*, *aliquid*: sic possent addi sexcenta, *existens*, *idem*, *utile*: *vero*, et *bono* ¿quis utitur, pro transcendentibus? non nego quin aliquo in sensu omni rei conveniant, ut *verum* ad essentiam pertineat, *bonum* ad finem; illud intellectus, hoc voluntatis; sed utrumque in Deo, nam nos fallimur fere et in judicando, et in eligendo; nec minus esset transcendens *utile* aut *commodum*, quàm *bonum* eadem ratione; nec naturalia passi sunt quieta esse; *libros* Aristotelis *de anima*, in *posteriora* effuderunt.

Ad divina transgressi, puero in schola ludenti, ac nuganti de syllogismis diviris, in manus dederunt rem arduam, et periculosam; ibi tam confidenter *distribuunt*, *singularizant*, *particularizant*, *complete*, *incomplete*, quàm si de pomo aliquo esset sermo; et dum volunt rem humana ingenia superantem in pueriles formulas redigere, in multa incidunt absurda, et impia, quæ tamen consuetudo inter illos effecit levia, ut, *tres esse Deos*, *tres Essentias divinas*, *Filium esse Patrem et non esse Patrem*, et alia quæ aures abhorrent audire: loquuntur ipsi de rebus offensivis piarum aurium; ¿quæ possunt esse magis? Sed his quia soliti audire non offenduntur, iis demum permoventur quibus non assuevere; et quum nihil sit apud ipsos abjectius aut despicatius grammatici nomine, ipsi plura disserunt quæ pæne sunt ex triviali schola, quàm ipsi grammatici, sed omnia absurdissime, conversis vocabulorum significatibus quò illis collibitum est, ut nihil reliquerint integrum; facile hoc sibi vindicantes, quum corrupta grammatica, et lingua, tamquam sensu amisso, nemo esset, qui injuriam sentiret, aut doleret, aut per injuriam occupata repeteret: nam quæ in libris *de intepretatione* tractantur, ¿an non litterarii sunt ludi? ostendi de nomine, de verbo, de negatione, affirmatione, de signis, de quantitatibus pronuntiatorum; in quibus nuperrimi dialectici, non contenti corruptela significationum quam a majoribus acceperant, quando-

finite place. Then they rise above the categories and make, out of a misunderstanding of Plato's *Sophist*, six transcendentals: *being, thing, one, good, true, something*. In the same way they could add six hundred: *existing, same, useful* . . . Who uses *true* and *good* for transcendentals? I do not deny that in some sense these do apply to everything, as for example *true* appertains to essence, *good* to an end; the former with respect to the intellect, the latter to the will; but both with respect to God, for it is certain that we mortals commonly err both in judgment and in choice. Nor would *useful* or *suitable* be less transcendental than *good*, for the same reason. Not even natural questions can be left undisturbed; they have diffused Aristotle's books *On the Soul* into the *Posterior Analytics*.[12]

Proceeding to religion, our new men have put into the hands of boys playing in school and trifling with sacred syllogisms a tool both difficult and dangerous: on the spot they *distribute, singularize, particularize, completely* and *incompletely*,[13] as confidently as if the discussion were about some apple. And while they let their human minds reduce a lofty subject to childish formulas, they fall into many senseless and impious errors, which habitual use makes commonplace to them, such as: 'There are three Gods, three divine Essences'; 'The Son is the Father and is not the Father', and other things the ears shrink from hearing. They themselves talk about things offensive to pious ears;[14] what could be more so than these? But they are not offended by them because they are used to hearing them; they are upset only by things they are not accustomed to. And although nothing is more abject or despicable to them than the name, 'grammarian', they argue about more things wholly related to the grammar school than do the grammarians themselves – but all most absurdly, interchanging the meaning of names for any reason they please, with the result that they have left nothing sound and unspoiled. They have easily arrogated this domain to themselves, for when grammar and language are corrupted and, as it were, all meaning lost, there can be no one to perceive anything wrong, or feel regret, or reclaim territory wrongfully seized.

For example, do not the subjects treated in *On Interpretation* belong in grammar school – displaying the noun, the verb, negation, affirmation, punctuation, the quantities of pronunciation? In these matters the newer dialecticians, not content with the corrupted meanings they learned from their predecessors (for these seemed to them already commonplace and

doquidem illa jam vulgata et protrita videbantur, ipsi novam penitus linguam invexerunt: *Cujuslibet hominis quilibet asinus*, *et asinus præter ab asinus*, *et asinus possibiliter non sunt*: *alter alius homo est ipsemet*: *cujuslibet alterius hominis alius asinus est ens*: (¿quis hæc ulla in lingua intelligat?) adjectis litteris, quandoquidem verba deerant, et ad melius divinandum.

¿In *terminis*, quos primos objiciunt pueris suam scholam ingressis, quid aliud loquuntur, quàm de *significatione*, de *complexione*, de *incomplexione*, de *communi*, et *proprio*, quæ sunt puerilis in Grammatica instituti? ¿Sed de his quomodo præcipiunt? *terminos* Aristoteles vocat in Topicis, quasi *extrema* enuntiati τὰ ἄκρα, et Boëthus eodem sensu *nomina* et *Verba* quæ in simplici propositione prædicantur, ut in eo quod est, *Socrates disputat*, *Socrates* et *disputat*, termini sunt; isti, quum terminorum notitiam tradant pueris tamquam rerum simplicium ex quibus conficiuntur enuntiationes dialecticæ, integra pronuntiata, et longas orationes faciunt terminos, et Homeri totam quam longa est Iliadem aut Odyssæam, immo Iliadem et Odyssæam, si quis inter utranque adscribat τὸ καί; Vocem omnem volunt significare se, et suum prolatorem, et prolatori similem, quin etiam scriptorem, et tabellarium, et pennam, et manum, et Latinam litteram, et Romanos, et Carmentam inventricem, et alia ridicula: quod si circulus œnopolii sit hederaceus, significabit Vergilium quoniam hedera coronabantur poëtæ, veteres item ac ruinosos parietes qui hedera solent vestiri: et *festina lente* significabit Augustum Cæsarem, quòd is dicto illo soleret delectari; et *laurus* populum Carthaginensem, quòd de illo triumphans Africanus, *lauro* est coronatus: tum locus omnis eum, quem aliquando in eo loco vel vidimus, vel audivimus fuisse: et alia ridicula absque numero: non est hoc significare, sed admonere, et alicui aliud ex alio venire in mentem.

Nec minus illa jocularia: si ex eodem attramento, quo scribitur hæc vox *homo*, scribatur illa *buf*, ¿an *buf* significabit? nam isti non contenti rebus naturalibus, ad ea quæ supra naturam sunt, immo contra naturam, se extollunt, etiam inter pueros: ut *atramentum poni in duobus locis*: *omnes terminos creabiles*

crea-

trite), introduced a completely new language: 'Of every man every donkey both a donkey other than a donkey and a donkey possibly are not'. 'Other than another man is the man himself'. 'Of every other man the other donkey is a being.' Who would understand these in any language? – and they threw in letters, whenever words were lacking, and to improve the divination.

With respect to *terms*, which are the first things that confront beginners in their school, what do they talk about but *signification, complexity, incomplexity, common* and *proper*, which are taught in elementary grammar? But how do they teach these? Aristotle in the *Topics* calls terms the extremes (*ta akra*), as it were, of the proposition, and Boethius, with the same meaning, says they are the nouns and verbs that are predicated in a single proposition; for example, in the statement, 'Socrates discusses', 'Socrates' and 'discusses' are the terms.

But our new men, when they should be teaching children an understanding of terms as simple things from which dialectical propositions are formed, make terms whole propositions and lengthy orations, as long as the whole *Iliad* or *Odyssey* of Homer – indeed, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* combined, if anyone adds 'and' (*to kai*) between the two.[15] They want every word to signify itself, and the person who utters it, and anyone like the one who utters it – nay, even the writer, and the courier, and the pen and the hand and the Latin word and the Romans, and Carmenta the inventress of prophecy, and other ridiculous things.[16] If the wreath over a wine shop is made of ivy, it will betoken Virgil, because poets are crowned with ivy – and in the same way, old and crumbling walls that are generally ivy-clad. 'Make haste slowly' will stand for Augustus Caesar because he was partial to that saying; and laurel will mean the Carthaginian people because Africanus, when he triumphed over them, was crowned with laurel. Thus every place will signify either a man we once saw there or have heard was there, and other absurdities without number. This is not to signify but to suggest, and mentally convey something from one to another.

And these are just as droll: 'If in the same ink in which the word *man* is written, the word *buf* were written, would *buf* mean anything?' For these men, not content with natural problems, aspire to those that are supernatural, indeed contrary to nature, and argue them even in the presence of children. Thus we have: 'The ink is put in two places'; 'All creatable terms are created'; 'The hour is divided into proportional parts

creari: *horam dividi per partes proportionales minoribus huc vel illuc terminatis in qualibet parte*: *dividi hoc corpus in duas partes, rursum conjungi, sed contrariis copulis quàm antea*: vel *in partibus paribus Socratem esse album, in imparibus nigrum*: *creari aliquod infinitum*, et alia ejusmodi: quasi ullus sit horum usus in dialectica, et communi vita; nec illorum quidem quæ nunquam contingunt, *antecedens esse Romæ, consequens Lutetiæ*: vel *antecedens proferri nunc, consequens cras*: ¿Quorsum hæc? si assecuti peritiam necessariam, in his animi gratia tamquam tesseris luderent, fortassis essent ferendi, ¿sed homines imperitos, relictis veris, solidis et seriis, huc se conferre quis ferat? ¿hoccine est instrumentum seriarum disciplinarum, plusquam pueriles lusiones? Sed de significando, ¿quis melius potest, aut debere præcipere, quàm grammaticus, aut certe populus,

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi?

jam, in *terminis connotativis album* significat *rem et alborem*; certe non magis quàm *homo animam*, vel *animal*, vel *rationale*; neque enim quod aliquid sit in alterius deffinitione, ab eo significatur; et de hoc termini genere, dant regulam: *Quando terminus sumitur pro aliqua re, et desinit sumi pro illa, si non est propter defectum rei, hoc est propter defectum connotationis*: ¿quid ergo *risibile*? ¿quid *rationale*?

At inquient *non recurrit formula*: atqui oportebat eam recurrere quæ traderetur pueris ne fallerentur, tum quod ad cognitionem *connotativorum* parabatur: sed esto ita: ¿Quid nomina propria, quæ omnia possunt tolli, et imponi alia? Nec satis est quod Paulus Venetus dicit, *Socrates* dupliciter accipi, *pro illo homine*, aut *pro hoc composito* vocatus *Socrates*, hoc mutari posse, illud non posse; idem dicat de vocibus mundi omnibus; loquor de scriptis, et quæ proferuntur, nam in mente imagines sunt rerum sine nominibus; et tamen ex iis quæ sunt illic, de termino *complexo, et incomplexo* definiunt quod est imperitum; nam mens nostra compositas voces simpliciter sæpe in-

with the smaller ones terminated here or there in every part'; 'This body is divided into two parts and joined again, but with opposite connections than before'; or 'In the even parts Socrates is white, in the odd ones, black'; 'Something infinite is created', and others of this kind. As if these statements had any use in dialectic and in daily life; and still less those that never happen: 'The antecedent is in Rome, the consequent in Paris', or 'The antecedent is known now, the consequent tomorrow'. What use are these? If men were playing with them like dice, to acquire a necessary skill and with an intellectual purpose, it would perhaps be tolerable; but who can bear ignorant men who have abandoned real, solid, and serious things to apply themselves to this? Is this the instrument of the serious disciplines, these more than childish games?

As for signification, who better can or ought to teach it than the grammarians, or surely the people,

"In whose keeping is the judgment, the law, and the norm of speech"?[17]

Now, as regards *connotative* terms, 'white' signifies a thing and whiteness, but certainly no more than 'man' signifies soul or rational; for the fact that something is in the definition of another is not signified by it. And with respect to this kind of term, they give the rule: 'When a term is taken for something, and ceases to be taken for it, if this is not because of the failure of the thing, it is because of the failure of the connotation'. What about 'risible' then? What about 'rational'?

But they say, 'The rule does not convert'; and yet the one they teach schoolboys ought to convert, so the boys will not be deceived when they come to learn about connotation. But no matter. What about proper nouns, which can abolish all rules and impose still others? It is not enough to say, as Paul of Venice does, that 'Socrates' is taken in a double meaning, as 'that man', or as 'this composite called Socrates'; and that the former can be interchanged, the latter cannot. He would say the same about all the words in the world. I am talking about written and spoken words; for in the mind there are images of things without names, and yet from these mental images these men define, by the terms *complex* and *incomplex*, things they have no experience of. For our mind often understands composite words simply, and simple ones compositely.

intelligit, et simplices composite, ut audita hæc, *Trojanorum acerbus terror*, *Achillem* solum nonnunquam intelligit, interdum quum *Achillem* audit, de *terrore*, *et Trojanis et sævitia juvenis* cogitat: ¿Quid, quod quæ vox est in una lingua simplex, in altera est composita? ut Latine *Paterfamiliâs*, Græce οἰκοδεσπότης; Latine *tribunus militum*, Græce χιλίαρχος; Latine *tribunus plebis*, Græce δήμαρχος: et in eadem sæpe lingua; ut, idem sunt *Dictator*, et *Magister populi*; idem *Censor*, et *Magister morum*: ¿Quid quod Gregorius Ariminensis nullam categoricam pronuntiationem compositam vult esse in mente? Utique non facile dictu est quid cogitatus noster simpliciter sibi fingat, quid conjunctim, et complexe; adeo est liber, etsi hic ad hunc modum intelligit, ille multo secus, ut præcipi hac de re ex mente, et intelligentia nullo modo possit.

Ex istis conficiunt dialecticas enuntiationes, quæ constant subjecto et prædicato, sed eo ordine, ut non sit periculosius hunc universi ordinem perturbare: subjectum necesse est esse prius prædicato: *omnis homo est animal*, recte: *animal omnis est homo*; perturbata omnia, et confusa: ¿an non hic est in prima forma syllogismus? *omne animal est corporeum*, *animal est homo omnis*, *ergo omnis homo est corporeus*: ergo animal tam prædicatur in assumtione, quàm in propositione subjicitur: *animal omnis homo est*, τὸ *omnis* non est pars prædicati; *animal est omnis homo*, par est, verificari ut de nullo possit, neque enim invenietur de quo vere dicatur, *hoc est omnis homo*: quæ ego ¿quid communi usu et scriptoribus Latinæ linguæ omnibus reprobem? ipso Aristotele confutabuntur; is enim in libro *Perihermenias* istis pronuntiatis utitur, *est justus homo*, *non est justus homo*: ¿an non ibi *justus* de *homine* prædicatur? atqui hoc ipse dicit disertis verbis, ut in hac ejusdem, *est homo*, ¿quid, *homo*, prædicatur ne? jam, ubi ait: *valet omnis homo*, *non valet omnis homo*, est ne *omnis* pars prædicati? Sed isti nec Aristotelem, quem tantum habent in ore, nec ullum bonum, et magnum auctorem legunt, vel intelligunt; nec est opus auctoribus, aut libris ad ea, quæ agunt; verba omnia adjectiva volunt resolvi in substantivum verbum, et participium: ut, *ambulat*, *est ambulans*,
alio-

Hearing the phrase, 'the harsh terror of the Trojans', it sometimes understands only Achilles, and occasionally when it hears 'Achilles' it thinks of terror, and the Trojans, and the savagery of youth. Again, a word which is simple in one language is composite in another, as the Latin *pater familias* and the Greek *oikodespotes*; the Latin *tribunus militum*, Greek *chiliarchos*; Latin *tribunus plebis*, Greek *demarchos*; and this is often true in the same language, as *dictator* and *magister populi*, likewise *censor* and *magister morum*. What about Gregory of Rimini, who thinks there is no composite categorical proposition in the mind?[18] Certainly it is not easy to say what our thought imagines to itself simply, or conjointly and complexly; thought is so free that, though one man understands in one way and another very differently, no rules can possibly be given about this matter of the mind and intellect.

From these terms they produce dialectical propositions that consist of subject and predicate, but in so precise an order that it would not be more dangerous to disturb the order of the universe. It is necessary that the subject precede the predicate: 'Every man is an animal', – correct; 'An animal is every man', – all confounded and confused. But is this not a syllogism in the first form? 'Every animal is corporeal, an animal is every man, therefore every man is corporeal'; 'animal' is therefore as much the predicate of the minor proposition as it is the subject of the major. 'An animal every man is'; the word 'every' is not part of the predicate; 'An animal is every man' is the same kind, so that it is impossible to establish or even discover anyone of whom it can be truly said, 'This is every man'. To this I say, why should I reject common usage and all the writers of the Latin language? Aristotle himself will confute these new men, for in his book *On Interpretation* he uses these propositions, 'Man is just; man is not just'[19]. Are we to think that 'just' here is not predicated of 'man'? But he clearly says that it is, as here in the same book, 'Man is[20]'. How then? Is 'man' not predicated? Then when he says, 'Every man is healthy; every man is not healthy'[21], is not 'every' part of the predicate? But our new men do not read or understand either Aristotle, whose name is so often on their lips, nor any good and outstanding author; there is no need of authors or books for what they do. They want all adjectival verbs broken down into the substantive verb and the participle, as for example, 'He walks' into 'He is walking'.

alioqui non esse satis perfectam, et satis explicatam enuntiationem; Aristoteles, inquit, idem esse si quis dicat, *Socrates disputat, et Socrates est disputans*: ¿an quia nihil sensu distant, protinus quidquid est in una prædicatum, erit etiam in altera? neque enim hæc differunt, *homo disputat, et animal rationale disputat*: non tamen idem est subjectum.

Quid, quod ad resolvendum non tantam habemus participiorum copiam, quantam Græci, qui habent participia præteriti, et aoristorum in voce activa, et præsentis, ac futurorum in passiva; ut hæc difficile possit a Latinis explicari: *Socrates diligitur aut laudatur*: a Græcis facillime: quid, quod non semper idem reddit participium quod verbum, præsertim in iis verbis quæ non præsentem actionem, sed consuetudinem significant: longe sunt diversa, *pingit*, et *est pingens*, *amat*, *docet*, et *est amans*, *est docens*, quæ de dormiente bene dicantur in verbo ad hunc modum: *Hic docte pingit, hic amat illam, hic docet filios meos*; non item in participio, quod præsentem actionem notat: adde quod multæ sunt propriæ locutiones per verbum, quæ non sunt per participium, ut, *Socrates confidit*, et *est confidens*: *rubet*, et *est rubens*: *pallet*, et *est pallens*: *pluit*, et *est pluens*: *licet*, et *est licens*: sed in hoc non immorabor, nam inter ipsos sophistas parum convenit, aliis dicentibus verba adjectiva esse incomplexa, cujus est sententiæ Petrus Mantuanus, in qua videtur Aristotelem et Boëthum habere auctores, aliis asserentibus ea esse complexa, nec dici verba dialectica; sed ea disputatio et controversia nec rebus, nec rationi loquendi officit; illud magis et sermonem, et intelligentiam omnium lædit, quòd prædicatum volunt astringere subjectum in his, ac ejusmodi: *homo est pictus, homo est mortuus*, in quibus de analogo prædicatur significatio ignobilior, ut hæc sit vera propositio, quod absit, *omnis homo est mortuus*: et hæc, *omnis homo est pictus*: fortasse illis, qui sedebant in specu Platonis, *omnis homo erat umbra*, nobis non item, nisi forte iidem isti qui hæc somniant.

Quid, quum subjectum restringit prædicatum, ut in hac, *Socrates albus*: ut hæc sit vera, *tantum Socrates est albus*: nam volunt esse sensum, *solus Socrates est Socrates albus*: quod a Paulo

Otherwise the proposition is not sufficiently complete and well set forth. Aristotle says it is the same thing to say, 'Socrates disputes' and 'Socrates is disputing'. Does that mean that, because these do not differ at all in sense, whatever is predicated in the one will automatically be so in the other, too? For neither do these differ: 'A man disputes' and 'A rational animal disputes', and yet the subject is not one and the same.

And furthermore, for the free use of the verb we have not such a wealth of participles as the Greeks, who have participles of the preterite and the aorists in the active voice, and present and future ones in the passive. For example, the statement 'Socrates is loved or praised' can be explicated only with difficulty by the Latins, but very easily by the Greeks. What is more, the participle does not always express the same meaning as the verb, especially among verbs that signify not present but customary action. These expressions are far different: 'He paints' and 'He is painting'; 'He loves', 'He teaches' and 'He is loving', 'He is teaching'. These things can rightly be said of a sleeping man by means of the verb, thus: 'He paints skillfully', 'He loves her', 'He teaches my sons'; but not by the participle, which denotes present action. Besides there are many locutions proper to the verb that are not so with the participle, such as 'Socrates trusts', and 'Socrates is trusting'; 'He blushes', and 'He is blushing'; 'He grows pale', and 'He is growing pale', 'It rains', and 'It is raining', 'It is allowed', and 'It is being allowed'. But I shall not linger over this, for there is little agreement here among the sophisters themselves. Some say adjectival verbs are incomplex, which is the opinion of Peter of Mantua; here he seems to have Aristotle and Boethius as authorities. Others claim they are complex and should not be called dialectical verbs. But this argument and controversy affect neither the matter nor the order of speaking; what does more damage to speech and intelligence in general is that they want the predicate to restrict the subject in such a way that, in the propositions 'A man is sketched', 'A man is dead', the meaning, from analogy, is stated more obscurely, so that the true proposition (God save us) would be this, 'Every man is dead', and 'Every man is sketched'. Possibly to those who sat in Plato's cave 'Every man was a shadow', but not to us, except possibly to those who are dreaming up these things.

What about when the subject restricts the predicate? – as, for example, 'White Socrates', as if it were true that only Socrates is white; for they intend the meaning to be 'Socrates alone is white Socrates'. This was

Veneto allatum, ceteri magno applausu exceperunt, tamquam illic Socrates substantivum sit illius adjectivi *albi*, et non potius *homo*: quod si ita sit, nulla harum non erit vera, *tantum Socrates est philosophus*, *solus Socrates est Atheniensis*, *solus Socrates habet patrem*: eadem lege factæ sunt hæ veræ: *Socrates videt omne astrum*, quum unum tantum videt: *Socrates possidet omnem asinum*, qui unum habet: si sic lubet explicare, dicam et hanc esse veram, *homo est asinus*: nam sic interpretabor, *homo est asini possessor*: respondebunt mihi neminem sic uti illo pronuntiato: ¿At ostendant ipsi quis ad eum modum utatur illo suo præter ipsos? Sed de hoc post paullulum, nunc pergam alias addere.

CAPUT VI.

NEc in minores angustias deducta sunt illa de *forma*, et *forma acceptionis terminorum*; a veteribus perplexe sunt prodita, sicut a Petro Mantuano, et ab Strodo, cujus deffinitionem *consequentiæ formalis* tres expositores Sermoneta, Ferabrich, et Thienensis nequiverunt satis declarare; recentiores *formam* sic constituunt, ut sit *eadem qualitas enuntiatorum*, *eadem quantitas*, *synonymitas terminorum*, *similis acceptio terminorum*, ut nullus sit jam syllogismus bonus de *forma*, nulla oppositio, nulla conclusio, ni in angustias sermonis illorum et in illas loquendi absurditates redacta: Cicero sic colligit: *Omne gaudere bonis animi beatum est*, *omnis sapiens iis bonis animi gaudet*, *omnes ergo sapientes beati*: instari enim potest sic: *omne gaudere bonis animi beatum est*, *omnis stultus suavibus bonis animi gaudet*, *suavibus* posito pro *iis*: neque hic esset bonus: *omnis homo legit*, *Socrates est unus ex hominibus*, ergo *legit*: nam in assumptione, hæc est instantia: *Bucephalus est asinus hominis*: et Quintilianus libro secundo: *Omnis*

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derived from Paul of Venice, and others have taken it up with great approval, as if here 'Socrates' and not 'man' were the substantive of the adjective 'white'. But if this is so, all of these statements will be true: 'Only Socrates is a philosopher'; 'Socrates alone is an Athenian'; 'Socrates alone has a father'. By the same law these become true: 'Socrates sees every star', when he sees only one; 'Socrates owns every donkey', when he has one. If it is such fun to explicate in this way, I shall say this one is also true, 'A man is a donkey', and I will explain, 'A man is the possessor of a donkey'. They will answer me that no one uses that proposition in that way. But do they tell who, besides themselves, uses theirs in their way? But more of this presently; now I shall go on to other matters.

CHAPTER VI

Questions of *form*, and *form of acceptance of terms* have been reduced to the same narrow limits. These were set forth obscurely by earlier men like Peter of Mantua and Strode, whose definition of *formal consequence* three expositors, Sermoneta, Ferabrich, and Gaetano di Thiene were unable to clarify satisfactorily.[22] The newer men define form as 'the same quality of proposition', 'the same quantity', 'synonymy of terms', 'a like acceptance of terms', so that now no syllogism, opposition or conclusion is acceptable with respect to form unless it is cast within the narrow limits of their vocabulary and absurdities of speech. Cicero makes this syllogism: 'All enjoyment of the good things of the mind is happy; every wise man enjoys these good things of the mind; therefore all wise men are happy'. In fact it can be counter-instanced in this way: 'All enjoyment of the good things of the mind is happy; every fool enjoys the agreeable good things of the mind', – substituting 'agreeable' for 'these'. Nor would this be acceptable: 'Every man reads; Socrates is one belonging to men (*ex hominibus*), therefore he reads,' for 'Bucephalus is a donkey belonging to a man (*hominis*)' is a counter-instance to the minor premise.[23] Also Quintilian's syllogism, in Book II: 'Every art has some subject matter; rhetoric has no proper subject matter, therefore it is not an art'[24], may be counter-instanced in this way: 'Every man has some

ars habet aliquam materiam, Rhetorica nullam habet propriam materiam, non ergo est ars: instatur: *omnis homo habet equum aliquem, Socrates non habet equum album, non ergo homo*: in omni re sunt nimii; interdum volunt referri omnia ad animum, et modum concipiendi; cogitatione interdum in nudis vocibus sistunt sine intelligentia; spectandum est in verbis omnibus quid mens soleat communiter intelligere: jam, ¿quales consequutiones faciunt? *homo est asinus, ergo baculus stat in angulo*: *Socrates ambulat, ergo Deus est bonus*: ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet, sicut necessarium ad quodlibet: quasi vero non ratio connexionis potissimum spectari debeat; ut in *disjunctis*; *ego curro*, vel *Deus est.*

In modalibus, alias faciunt de *sensu composito*, alias *de sensu diviso*: non tam improbo rem, quàm eorum in verbis definitionem: ut, quum in medio est *modus* esse *de sensu diviso*: *Socrates necessario currit*: quum initio vel fine, de *sensu composito*: *Socratem currere est necesse*: Aristoteles has duas ponit eodem loco, et sensu: *quod est, esse quum est*, et *quod non est, non esse quum non est, necessum est*: et hanc, *omne quod est, necessario est quum est*: nam τὸ ἀνάγκη in priore illa postponitur, in posteriore ponitur in medio: et in primo elenchorum hanc vocat amphibolam: τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν *posse sedentem ambulare*, et ait posse esse *sensus divisi, et compositi*: quid, quod fecerunt alias modales, nempe *verum, falsum, scitum*, tum *opinatum*, ut Buridanus et alii, in quibus etiam de *sensu diviso*, et *composito*; quod quomodo possit fieri nulla mens capit, ut, *Socratem scitum est disputare.*

Conjunctæ categoricæ, quas hypotheticas vulgo nominant, quum sint innumeræ, nempe quot conjunctiones, quot etiam adverbiorum non pauca, reduxerunt antiqui. eas ad tres species; alii paullo plures addiderunt: Paulus Venetus, quem Dullardus, (et vulgo eorum scholæ) in hoc, sicut in multis aliis, sequitur, hanc fecit distinctionem, ut quæ conjunctiones conjungunt enuntiationes per se intelligibiles, hoc est, de indicativo, efficiant hypotheticas; quæ vero de aliis modis, non item; ideo has conjunctiones, *licet, quamvis, etsi, quamquam*, non fa-

horse; Socrates does not have a white horse, therefore he is not a man'. Excesses abound. Sometimes the new men want all statements referred back to the mind and the manner of comprehending. Sometimes they set up everything mentally in bare words without discrimination. One must consider, with respect to all words, what the mind habitually and ordinarily understands by them. And then, what consequences do they draw? 'A man is a donkey, therefore a stick stands in the corner'[25]. 'Socrates walks, therefore God is good'. Anything follows from the impossible, just as the necessary follows from anything.[26] As if the order of the sequence need not be very carefully observed, as in disjunctions: 'I am running or God exists'.

When it comes to modal propositions, they make some in the compounded, others in the divided sense. I do not disapprove this division so much as their definition of it. For instance, when it occurs in the middle of a sentence, the mode is in the divided sense: 'Socrates necessarily runs'; when it is at the beginning or the end, in the compounded sense: 'That Socrates is running is necessary'. Aristotle places the two in the same place and sense: [1] That 'whatever is, is when it is, and whatever is not, is not when it is not, is necessary', and [2] 'Everything that is, necessarily is when it is'[27]. For in the first of these he places the necessity (*to ananke*) at the end; in the second he puts it in the middle; and in the first book of the *Elenchi* he calls this an *amphibola*: (*To dunasthai kathemenon badizein*) 'That a sitting man can walk', and says it can be taken in both a divided and a compounded sense.[28] What about their producing other modals, namely *true*, *false*, *known*, and even *conjectured*, as did Buridan and others who also used these in a divided and compounded sense? How this can be eludes one's wits; for example, 'That Socrates it is known disputes'.

The connected categorical propositions that they commonly call hypothetical are innumerable. I am sure there are as many connectives as there are adverbs. The older writers reduced them to three forms, and others gradually added many more. Paul of Venice, whom Dullaert (and in general their schools) followed in this as in so many other things, made this distinction: that the connectives that joined propositions that are intelligible *per se* – that is, in the indicative – gave rise to hypotheticals, but those in the other moods did not. Therefore connectives such as 'it is permitted (*licet*)', 'howevermuch', 'though', 'although', do not produce hypotheticals, because while it can be said correctly 'Although Socrates may run (*licet Socrates currat*), yet Socrates is not moving', still the

cere hypotheticas; quia recte dicitur, *licet Socrates currat, Socrates tamen non movetur*: non recte autem, nec latine, *licet Socrates currit*: ¿An non hæc sunt ad risum movendum aptissima? primum, has, et similes, *si asinus volaret, asinus haberet alas*, non negant esse hypotheticas; deinde ¿quid prohibet quominus bene et latine dicatur, *licet Socrates currit, etsi, quamquam Socrates currit*? Isti sunt qui in formulam redigunt latinum sermonem, cujus umbram nunquam viderunt; sicut Mantuanus, qui ait ab hypothetica temporali ad quamlibet sui partem valere consequentiam, ut a conjunctiva; ut hæc sit bona conclusio: *Tu moveris cum curris, ergo tu curris et tu moveris*: tum hæc: *æstas est quum sol est in Cancro, ergo æstas est, et sol est in Cancro.*

Sunt enuntiationes quædam categoricæ de conditionato extremo, ut vocant: *Socrates, si est homo, currit*: *do tibi lapidem, si est avis, et do tibi avem, si est lapis*; ut hæc sit vera: *do tibi animal, si est homo, quum do ad amantem*: quæ sunt profecto aptiora ad ludendum, quàm ad loquendum: qualia sunt, quum in libris eorum aliis infinita (¿nam quis posset percensere omnia? non facilius quàm arenas Lybiæ) tum potissimum in iis, quæ vocant *parva logicalia*, omnia ex linguæ ignoratione excogitata, de quo pauca prius loquar, non tam disputandi, aut convincendi gratia, quàm docendi; nam ea est res, quæ si exposita fuerit, nec ipsos eosdem arbitror repugnaturos qui sunt commenti; quippe ejus rei adhuc retinent semina quædam, sed degenerantia; itaque si vera, et meliora ostendantur, facile agnoscent et accedent. In hac rerum natura artes sunt ab hominibus cura, labore, meditatione, industria observatæ, ac excusæ; nulla earum sibi facit novam materiam, sed in facta jam, et parata operatur; et aliæ circa res versantur; aliæ circa verba quæ sunt grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica: nulli istorum vel mutare populi sermonem, vel novum licet fingere, sed in recepto, quæ sui sunt muneris, defungi: Grammaticus, rationem, et verborum simplicium, et aptæ compositionis, inquirit; Dialecticus, quæ faciunt sensus veros, quæ falsos (loquor ex recepta opinione) quæ consequantur, quæ repugnent; Rhetor,

Translator's correction: 2nd par., line 18, read 'istarum' for 'istorum'.

phrase *licet Socrates currit* violates Latin grammar as well as reason. Are these not more than enough to make one laugh? In the first place, the dialecticians do not deny that these and similar sentences, 'If a donkey were to fly, a donkey would have wings' – are hypothetical. Then what prevents anyone from saying, however incorrect and atrocious his Latin, *licet Socrates currit*, using the other connectives that take the subjunctive? These are the men who reduced to a formula the Latin speech whose shadow they have never seen. They are like Peter of Mantua, who said that the consequence from a temporal hypothetical to any of its parts is valid – like the consequence from a conjunctive proposition – so that this would be an acceptable conclusion: 'You are in motion when you run, therefore you are running and you are in motion'; and this: 'It is summer when the sun is in Cancer, therefore it is summer and the sun is in Cancer'.

There are certain categorical statements with an extreme condition, as when one says, 'Socrates, if he is a man, is running'; 'I give you a stone if it is a bird, and I give you a bird if it is a stone', so that this would be true: 'I give you an animal if it is a man, since I am giving to a lover', – all certainly more appropriate for games than for discourse. While there are countless examples of this kind in different books of theirs (for who could enumerate them all more easily than he could the Lybian sands?) they abound especially in the books they call the *Little Logicals*, all conceived in ignorance of language. I spoke briefly about this before, not so much for the sake of disputing or convincing as of teaching. For I think that if this matter were explained, even the people who devised these things would not defend them. For in fact these men retain certain elements of the right method even now, but in degenerate form; so that if they were to be shown the true and better things, they would easily recognise and assent to them. In the natural order of things, men respect the arts and mould them with care, labor, industry and thought. None of the arts makes new material for itself, but each works upon material already formed and provided. Some arts have to do with things; others with words, and these are grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. None of these can change the popular speech or fashion a new one, but each must play its given role within the customary language. The grammarian studies the science both of simple words and skillful composition. The dialectician examines what makes meanings true or false (I cite the common opinion), what things are consequent and what inconsistent. The rhetorician seeks what is beautiful, embellished,

tor, quæ pulchra, ornata, insignia, quæ cum dulcedine in animos blande instillentur, quæ aspera, et dura: si grammaticus novum aliquod, et inusitatum afferat vocabulum, aut doceat pueros suos aliter loqui quàm populus loquatur, nimirum explodetur ut barbarus; si rhetor dicturus, nova sibi fingat schemata, et non illa sumat de medio, stultitiam et absurditatem hominis omnes explodent; ¿quid si dialecticus verum et falsum scrutatur, fictis suo arbitratu sensis verborum, relictis illis vulgaribus et receptis? plane dicent omnes quibus lingua erit nota, *non nostri sermonis verum inquiris, sed tuorum somniorum; si tu in his verbis et hoc communi sensu aliqua observas, audiam te docentem, sin fingis tibi linguam, ac voces, tibi, et tuis paras dialecticem, cujus nullus sit usus, quum nemo sic loquatur, ac ne tu quidem, et tui.*

Hoc adeo verum est, ut nec Aristoteles, nec Boëthus, nec ipsi iidem, quibus hæc nescio quis Deus misit in mentem, ad præscriptum suorum canonum possint vera loqui; Aristoteles, ac veteres omnes Græci, usum Græcæ linguæ sunt secuti; Cicero, et Latini, Latinæ: infinita sunt quæ ex communi usu affirmat Aristoteles in *prædicamentis*, in *metaphysicis*, in *topicis*, denique ubicunque de *sensu verborum* agitur; et recentiores isti non ignorant dialecticam suam præcepta esse in communi lingua observata; ideo enim multa probant per communem modum intelligendi, et ad tuendas eas enuntiationes quæ vulgo habentur pro veris, tot regulas illis prioribus interfarserunt, ut de *suppositione accommoda*, et *personali*, de *tempore pertransacto*, de *distributione* pro *singulis generum*, pro *generibus singulorum*, et ejusmodi, haud penitus ignari observationem esse linguæ dialecticam: quod si meliorem novissent linguam, utique ad eam accommodassent canones, sed de ea loquebantur, quam illi non solum optimam esse autumabant, sed solam, quum aliam ne de facie quidem unquam vidissent; nam quod dicunt quidem: *ego sic mente concipio*: hoc vero nihil ad dialecticam quæ est de sermone, neque enim quum dico, *homo est ceruleus*, spectare debeo quid intelligat indoctus, qui *ceruleum* capiat pro *cereo*, sed quid in Latina lingua signet; *Vera, et falsa, et contraria,*

et

remarkable, what can be carefully instilled into the mind with charm, what things are harsh and unpleasing. If the grammarian should introduce any new and unaccustomed noun, or teach his pupils to speak differently from the people, he would surely be hooted off as a barbarian. If the rhetorician were to propose to make himself new figures of speech instead of using the familiar ones, everyone would denounce the stupidity and silliness of the man. What then if the dialectician should investigate the true and false by verbal meanings made up at his pleasure, ignoring the common and current ones? Surely everyone who knew the language would say, "You are not seeking the truth of our discourse but of your own dreams. If you make any discoveries in our words and their common meaning, I shall listen to what you have to say, but if you make up a language and speech of your own, you must also prepare a dialectic in your words; since no one speaks that way, there will be no use for your dialectic, nor even for you and your language."

This is so true that neither Aristotle nor Boethius, nor even these same new men (inspired by some demon or other with these ideas) could speak the truth according to the precepts of their canons. Aristotle and all the ancient Greeks followed the usage of the Greek language; Cicero and the Latins, of Latin. The things Aristotle affirms out of common usage are innumerable in the *Categories*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *Topics*, and everywhere the question finally comes down to the meaning of words. And these new men are quite aware that their dialectic was set forth in a common language. This is why they demonstrate many things by the common method of understanding; and to safeguard the propositions that are generally accepted as true they have crammed so many rules in among those earlier ones, such as suitable and personal supposition, time elapsed, distribution according to the individuals of the genera and the genera of the individuals – things of that sort – that one could hardly ignore that dialectic is an exactness of language. Now if they had known a better language they would certainly have adapted their rules to that, but they were speaking about the one they averred was not only the best but the only language, since they had never understood any other, even superficially. For in fact what they are saying is, 'I conceive of it this way'[29]. But really this has nothing to do with dialectic, which concerns itself with speech, any more than when I say, 'The man is dark', I should consider what an ignoramus might understand who takes 'dark (*caeruleus*)' to mean 'wax (*cereus*)', instead of what it means in the Latin language. "Truth and falsehood, the logical and illogical", as Cicero

et consequentia, inquit Cicero, *sua sponte, non alienâ, judicatur*: de quo fuse disputavi in Epistola ad Joannem Fortem.

Putabam olim, quum inciperent hæc mihi displicere, magnum me negotium habiturum istis confutandis contra homines pertinaces, distinctionibus armatos, disputando invictos, et qui numero valerent; sed hoc tempore, renato sermone Latino, et vel pueris jam proprietatem linguæ Latinæ intelligentibus, facilior erit eorum confutatio, quæ ex prave cognita lingua fuerunt corrupta. Dicunt: *usum populo concedentes, scientiam nobis reservamus*; et duos faciunt sensus, bonum, et rigorem; ¿quid est rigor aliud, ad eorum sensum, quàm exacta quædam loquendi ratio? ¿At eam ex quibus petemus, nisi ex iis qui exactissime quamque linguam tenent, non ex iis qui sunt ejus inscientissimi? In Latina ex Cicerone, Plinio, Seneca, Varrone, non Petro Hispano, aut Gulielmo Hentisbari: Boëthus, Apulejus, Capella, in suis dialecticis dicta Ciceronis adducunt pro testimonio nempe Latini homines hominis Latinissimi, quique absolute linguam illam norat, et rigorem hunc poterat adjuvare; Græci, Demosthenis, Isocratis, Homeri, Euripidis, Sophoclis; de quo alio loco a me dissseretur; nos etiam magnorum auctorum utemur dictis, ¿nam unde, nisi ab illis, requirenda est linguæ proprietas? Ex illa imperitia sermonis natæ sunt nobis *suppositiones, ascensus, descensus, ampliationes, restrictiones, appellationes, exponibilia*, ad quæ si lingua esset aptanda, non solum obmutescendum esset, sed nec aliquid esset verum in scriptoribus, ut interdum mirer, quomodo hæc eis venerunt in mentem, tam ab omni ratione, et loquendi, et sentiendi, abhorrentia.

In *suppositione* sunt *discreta, determinata, confusa, distributiva*; sunt *termini certi*, qui illas faciunt, certo loco, et ordine: *omnis homo est animal*, vera est, et animal *confuse* supponit: *animal est quivis homo*, falsa, *determinate* enim: *caput omnis homo habet*, falsa; *omnis homo habet caput*, vera: *equus requiritur ad equitandum*, falsa; *ad equitandum equus requiritur*, item falsa; *ad equitandum requiritur equus*, vera: Cicero dicit in Oratore, *acumen dialecticorum requirendum est*, et in Finibus, *quoniam aliquid omnes*: ¿quid Lucius? et Quintilianus: *Est aliquid in omni materia* *na-*

Translator's correction: line 8, read 'earum' for 'eorum'.

said, "are judged by themselves and not by anything else", on which I discoursed at length in my letter to John Fortis.

I once thought, when these things began to annoy me, that I would have no little trouble confuting them against pertinacious men, armed with distinctions, invincible in dispute, and who outnumbered me. But in these days, when the Latin language is renewed and even schoolboys now understand the idiomatic quality of Latin speech, it will be easier to confute corruptions derived from ignorance of the language. They say, "While we concede usage to the people, we reserve knowledge for ourselves"; and they distinguish two senses, 'good' and 'rigorous'. What is rigor, in their sense, but a certain exact rule of speech? But from whom shall we seek this, if not from the greatest masters of whatever language, instead of from men who are ignorant of it? In Latin we seek it from Cicero, Pliny, or Varro, not from Peter of Spain or William Heytesbury. Boethius, Apuleius, and Capella, in their dialectical treatises, adduce the words of Cicero as testimony, impeccable Latin authors calling upon the most Latin of men, who thoroughly knew that language and could sustain that rigor. Among the Greeks there are Demosthenes, Isocrates, Homer, Euripides, Sophocles – but I have discussed this in another place. And we, too, should profit by the sayings of great authors; from whom else can we seek to know the proper signification of a language? Ignorance of speech has begot for us *suppositions, ascent, descent, ampliations, restrictions, appellations, exponibles*. If the language had to be adapted to these, not only would it fall silent, but nothing in the ancient writers would be true. Indeed I sometimes wonder how these ideas ever came into their heads, so much are they at odds with any rational speech or thought.

In the category of *supposition* we have *discrete, determinate, confused,* and *distributive*. There are certain terms that produce these sorts of supposition by means of a certain location and order. 'Every man is an animal' is true, and 'animal' has confused supposition; 'An animal is every man' is false, for 'animal' here has determinate supposition. 'A head every man has' is false; 'Every man has a head', true; 'A horse is needed for horseback riding', false; 'For horseback riding a horse is needed', also false; 'Horseback riding requires a horse', is true. Cicero says in the *Orator*, "Keenness must be required of dialecticians"; and adds, in *De finibus*, "since everyone has some". What does Lucius say? And Quintilian: "In every subject matter there is something that is naturally primary". And in the Scriptures, "The poor

naturaliter primum: et in sacris litteris, *Pauperes semper habebitis vobiscum*: ¿sunt hæ falsæ? ¿quis aliter loquitur? nec ipsi iidem, etiam quum de his præcipiunt. Jam, usum negationis, qui varius est apud Græcos, et Latinos, et unamquamque linguam, et patet latissimè, si quis conetur ad ceteras formas redigere, peribit sermonis universa vis, et gratia: *Nemo est ex aliqua parte non felix*: ¿quid istud est? ¿*ex nulla parte*? et dicunt *quod mobilitat immobilitatum, immobilitat mobilitatum, ut se negationes impediant; et negatio cadens super signum universale.* In omni lingua duæ negationes fortius negant, præterquàm in latina; Demosthenes quatuor posuit pro una; in nostra, etiam sæpenumero non plus efficiunt duæ quàm una: ut, *non possum ne dormire quidem.* Cicero: *Nolo ne hæc quidem humana ignoret*: idem sunt: *non reveretur neque deos, neque homines; neque deos, neque homines reveretur*: *non veretur homines, non deos*: *non timet homines aut deos*; *non metuit hominesve deosve*: *ne scribere quidem novit*; *non novit ne scribere quidem*: Aristoteles expresse ait non esse hanc universalem: *non est homo pulcher*; nec idem esse, *non est homo pulcher, et nullus homo est pulcher.*

In ascensu magna controversia in ponenda *constantia*: quidam recentiorum, repudiato vetere more, ita eam ponunt, ut ipsa enuntiatio, ad quàm *ascenditur*, luce sit clarior præ constantia: sed quomodocunque ponatur, nullus est ejus usus, neque unquam aliquis sic colligit, ne ludens quidem: multo aliter utebatur Socrates suis ἐπαγωγαῖς: jam descendent mihi sub hac quæ est apud Cic. in Academicis quæst: *Judicium Protagoræ est, qui putat id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur*: vel illa in ii Philip.: *Ita cuique eveniat, ut de republica quisque mereatur*: ¿an erit, ita Antonio eveniat, ita Fabio, ut de republica quisque mereatur? ¿quid absurdius? *In ampliationibus et restrictionibus* illa sunt prodigiosa: *meretrix erit virgo*: *artocreæ devoratæ, et egestæ, sunt edendæ*: *puer anniculus fuit centum annorum*: *in appellationibus*: *nun vidi papam, et papam vidi*: *consulem cæcidi, et non cæcidi consulem*: ergo omnes istæ ad eorum normam sunt falsæ: *L. Cæsar genuit Cæsarem dictatorem*: *Jesse genuit David Regem ex ea quæ fuit Uriæ*: *Cajeta nutriit Æneam Re-*

Translator's correction: 2nd par., line 14, read 'non' for 'nun'.

you will always have with you''[30]. Are these false? Who speaks in any other way? Certainly not the sophisters, even when they teach these rules. Take for example the use of the negative, which varies among the Greeks and Latins and other languages; it is abundantly clear that if anyone should try to reduce it to other forms, the whole force and charm of the language would be lost. 'No one is in any degree not happy'. What does that mean? 'In no degree?' And they say, 'Whatever moves the immobile, immobilises the mobile', so that the negatives cancel each other out, and negation falls under the universal sign. In every language except Latin two negatives have a stronger negative force. Demosthenes used four in the place of one. In our language even two are often no more efficient than one, as in 'I cannot not even sleep'. Cicero said, 'I do not want him to ignore not even these human affairs'. These mean the same: 'He does not fear (*reveretur*) neither gods nor men', 'neither gods nor men does he fear', 'he fears not men, not gods', 'he does not fear (*timet*) men or gods', 'he does not fear (*metuit*) either men or gods'; 'Not even how to write did he know', 'he did not know not even how to write'. Aristotle expressly says that this form is not universal: 'Man is not beautiful', and that these are not the same, 'Man is not beautiful', and 'No man is beautiful'[31].

In *ascent* there is great controversy in establishing consistency. Certain of the new men have repudiated the old custom and establish it in such a way that a proposition to which there is ascent is clearer than light by reason of consistency. But however it may be established, it is of no use, nor does anyone ever consider it useful, even as a joke. Socrates used his inductions (*epagogais*) in quite another way; and in fact they descend in my view under the rule in Cicero's *Academic Questions*: 'In the judgment of Protagoras, everyone thinks that that is true for him which seems so to him'[32]. Or see that remark in the second *Philippic*: 'So may it befall everyone, that everyone deserves well of the state'. Does this mean, 'So may it befall Anthony, and so Fabius, that everyone deserves well of the state?' What could be sillier?

In *ampliations* and *restrictions* the examples are even more strange: 'A whore is a virgin'; 'Meat-pies consumed and digested are to be eaten'; 'A one-year old child was a hundred years old'; in *appellations*: 'I have not seen thè Pope and the Pope I have seen'; 'I have killed the consul and have not killed the consul'. Therefore all these statements, according to their rule are false: 'Lucius Caesar begat Caesar the Dictator'; 'Jesse begat King David upon the woman who was Uriah's wife'[33]; 'Cajeta

Regem Lavinii: *hæc mulier nupsit magno illi pictori Apelli*, si antequàm ad summum pervenisset artis, nupserat: *Hoc opus scriptum a est patre Catonis*, si scripsisset antequam Catonem gigneret; et alia quæ sunt in ore omnium infinita.

Exponibilia fecerunt, *tantum*, *præter*, *in quantum*, *immediate*, *incipit*, *desinit*: tum *comparativa*, *totus*, *semper*, *ab æterno*, *infinitum*: ¿cur non plura? quasi vero non pæne verba omnia, et adverbia, possent etiam cum cavillis exponi aptis disputantium circulis, ut, *currit*; ¿*quis motus necessarius sit ad currendum*? *cantat*; ¿*quàm alta vox ad cantandum*? *plorat*; ¿*quis animi motus*, *quæ vox*, *qui gestus ad plorandum*? *ridet*; ¿*quis oris rictus ad risum*? *solet*; *consuevit*; ¿*quot actus ad habitum*, *aut ad consuetudinem*, *quanta intermissio*? ¿et sicut *incipit*, ac *desinit*, cur non etiam *aggreditur*, *expedit se*, *delassatur*, *cessat*? Jam quum adduntur adverbia, *celeriter*, *bene*, *male*, *tarde*, *pæne*, *fere*, *quasi*, *etsi*; *quasi jam* exponunt *major pars*, ut: si sint hic Romani mille quingenti, et unus discesserit, verum sit, *quasi nemo Romanus hic remansit*: putant agi de numero sententiarum in foro aut curia: sed videamus ea, quæ tradunt: *tantum animal est homo*: *tantum coloratum est album*: *sola animalia sunt homines*: ¿Quis hæc intelligat? bene additur inferiori *exclusio*, quippe est exclusio velut quædam restrictio, quæ fit a *majore*, atque *ampliore*; ad summum, *æquo*, sed sic, ut pro *majori* positum appareat: *tantum homo ridet*: *Soli Romani sunt liberi*: superiori additum nullum facit sensum, et prope contrarium solet intelligi, ut, *tantum liberi sunt Romani*, *quasi soli Romani sint liberi*: et, *tantum animal est homo*, quasi *solus homo sit animal*: Plinius libro VII. *Præter feminam pauca animalia noverunt coitum post conceptum*: ¿Quomodo hic fit exceptio?

Horum verborum, *incipit*, et *desinit*, si loquendum sit ad canones istorum, nullus esse potest usus; ¿quis poterit tenere minutias illorum instantium? quum in prandio sumo secundam buccellam, aut etiam quum primam habeo inter dentes, non possum dicere: *incipio prandere*: quod infinita vis instantium præterfluxerit; nec quum mando postremam: *desino prandere*: quum libri secundam litteram scribo, non *incipio* librum scribe-

nursed Aeneas, King of Lavinium'; 'This woman married the famous painter, Apelles,' if she married him before he reached the pinnacle of his art. 'This work was written by the father of Cato', if he wrote it before Cato was born. And countless others they all talk about.

They have invented *exponibles*:[34] 'only', 'except', 'insofar as', 'instantly', 'begins', 'ceases' – then *comparatives*: 'whole', 'always', 'eternal', 'infinite'. Why not more? As if, indeed, almost all verbs and adverbs could not also be expounded with cavilling fit for the company of disputers. For example, 'He runs'; 'what motion is required for running?' 'He sings'; 'how high a voice is needed for singing?' 'He weeps'; 'what emotion of the soul, what voice, what gestures for weeping?' 'He laughs'; 'what opening of the mouth for laughing?' 'He is used to . . . he was accustomed to . . .'; 'how many repetitions are required for a habit or custom, how long a period of time?' And in the same way 'he begins' and 'he ceases'; why not also 'he undertakes', 'he gets ready', 'he tires', 'he gives up?' – since adverbs are already added: 'quickly', 'well', 'ill', 'late', 'nearly', 'entirely', 'as if', 'although'. 'As if (*quasi*)' they now construe as 'the most part'; for example, if there were fifteen hundred Romans here and one should leave, it would be true that 'for the most part no Roman is left here'. They think it is a question of the number of votes in the forum or in court. But take a look at the things they teach: 'Only an animal is man'; 'Only something colored is white'; 'Animals alone are men'. Who can understand these?

Exclusion is correctly added to a [term] inferior [in the predicamental line] because exclusion is, as it were, a kind of restriction made from the greater and larger. In general it seems to be taken in an equal sense, but in such a way that it stands for the major. 'Only freemen are Roman', is taken as if 'Romans alone are free'; and 'Only animal is man', as if 'Man alone is animal'. Pliny says in Book vii: 'Few animals except woman have sexual intercourse when pregnant'[35]. Just how is this exception made?

As for the words 'begins' and 'ceases', if they must be discussed according to these men's rules, they can be of no use at all. Who could master the minutiae of their 'instants?' When at breakfast I take the second bite, or even when I have the first between my teeth, I cannot say, 'I begin my breakfast', because an infinite number of instants have flowed by; nor when I swallow the last can I say, 'I stop eating'. When I write the second letter of a book, I do not 'begin' to write the book; when

bere, quum antepenultimam, non *desino*: ¿Quid ergo potest *incipere* aut *desinere*? Plinius, *apud Græcos*, inquit, *desiit nugari Diodorus*: non possunt inveniri exponentes: rejicienda est tamquam parum dialectica: quæro ¿cur homines *nominales*, qui negant esse in rerum natura, *instantia*, Scotum, et *reales* sint in hoc secuti, de *instantibus* exponentes *immediate*, *incipit* et *desinit*? ¿An non videtis cavilla quæri, et materiam lusui aptiorem? *Comparativa*, et *superlativa* dicunt *distribuere* terminos sequentes, ut non idem sit, *Socrates est Trojanis doctior*, et, *omnibus Trojanis doctior*, quia sunt duo *signa mobilitantia*: *Socrates est Græcorum doctissimus*, et, *omnium Græcorum doctissimus*: ¿Quid ego his et similibus refellendis nugis ludam operam, quam illi ipsi usurpandis quæ sunt pueris ad derisum cognita? Illud acutum, quod ex hujus *exponentibus*, *Socrates est Græcorum sapientissimus*, unam faciunt quidam, *omnes Græci sunt sapientes*: ¿Cur non has exponunt, *multo doctior*, *paullo*, *aliquanto*, *non multo*, *non paullo*, quæ magis expositione egent? *Socrates a Græcis differt*, vera; *differt a Græcis*, falsa; quia distribuitur; et quemadmodum hanc, *uterque homo disputat*, explicant, *aliquorum duorum hominum quilibet*: ita hanc, *alter homo disputat*, *omnium duorum aliquis*: ¿Quis unquam talem excogitasset sensum, qui Latinam linguam audivisset?

Tum *signum collectivum* cum suo termino facere *terminum communem*, *et propositionem indefinitam*, *et posse universalizari*, *et fieri collectivam*; capiamus ergo hanc: *omnes Apostoli Dei possibiliter sunt duodecim*: fiat rursus collectiva, *omnes omnes Apostoli Dei*; rursum distributiva, *omnes omnes omnes Apostoli Dei*: ¿quo quid est absurdius? et hanc concedunt, *omnes duo Apostoli Dei sunt duodecim*: similiter, *omnes Apostoli Christi non sunt boni*, vel, *sunt non boni*, veram esse volunt, quia Judas fuerit malus; cui Aristoteles refragatur disertis verbis, in libro Elenchorum, negans posse dici *non bona ea*, *quorum aliquod unum non sit bonum*: addunt *obligationes*, quas alii *theses* vocant; quasi vero hæ essent formularum artis, et non potius exercitatio, et usus artis, quo quisque nihil concedat repugnans, aut neget quod consequatur: tum etiam *insolubilia*, quum in se reflectuntur enunciationes;

I write the antepenult one I do not 'finish'. What then is the meaning of begin or cease? Pliny says the Greek logician Diodorus died of sophistry.[36] No one can be found to explain all this; it must be rejected as unworthy of dialectic. By why, I wonder, have the nominalists, who deny that there are instants in nature, followed Scotus and the realists in this case, holding forth about 'instants', 'immediately', 'begins', and 'ceases?' Is it not clear that they are looking for quibbles and material better suited for games? They say the comparative and superlative distribute the following terms so that these two are not the same: 'Socrates is wiser than the Trojans', and 'wiser than all the Trojans', because here there are two 'mobilitating signs'; 'Socrates is the wisest of the Greeks', and 'the wisest of all the Greeks'. Why should I waste my time refuting this and like nonsense while these men are acting like children and turning accepted truths to mockery? By 'exponents' of this kind some make a perfectly intelligent remark, 'Socrates is the wisest of the Greeks', the same as 'All Greeks are wise'. Why do they not explain the exponible terms, 'much wiser', 'a little', 'somewhat', 'not much', 'not a little', which need explaining more? 'Socrates from the Greeks is different', – true; 'is different from the Greeks – false, because the term is distributed. And in the same way they explain the statement, 'Each man disputes', by 'either one of any two men disputes'.

Then they made the *collective* sign together with its term a common term and indefinite proposition, that can be universalized and can be made collective. And so we get the statement, 'All the Apostles of God are possibly twelve'. Again, it becomes collective: 'All all the Apostles of God'. And again, distributive: 'All all all the Apostles of God'. What is sillier than this? And they allow this one, 'Every two Apostles of God are twelve'; in the same way they want this to be true: 'All the Apostles of God are not good', or 'They are bad', because Judas was evil, an interpretation Aristotle contested with authority in the *Elenchi*, denying that one could say, 'Those things are not good, of which any one is not good'[37]. They add to these *obligations*, which some call *theses*.[38] As if, in truth, these constituted an art of formulae, instead of the practice and use of an art in which one must concede nothing contrary or deny nothing consequent.

Then also there are *insolubles*, where propositions turn back upon

hæc propositio est falsa, omnis propositio universalis significat aliter esse quàm est: *omnis consequentia in Darii est mala, hæc est consequentia in Darii, mala ergo*: sed illas omnes, et similes, de aliis oportet loqui, non de se; si quis dicat: *ego mentior*: continuo rogabunt omnes ¿quid dixerit in quo sit mentius? *hæc pronuntiatio est falsa*: ¿quærent quænam? si pergat dicere, *hæc ipsa*, respondebunt id nec verum esse, nec falsum; idcirco non defuerunt inter eos quidam, ut Petrus Mantuanus, et Andreas Limosus popularis meus, qui negarent propositionem posse ostendere se ipsam, multum aliis frementibus, quòd tanta materia disputationibus detraheretur, itaque calumnia eos impetiverunt quod id dicerent subterfugientes argumentorum laqueos, et pugnam ignave detrectantes.

CAPUT VII.

SEd sit finis quum illi finem nullum faciant; nam in infinitum sunt egressi, quum in omni dialectica, tum potissimum in his *parvis logicalibus*, quem *septimum tractatum* nominant extra logicam utramque, *novam et veterem*, quòd nihil esset de his traditum a prioribus; quæ res in causa fuit tantopere corrumpendi hanc partem, quod ipsi, nulli melius sentienti innixi, toti essent sui; confinxerunt omnia pro captu illo suo, et linguæ, et bonarum rerum omnium experti: atque hoc loco, inque reliqua omni dialectica, quum ignorarent quænam essent sua, quæ aliena, et in omnes fere artes impetum indocte fecissent, detinuerunt auditorem diutissime, tradendis tam multis præter rem *naturalibus*, *supernaturalibus*, *divinis*, *grammaticis*, quæ ut erant perplexa, et confusa omnia, ita fuerunt per majores ambages circumducenda: mirandum est quum *dialecticam* fateantur esse *instrumentum aliarum artium*, huic, Lutetiæ duos annos

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Translator's correction: line 5, read 'mentitus' for 'mentius'.

themselves: 'This proposition is false'; 'Every universal proposition means something different than it is'; 'Every consequence in Darii is wrong; this is a consequence in Darii, therefore it is wrong'. But all of these and similar statements should be said of others and not of the self. If anyone says, 'I am lying', everyone will immediately ask what he said wherein he lied. 'This statement is false'. They will ask, Which one? If he persists and says, 'This very one', they will reply that it is neither true nor false. Therefore some men, like Peter of Mantua and my compatriot, Andreas Limos, denied that a proposition can refer to itself. But others complained loudly because such a denial would eliminate so much material for disputations, and so they attacked these men with the malicious charge that they were saying this to escape the snares of arguments and ignobly refuse the contest.

CHAPTER VII

But let us make an end, since they never will. For they have embarked upon infinity in the whole of dialectic, and especially in those *Little Logicals* which they call the *Seventh Tract*, beyond both the new and the old logic, because nothing in these had been handed down by earlier logicians. This was largely the cause of the corruption of this part of logic, because the new men, having the support of no better thinkers, were all on their own. They put everything together according to their own fancy, ignorant as they were both of language and all the better disciplines. And on this subject and in all the rest of dialectic, since they did not know what belonged to dialectic and what to other subjects, and made an ignorant attack upon almost all the arts, they detained their pupils tediously by giving them so many things beside the point, natural, supernatural, sacred, and grammatical; since all of these were complicated and confused, they prolonged them even more by major circumlocutions. It is a wonder these men acknowledge that dialectic is an instrument of the other arts. At Paris two years are spent upon it, while on the rest of philosophy, natural, moral, and metaphysical, scarcely a year; and note that some even cut off part of this one year for

impendi, ceteræ autem philosophiæ, et de *natura*, et de *moribus*, et *primæ philosophiæ*, vix annum; quid, quod quidam etiam de hoc anno aliquid dialecticæ decidunt; multi tota vita, etiam longissima, nihil sunt aliud quàm dialectici; ea mora plurima suasit inducere alienissima a re, et depravatissima, idque usu venit eis, quod est apud Ciceronem de philosophiæ studiis, persona L. Crassi in tertio de Oratore: *Ista discuntur*, inquit, *facile, si et tantum sumas quantum opus sit, et habeas qui docere fideliter possit, et scias etiam ipse discere; sed si tota vita nihil velis aliud agere, ipsa tractatio et quæstio quotidie ex se gignit aliquid, quod cum desidiosa delectatione vestiges: ita fit ut agitatione rerum sit infinita cognitio, facilis usus doctrinam confirmet, mediocris opera tribuatur, memoria studiumque permaneat: libet autem semper discere, ut si velim ego talis optime ludere, aut pilæ studio tenear; etiam fortasse si assequi non possim, at alii quia præclare faciunt, vehementius quàm causa postulat delectantur, ut Titius pila, Brulla talis: quare nihil est quod quisquam magnitudine artium, ex eo quod senes discunt, pertimescat; namque aut senes ad eas accesserunt, aut usque ad senectutem in studiis detinentur, aut sunt tardissimi: res quidem sic se mea sententia habet, ut nisi quod quisque cito potuerit, nunquam omnino possit perdiscere*: sic Cicero.

Et quia statim *altercandum erat*, et semper *altercandum*, quæsita sunt spinosa quædam apta disputationibus quæ materiam suppeditarent rixis, et diutissime proferrent *altercationem*, etiam in tradendis præceptis artis; nihil semel dicunt ne adimant sibi argumentandi et in contrarium dicendi occasionem; sed si quam deffinitionem aut formulam tradunt, primum confuse et ruditer proponunt, postea paullatim, velut cogentibus ad id argumentatiunculis, expoliunt, et crebris tibicinibus fulciunt, ut denique per longissimos verborum circumactus sit perfecta; et queruntur postea de prolixitate eorum qui excultius scribunt, cum ipsi, dum undique ansas argumentorum venantur, id multis paginis vix explicent, quod exponi paucissimis verbis potuisset: jam vero, ne deesset velut bello huic commeatus, de omnibus inquisierunt, etiam reconditis, et alienis, et puerilibus, et absurdis, et de iis quæ capere non potest humana mens; quum

more dialectic. Many throughout a lifetime, however long, remain nothing but dialecticians. This procrastination encourages them to introduce many things extremely remote from the subject and extremely wrong, and the same thing happens to them that Cicero remarks about the study of philosophy, in the persona of Lucius Crassus in Book iii of *De Oratore*:

> These things are easily learned, if you take up only so much of them as you really need, and have a reliable teacher, and also know how to learn by yourself. But if you want to devote the whole of your life to study and to nothing else, your very studies and inquiries daily give rise to something for you to investigate as an amusement and at your leisure. Thus it happens that the pursuit of facts is endless, and knowledge is easy, if practice reinforce learning, a moderate amount of work be devoted to it, and memory and inclination last. Moreover it is always amusing to learn; as if I, for example, should wish to excel at dice, or had a strong desire to play tennis, even though perhaps I should not be very good at it; but other men, because they play exceedingly well, take keener delight in it than the occasion calls for – like Titius in tennis and Brulla at dice. There is no reason, therefore, why anyone need fear the magnitude of the sciences because old men are studying them, for either they were old men when they first came to them, or they are very slow learners. In fact, my own opinion is that unless a man is able to learn quickly, he will never be able to learn thoroughly at all."[39]

And moreover, because one must promptly dispute, and perpetually dispute, they look for certain thorny questions suited for debate, which will supply abundant material for contention, and they spin out their wrangling endlessly even in teaching precepts of the art. They never make a statement only once, lest they miss an occasion for argument and contradiction; but if they are teaching some definition or formula, they present it first in a crude, confused form, and then gradually, as if compelled by their trivial arguments, polish and prop it up with close supports so that finally, by the most lengthy and roundabout process of words, it may be complete. And then they complain about long-windedness in men who write with more care, when they themselves, hunting opportunities for arguments on all sides, can scarcely unfold in many pages what could be set forth in very few words. By now, lest they lack equipment, as it were, for the battle, they have pried into everything, however obscure and unsuitable and childish and silly and even

tamen Aristotelis sit in primo Topicorum sententia, *neminem sanæ mentis propositurum quod ab omnibus, vel reprobatum sit, vel comprobatum, vel etiam plurimis.* Hæc enim dubitationem nullam habent, nam quæstio dialectica, est quæstio probabilis, non paradoxa: nec contenti iis, quæ natura ingenii humani assequi et definire poterat, ad vivum voluerunt omnia resecare, adducti dulcedine disputandi; et quemadmodum qui pruritus titillatione acti, nimium scabentes sanguinem eliciunt, et dolor succedit in locum suavitatis, et mali chirurgi dum morbidum nimis resecant, sanum quoque attingunt, ita isti dum nimium scalpunt veritatem, amittunt, et in falsum incidunt quod profert se majore aliqua verisimilitudine, quàm verum ipsum, ut interdum aurichalcum magis exprimit colorem auri, quàm aurum ipsum, et qui simulat, quàm qui agit simpliciter, propius ad imaginem veri accedit, etsi longius a vero ipso.

Hinc est acutus ille Mimi versiculus: *Nimium altercando veritas amittitur*: ad populum vero spectatorem, et interdum etiam, si diis placet, altercationum arbitrum, quæsita ludicra, tamquam in fabula, ac ipso sono, grandia, et vasta, ut pullata turba admiraretur quæ non caperet, ipsique magni essent vulgi existimatione; inde arrogantia quid aliquid sibi esse viderentur, quia populo stulto judici videbantur; nam bellaces homines pulcherrimum censebant esse titulum *invicti*, ut Principes; hinc *sophistæ* nomen sunt amplexi, cum alioqui *sophistam* deffinirent non *existentem*, sed *apparentem*; quidam se *horribilem sophistam* cognominabat Lutetiæ, non minorem eam appellationem ratus, quàm *Africani*, aut *Asiatici*; intravit palam, et magno agmine, ostentatio, atque ex ea pertinacia non cedendi melius dicenti, ne victus hoc coactusque vi argumenti videatur facere, et ex pertinacia tuendi quidquid suscepissent, convicti, et prostrati, ad rem maxime absurdam confugiebant, quæ illos in præsens periculo eximeret; mox liberati, honorem illi habebant, tamquam servatrici, et dignitatem attribuebant *placiti*; ita ex *evasione* transibat in *dogma*; accendebantur leves homines gloriæ cupidine, quum se quisque auctorem haberi vellet *novi inventi*; quæ confirmavit consensus sequacium;

quòd

incomprehensible to the human mind. And yet Aristotle's opinion, in the first book of the *Topics,* was that "no one in his senses would make a proposition of what is either rejected or confirmed by everyone, or even by the majority"[40]. To be sure, such questions admit of no uncertainty, for a dialectical proposition is a credible proposition, not a paradoxical one.

But these men, not content with things that natural intelligence can ascertain and define, and led on by the pleasure of debate, wished to pare everything to the quick. A man driven by the tickling of an itch draws blood by too hard scratching, and pain follows upon pleasure; and clumsy surgeons, when they cut the diseased part too deeply also damage what is sound. In the same way these men, by scraping excessively at the truth, lose sight of it and fall into an error that presents itself with some greater verisimility than the truth; for brass sometimes displays the color of gold better than gold itself, and what is counterfeit comes closer to the appearance of truth than what is honest, while far from being so.

Here that line of the Mime is to the point: "By too much disputing the truth is lost"[41]. To appeal to the popular audience and even sometimes, forsooth, to the arbiter of the disputation, they made up ludicrous things as if in a play, and with the same lofty and empty style, so that the common crowd would admire what they could not understand, and they themselves would gain a reputation among the people. In their arrogance they would seem to themselves important because they appeared so in the judgment of a stupid crowd. Contentious men, for instance, held in high honor the name 'Invincible', like footsoldiers of the second rank. For the same reason these men embraced the name 'sophister', though in other contexts they defined a sophist as not a real, but only an apparent wise man.[42] One man in Paris surnamed himself 'the Formidable Sophister', considering this title not inferior to 'Africanus' or 'Asiaticus'.

Display made public entrance and with a great train. Out of obstinacy in not yielding to a better speaker lest they seem to be conquered and forced by the power of argument, and obstinacy in defending whatever they had undertaken, when they were refuted and overthrown, they would have recourse to any really silly strategem that might deliver them from the moment's peril. Once safe, they would honor the strategem as a preserver and give it the dignity of an 'opinion (*placitum*)', and thus it was transformed from an 'escape' into a 'doctrine (*dogma*)'.

Men of slight consequence were kindled by the desire for fame, and everyone wanted himself regarded as the author of some 'new discovery',

quòd erat factu facillimum, quum ad eam rem nec litteris, nec libris esset opus, tantum invicta contentione, si sibi in respondendo constaret, nec admitteret repugnantia: vere erant *placita*, nam pro ratione nihil afferebatur aliud, nisi *sic placet, sic videtur*; *impugna ipse, ego consequenter tuebor*: nam quum Aristoteles quinque metarum genera posuerit, in quibus sistit disputatio ubi ad aliquid illarum est perventum, isti nihil est tam nugæ, aut inopinabile, aut contrarium magnis viris, aut absurdum, et anile, quod metam censeant, sola *contradictio* est meta, et ea una efficit ut rejiciatur dogma; ad alia, quantumcunque absona, et stulta, unicum dant responsum, *concedo, nam sequitur ex mea conclusione*: immo ipsi iidem posito dogmate statim ultro inferebant paradoxa quædam, ad quæ omnia illa erat clausula: *Hæc omnia sunt concedenda, quæ sequuntur ex opinione mea*: ita dialectica fuit quidquid cuivis, aliquando, quomodocunque, venisset in mentem.

Qualia vero essent illa *placita* (præter ea quæ attigi, quæ tamen sola attigi maxime inter eos vulgaria, et receptissima, de peculiaribus quorum nullus est modus) hinc potest intelligi, quòd ad ea asserenda veniebant pueri, sine lingua, sine libris, sine eruditione, instructi casibus tamquam quæstionibus hariolandi, quas pueri, unius noctis meditatione, sexcentas citius excogitant, quàm viri graves sexcentis annis unam: *Omne a possibiliter est b, et tamen nullum b possibiliter est a*; et ejusmodi: hinc infinita dogmata, et totidem dialecticæ: hæc Pauli, illa Hentisbari, alia Mantuani, Scoti, Thomæ, Alberti, Ochami, Pardi, Dullardi, parcam nominibus viventium, et id quidem non in ea parte, quæ est de invenienda probabilitate, aut de judicio argumentationis, quòd esset ferendum, sed in intelligentia, et explicatione, ac usu sermonis Latini, qui unus semper est, et simplex: et tamen quum talia sint eorum inventa, mirantur non intelligi ab aliis quæ ipsi somniarint, quasi omnes sint Josephi, aut Danieles, qui possint illa interpretari, egressique illam suam rerum naturam quàm incolunt, mirantur se et sua ab aliis non agnosci, et ad hujusmodi formulas exigunt dicta omnium, quæ quum non congruunt, *indoctos* eos esse judicant,

et

confirmed by the consensus of his followers. This was the easier to do, since it required neither letters nor books, but only an invincible contentiousness, so long as one could be consistent in reply and not admit any contradiction. Their statements really were 'opinions', for nothing else was adduced on reason's part except 'This is my opinion (*sic placet*)', 'So it seems', 'Do you attack it and I will consequently defend it'. For while Aristotle established five classes of limits that put an end to disputation when it arrives at any of them,[43] these men consider nothing so trivial or paradoxical or contrary to the opinion of wise men, or merely silly and old-womanish that it constitutes a limit. Contradiction is the sole limit, and is alone enough to refute a dogma. To other arguments, however incongruous and silly, they have a single answer: 'I agree, for it follows from my conclusion'. Indeed they themselves, when the doctrine was established, immediately and spontaneously introduced certain paradoxes, for all of which the conclusion was, 'All of these must be admitted, since they follow from my opinion'. Thus dialectic has become whatever occurred to any person, at any time, in any way.

But as to the quality of those 'opinions' (apart from the ones I have touched upon, and I have touched upon them only as especially common and current among them, since there is no limit to their own peculiar ones), a person can judge from the fact that schoolboys fell to asserting them, with no knowledge of language, or books, or learning, instructed in 'cases' as subjects on which to talk nonsense; and the boys, after one night's cogitation, think up six hundred with more agility than serious men could think of one in six hundred years. 'Every *a* possibly is *b*, and yet no *b* possibly is *a*' – things of that sort. And so we have countless doctrines and as many dialectics: here, that of Paul of Venice, there that of Heytesbury, elsewhere Peter of Mantua, Scotus, Thomas, Albert, Ockham, Pardo, Dullaert (to spare the names of the living), and this, forsooth, not in the part that deals with finding out probability or the judgment of argumentation, which one could tolerate, but in the knowledge and exposition and use of Latin speech, which is always the same and uncomplicated. And yet, though their inventions are so bizarre, they wonder that others do not understand what they have dreamed up, as if everyone were a Joseph or Daniel who could interpret them. Having left the natural world that they inhabit, they are astonished that they and their sayings are not understood by others. They measure everyone's statements according to rules of this kind, and when these do

et *asinos* pronuntiant, gaudentque se non intelligi, ut *circulatores* quòd obtuitum spectantium frustrentur; maximorum quoque scriptorum dicta examinant, quæ non congruere ad suos canones initio non tam admirantur, quàm velut indoctos, et se inferiores aspernantur, postea, tuente illos vetusta auctoritate, et consensu generis humani, ipsi etiam distinctionem habeant in gratiam illorum inventam: *Verum* dicunt isti *in sensu, in quo fiunt propositiones, non in sensu, quem faciunt*: ¿Quo quid potest dici insanius? quasi melius sciant pueri quem sensum faciunt verba, et sententiæ Latinæ, quàm Cicero, Varro, Plinius, Seneca, Hieronymus, Ambrosius, Augustinus; aut Græcæ, quàm Demosthenes, Plato, Aristoteles, Isocrates, Gregorius, Basilius, Chrysostomus, Origenes.

Adducti sunt quidam in eam opinionem, ut dicant hæc quidem hactenus esse aliis artibus utilia, quòd acuant ingenia discentium, et si quis hæc intelligat, facile etiam alia assequetur minus difficilia; quorum neutrum est verum; videntur esse illa ingeniosa, partim quòd non intelliguntur, nam quidam ea sola habent in precio, quæ non capiunt, alii subtilissimam oportere rem esse arbitrantur quàm ipsi non cernant; multis perinde videntur arguta, ut lusus pueriles festivi, et argutuli, nam ænigmata hæc non ex ingenio, eruditione multa exercitato et subacto, sed ex ignorantia meliorum sunt nata, tamquam herbæ inutiles in solo inculto; necesse erat eos aliquid agere, hæc est enim natura humanorum ingeniorum, ut, quoniam igneum est, etiam hebetissimum, se ad aliquid agendum applicet; itaque non acuunt hæc ingenium, sed cogunt silvescere, contentiosum reddunt spinæ istæ, et morosum, non vividum, et actuosum in pulchris; acuunt quidem, et dedolant, sed ita ut nihil supersit solidi, extenuant, minuunt, deprimunt, et in his semel fractum haud facile ad res præclaras sinunt attollere, præsertim quum hæc non modo aliena sint a veris artibus, sed etiam contraria, ut tendentibus ad altiores, ac veras disciplinas, tantà sint hæc curà dediscenda ne profectum impediant, quanta fuerant accepta, quum tamen instrumentum aliarum sit artium ad quòd depravatum torquent alia, et post

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not fit, declare the speakers ignorant, pronounce them 'donkeys', and are glad they themselves are not understood, the way jugglers are when they trick the eyes of the spectators. They also examine the sayings of the great writers; since these do not fit their rules either, in the beginning they do not so much admire as scorn the ancients, calling them ignorant and inferior to themselves. Later, since age-old authority and the consensus of mankind support the ancient writers, the new men are thankful for the distinction they have hit upon between them: the ancients spoke the truth "in the sense in which their propositions are made, not in the sense they make". What more insane thing could be said? As if schoolboys know better what sense words and sentences make in Latin than Cicero, Varro, Pliny, Seneca, Jerome, Ambrose and Augustine; or in Greek than Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom or Origen.

Some are persuaded that these things are useful to the other arts to the extent that they sharpen the wits of the students, and that learning these will make it easy to understand less difficult problems. Neither of these is true. These things appear to be 'clever' partly because they are not understood, for some people put a high value only on things they do not grasp; others think anything they do not comprehend must be very subtle indeed. In the same way, many people find them lively, like gay, prattling childish play, for these riddles proceed not from talent trained and disciplined by constant practice, but from ignorance of better things, like weeds in uncultivated soil. These men had to do something, for it is the nature of the human mind, energetic even when obtuse, to apply itself to some activity. And so these things do not sharpen the wit, but encourage it to run wild, and the thorns make it contentious and captious instead of animated and active in pursuit of worthy things. Or rather they do sharpen and whittle away, but in such a manner that nothing solid remains; they extenuate and diminish and depreciate, and make it hard for any talent once broken by them to attain to superior things, the more so since these fabrications are not only alien but even contrary to the true arts. Consequently any persons reaching for the true and higher disciplines must unlearn them, since dialectic is the instrument of the other arts and twists the others all awry when it is corrupted. And after

tam diuturnos clamores in scholis, adeo se pugnando exercitatos esse rentur, ut jactent se argumentis posse vertere *candida in nigrum*, *et ex homine facere asinum*, quòd longissime abest a vero.

Nam istorum lingua aut intelligitur, aut non; si intelligitur, *lanista in lanistam dimicat et pirata in piratam*, nihil est jacturæ; etiam, si antisophista mediocriter sit institutus, tanta est opinionum inter illos etiam probatarum varietas, ut hac conclusus evadere possit illac; ideo ad obstruendos exitus, et suffugia, multa consueverunt, ut ipsi vocant, *supponere*; ¿qui non intelligit quæ loquuntur, quomodo capietur? coget eos apertius loqui, et communi lingua; in ea vero tam nihil valent, ut nulla sit vetula, aut cerdo de vulgi fæce, qui non illis vertat *nigrum in candida*, nec ulla tam imbecillis ratio sumta de vita, et de medio, quæ non eos perturbet, nempe res ipsis nova atque inusitata: Laurentius Valla aggressus est reconcinnationem facere dialecticæ, in qua dissentit ab Aristotele, et Peripateticis veteribus, ac novis; monet in quibusdam neutiquam prave, etsi ea sunt perpauca; in plerisque labitur, ut fuit vir ille vehemens, et ad faciendum judicium præcipitatus; nec solum in re dialectica falsus est, sed in philosophia nam hanc quoque attingit, et quod magis mirêre, in præceptis Latinæ linguæ; sed non minus illic improbando aberravit, quàm in elegantiis, et invectivis: ceterum dialecticæ illius errores, qui sunt sane multi, nos vel omittemus prorsus, vel in aliud tempus, si videbitur, reservabimus, nam suscipere cum eo disputationem, res esset nimium prolixa, minimeque in præsens necessaria, quòd illius argumenta nec magnis rationibus nituntur, nec proinde sunt ab ullo recepta tamquam dogmata artis hujus.

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such lengthy clamor in the schools, these new dialecticians think they can turn white into black and make a donkey out of a man, which is very far from true.

For either their language is understood or it is not. If it is, then gladiator contends against gladiator, and pirate against pirate,[44] and no harm is done. Moreover, if an opposing sophister is tolerably well trained, there is such a variety of opinions to be tested even among themselves that a conclusion reached here can escape there. And so, for blocking exits and coverts, they have grown accustomed, as they say, to 'suppose' many things. How will anyone who does not know what they are talking about understand them? He will urge them to speak more plainly and in the common language; but in that language they are so worthless that any little old woman or cobbler from the dregs of the people could turn black into white for them; and there is no rule derived from life and the people so ineffectual that it would not upset them, as something certainly new to them and quite extraordinary.

Laurentius Valla undertook the reparation of dialectic, differing from Aristotle and the Peripatetics both ancient and modern.[45] He makes some recommendations that are not at all bad, though these are few; more often he slips into error, for he was an impetuous man and hasty in making judgments. Not only was he wrong in dialectic, but in philosophy, for he applied himself to that also, and what is more surprising, in rules of the Latin language. But he erred no less in his criticism there than in the *Elegantiae* and the *Invectives*. As for his errors in dialectic, which are certainly many, we shall either omit them altogether or save them for another time if it seems appropriate, for to undertake a dispute with him would be too prolix, and quite unnecessary at the moment, because his arguments neither rest on sound reasoning nor are they accepted by anyone as tenets of this art.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK

APPENDIX I

PREFACE

The *Adversus pseudodialecticos* was published at Selestat in April 1520. At the end of May More wrote Erasmus the letter included here. His praise of the young Vives is warm and generous, but the particular interest of the letter lies in his reaction to the treatise against the pseudodialecticians. Vives, he says, treats the same subjects on which he himself had once written, and in almost the same words, which gives More a strong feeling of intellectual kinship with the younger man.

The work to which More referred must have been the letter of 21 October 1515 to Martin van Dorp of Louvain, in defense of Erasmus. More wrote Dorp from Bruges when he was serving on an embassy for Henry VIII. Though he says he never published the letter (it was first printed in his *Lucubrationes* at Basel in 1563), it certainly circulated among the humanists, including Vives who was then living in Bruges. Perseveration seems still to have been haunting him, in humanistic as well as scholastic matters.

Erasmus had written the *Praise of Folly* and dedicated it to More with a graceful pun in the Greek title – the *Encomium Moriae* was a praise of Folly and a Praise of More – while he was a guest in More's home in 1509. The book was published in Paris in 1511 and went through seven revised editions, More tells us, in as many years. By itself, though it could hardly have found favor among dogmatic theologians, the *Folly* might not have aroused a controversy. But it followed upon the *Enchiridion* (1504), which advocated a return to the Scriptures in the place of liturgical observances, and was to be followed (1516) by the edition of the Greek *New Testament*, already in preparation. Erasmus had emerged as an enemy of dogmatic orthodoxy, and the clergy was aroused.

In September 1514 one Martin van Dorp,[1] at the instigation of his fellow-theologians at Louvain, wrote Erasmus reproaching him with the *Praise of Folly*, and trying to head off the publication of the *New Testament*. Dorp (1485–1525), a Hollander like Erasmus, and the first editor of Agricola, spent most of his life at Louvain, first as a humanist whose specialty was Plautus, and later as a member of the Faculty of

Theology; in 1523 he served as Rector of the University. He had been in previous correspondence with Erasmus, and was regarded as among the more humanistically inclined members of the Louvain faculty.

His original letter never reached Erasmus, who saw only a copy and replied briefly and courteously. The reply Erasmus published in 1515, and which often accompanies editions of the *Praise of Folly*, was greatly expanded for publication.

In August 1515, a fortnight after he received the doctorate and was admitted to the Faculty of Theology at Louvain, Dorp wrote a second letter to Erasmus, much sharper in tone, and pressing the reactionary objection of the Louvain theologians to the Greek *Testament* and to the worth of Scriptural study as against the study of the *Sentences*. It was to this letter that More replied. His genuine good will, powers of argumentation, and gentle chiding and ridicule appear to have helped win Dorp back over to Erasmus's side. Dorp delivered an *Oratio* before the University in 1516 in which he came out strongly in favor of reading St. Paul, and in defense of the study of Greek.[2] In a letter of 1520, which served as the preface to Vives's *Declamationes Syllanae*, Erasmus notes that Dorp has extricated himself from those factional tumults and is happily benefiting from liberal studies.[3]

Less than a third of More's long letter is concerned with dialectic, but his opinions, arguments, and phrasing are so close to Vives's that it seemed appropriate to include those passages here. The whole letter has been ably translated by Marcus A. Haworth, S. J., in Elizabeth Rogers, *St. Thomas More: Selected Letters*, New Haven, 1961, a translation from which my own has benefited. The text is from Rogers, *Correspondence of Thomas More*. The bulk of the letter consists of praise of Erasmus, a justification of new translations of the Bible, and a forceful and persuasive argument for the study of Greek.

Of the four passages given here, the first is concerned with dialectic itself and its parallels with Vives's little book are evident. (Vives's first section, esp. pp. 51–61; 73–75.)

The second passage ridicules the techniques of scholastic disputation and the pretensions of its fraudulent practitioners. (V, 61–75.)

The third is a satire on terminism in theology and its dependence on the *Sentences* for ecclesiastical observances. Men who devote their active lives to these preoccupations are mute and helpless outside their schools, and useless in the affairs of men. (V, 81–87; 91–95.)

The fourth passage is devoted to a discussion of the value of learning

Greek for a better understanding of both the Bible and Aristotle. Aristotle's translators and commentators are discussed, including Gaetano di Thiene. This is material that Vives will develop later in the *De disciplinis*.

It is not surprising that Vives should echo many of More's words. The humanists had a common vocabulary, derived from classical sources – Plautus and Terence provided them with many phrases and expressions for their informal writings – and from the riches of Erasmus's *Adages* and *Colloquies*. Many of the homely phrases and word-plays they used are almost clinchés.

What is striking is the core of argument and example in this brief section of More's long letter, that plainly left an impression on the twenty-two year old Vives, and that he was to develop four years later, 'at greater length', as More said, but certainly not 'with more elegance'.

THOMAS MORVS ERASMO S. D.*

De puero cuius causam commendasti mihi, iam ante cum patre eius egeram quam tu scripsisti. Rogarat enim pridem me per literas puer ipse, quod sibi persuaserat apud illum meam sententiam momenti aliquid ac ponderis habituram. Tractaui rem diligenter; quid profecerim haud satis certo scio. Respondit mihi pater eius non omnino duriter; et tamen (vt noui hominem ad rem attentum) opinor respondisse tam commode, magis pudore quodam aduersandi mihi quam quod ex animi sui sententia loqueretur. Summa erat, de filio se vsurum consilio meo; sed interim non obscure significabat eum se nummatum malle quam literatum. At puerum ipsum sic animatum video, vt non rem paternam tantum, sed ipsum etiam patrem citius relicturus sit quam se diuelli patiatur a literis; nimirum dignus cuius indolem talem foueant omnes atque omni ope promoueant.

Louaniensem illum scholasticum ita collocaui vt non dubitem quin tibi perpetuo sit habiturus gratias. Eruditio eius perplacet hero: qui quum audiuisset eum mihi commendatum abs te, rogauit vltro vti iuuenem ipsi permitterem: qua in re ego non grauatim illi sum gratificatus, vtpote quod alioqui destinaueram petere. Nam apud me pluribus ministris non vacabat locus.

Is dum primis illis diebus esset apud me, ostendit mihi opera quaedam Lodouici Viuis, quibus neque magis elegans neque magis eruditum quicquam iam diu vidi. Quotum enim quemque reperias, imo adeo quem vnum ferme reperias vsquam, qui tam virente aetate (nam tu eum virente etiamnum aetate scribis esse) tam absolutum ciclopedias orbem absoluerit? Pudet me profecto, mi Erasme, mei meique similium, qui vno aut altero libellulo, eoque fere inepto, venditamus nos, cum Viuem respicio tam iuuenem tam multa, tam excussa, tam diserti sermonis, tam abstrusae lectionis aedidisse. Magna res est linquarum alterutra pollere; ille se probat vtraque peritissimum. Maius quiddam ac fructuosius praeclaris imbutum esse disciplinis; at quis vno Viue se ostendit aut pluribus instructum aut melioribus? Multo vero maximum est sic bonas

* Letter No. 1106 from *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi*, P. S. Allen and H. M. Allen (eds.) (12 vols. 1906–1947). (*Reprinted by permission of the Oxford University Press.*)

THOMAS MORE TO ERASMUS

(Allen, 1106)
Canterbury, 26 May 1520

Thomas More to Erasmus, Greetings:

With regard to the boy whose cause you recommended to me, I was already in touch with his father before you wrote.[4] The boy himself had first written to request this of me, because he was convinced that my opinion of him would carry some weight and influence. I have handled the matter carefully; what I have accomplished I am not at all sure. His father replied to me courteously; and yet (althought I know the man was concerned about the matter) I think he replied in such friendly manner more out of some reluctance to oppose me than to express his opinion sincerely. In short, he would accept my advice about his son, but all the while he plainly showed that he would rather have the boy rich than learned. But I see that the boy himself is so eager that he would forsake not only his patrimony but even his father rather than let himself be sundered from learning. Surely it is right for everyone to encourage such talent as his and extend to him every assistance.

I have placed him with the famous Louvain scholar,[5] so that I have no doubt he will be grateful to you. The boy's learning pleases the master exceedingly, and when he heard the boy was recommended to me by you, he asked me to let him take the youth. In this I was not reluctant to accommodate him, since I was wondering where else to place him, for there was no opening available with most of my colleagues.

While the boy was with me those first days, he showed me some writings of Ludovicus Vives. I have never seen anything more elegant or more learned. How often do you find anyone – indeed have you so far ever found even one – who, at such a young age (for you write that he is still young) has so completely mastered the whole orbit of the disciplines? Indeed, my dear Erasmus, it puts me to shame that my colleagues and I pride ourselves on some rather unpolished little book or other, when I see Vives, still so young, producing so many works, based on such thorough investigation, in such fluent language, out of such profound reading. It is a fine thing to be proficient in one language or the other; he proves himself expert in both. It is even better and more profitable to be steeped in the noble disciplines; but who shows himself trained in more or better ones? But it is by far the best to have steeped yourself in the liberal arts

artes imbibisse discendo, vt in alios easdem possis rursus docendo transfundere; at quis illo docet apertius, dulcius, efficacius? Non possum satis admirari virtutes illas quas in Declamationibus eius tu et acute perspexisti et expressisti luculenter: potissimum vero (quod in declamando potissimum est) non modo illorum hystorias temporum tam exprompta memoria complecti quam non quiuis suarum rerum meminit, verum hominum tot olim saeculis functorum fato affectus tam praesentes induisse. vt von e libris hausisse quae declamat, sed vidisse, sensisse, in parte fuisse rerum vel prospere vel secus cadentium videatur: consilia denique non ex aliena conditione languidule, sed feruenter admodum ex suo ipse metu, spe, periculo, foelicitate metiri. Quod si in alterutra tantum parte praestaret, esset tamen admiratione dignum. Nunc vero talem se probat in vtraque vt chamelionta putes, verso solo simul mutasse colorem.

Vtinam expergiscantur, Erasme, atque ad istud Viuis exemplar componant sese quidam qui nimium ambitiose volunt haberi pro disertis! idque eo magis titule quod alia omnia contemnant, quam quod vel assequantur vel rite consequantur eloquentiam, vtpote qui ne per somnium quidem concipiant vllam rhetorices imaginem. Hi cum coetaras artes negligant, quonam studiorum nomine cohonestari postulant? Oratorem profecto vel rhetorem nemo iure vocabit eum qui neque veras agat causas neque declamet fictas. Quin poeta perquam tenuis fuerit atque exanguis, cuius poema nullis philosophiae monitis, nullis rhetorum praeceptis, nullis disserendi exercitamentis formetur. Viues quum in rhetorica talem se praestiterit qualem haud ferme iam quisquam qui nihil profitetur aliud, tamen caeterarum artium omnium quae quidem dignae sunt scitu, nullam reliquit, in qua non ita versatus est, vt in ea sola aetatem omnem contriuisse censeas.

Itaque vt nihil est illius quod non mirum in modum delectet omnes, ita me profecto quae scripsit in Pseudodialecticos peculiari quadam voluptate perfundunt: non ideo tantum (quanquam ideo quoque) quod illas ineptas argutias lepidis cauillis eludit, validis argumentis oppugnat, ineuitabili ratione a fundamentis eruit atque subuertit, sed et praeterea quod ibi video quaedam iisdem fere tractata rationibus, quas et ipse mecum olim, quum nihil adhuc Viuis legissem, collegeram. Quae mihi nunc non eo nomine placent in libello Viuis, quod meae rationes ante arriserint mihi (solet enim placere, si quid afferre alios videmus quod nobis ante in mentem venerat) sed quod mihi plaudo quando quod ante suspectum habueram ne parum apte diceretur, nune confirmor haud

by learning them in such a way that you can pass them along to others in turn by teaching them;[6] and who teaches more clearly, more pleasingly, more effectively than he? I cannot admire enough the qualities in his *Declamations*[7] that you acutely perceived and lucidly described. But chiefly (and this is more important in oratory) he seems not only to have described the events of times long past out of a recollection more vivid than anyone has of his own times, but to have taken on, himself, the emotions of men who died many centuries ago, as if they were still living. What is more, he seems not to have borrowed what he declaims from books, but to have seen, suffered, and been a part of events whether fortunate or disastrous, and finally to deliver his conclusions not from some dim and distant point, but fervently, wholly out of his own fear, hope, danger, felicity. Now if he excelled as much in either of these qualities he would still be worthy of admiration. But here he shows himself so excellent in both that you would think he was a chameleon who changes his color as the background changes.

I wish, Erasmus, that certain men would wake up and prepare themselves on the model of Vives. I mean those with excessive ambition, who want to be considered skillful orators, and more for the alleged reason that they look down upon everything else than that they pursue or rightly imitate eloquence, since they never conceive any idea of rhetoric even in their dreams. When they ignore the rest of the arts, in the name of what studies do they expect to be honored? Certainly no one will fairly call a man an orator or rhetorician who neither pleads true cases nor practices his delivery on fictitious ones. It would really be an extremely weak and ineffective poet who composed his poem with no teachings of philosophy, precepts of rhetoric, or practice of discourse. While Vives proves himself as excellent in rhetoric as almost anyone today who professes that sole discipline, he still neglects none of the other arts worth knowing, and in each of them he is so expert that you would think he had spent his whole life on that one alone.

And while there is nothing in all his work that does not afford me surprising delight, certainly what he wrote against the pseudodialecticians fills me with a peculiar pleasure. This is not only (although partly) because he mocks those silly subtleties with witty banter, opposes them with valid arguments and destroys and knocks them off their base with irrefutable reasoning, but also because I find there certain matters treated with almost the same arguments that I once put together by myself when I had not yet read Vives. These please me now in Vives's little book not only because my reasoning amused me before (for we commonly are pleased if we see others assert what had occured to us

inscitum esse, postquam Viui quoque video placuisse. Iam illud me capit ac delectat maxime, quod quum videam idem argumentum vtrique nostrum animum et cogitationem occupasse, tum sic vtrique tractatum, vt quanquam et fusius ab illo et elegantius, tamen in nonnullis non tantum res easdem afferamus, sed propemodum eadem etiam verba, sic mihi libenter blandior, quasi cognati quippiam syderis animos inter sese nostros occulta quapiam vi et conspiratione conciliet.

Hoc illi gratulor quod tantum habet locum apud reuerendissimum Cardinalem suum. Spero fore vt illius numinis fauor iniquitatem fortunae corrigat; quae solet in eos esse pessima quicunque merentur optima, et tanquam litteris ac virtutibus inuidens, indoctos fere atque improbos beneficiis suis euehere. Verum Cardinalis (cui beandi quemuis tam facilis fere quam ipsi fortunae facultas est) homini tali, quem inter penitissimos adsciuit, cui tantum eruditionis eximiae (qua nunc haud paulo clarius quam ipso dignitatis fulgore splendet) acceptum fert, non insigniter esse benificus neque pro insigni sua bonitate volet, neque sine insigni apud posteros quoque traductione potest.

Vale, mi Erasme charissime; quem ego spero fore vt Caleti propediem praesens praesentem in hoc Regum congressu complectar. Hodie appellit Imperator. Cras summo mane Rex in occursum prodibit, imo fortassis hac ipsa nocte quae iam nunc appetit. Non credas quanto gaudio, non dico Regis ac procerum, sed populi quoque, sit acceptus nuncius per quem constabat Imperatorem huc appellere. Iterum vale e Cantuaria pridie pentecostes.

Quiddam est, mi Erasme, de quo si mihi notus esset Viues, admonerem illum. Nunc quoniam hand certus sum quo animo acciperet ab ignoto tam importunum officium, ipse potes per occasionem submonere, esse in Aedibus legum atque item in eius Somnio (quod alioqui multorum superat peruigilatas vigilias) abstrusiora quaedam quam vt pateant nisi doctissimis; quum fuerit in rem litterariam vtile illius omnia quam plurimis intelligi. Ei rei vel explicando vel adiectis in margine breuissimis scholiis facile mederi fuerit. Addet item plurimum lucis Declamationibus, si breuibus historiae summam complexus vel vna pagella praeponat.

Iterum vale.

earlier), but because I am content with myself, being assured that what I suspected I had expressed rather unsuitably was not at all inept, since it also pleased Vives. Now it captivates and delights me especially because when I see that the same argument occupied both of our minds and thought, and then was treated in the same way by both – though at greater length and with more elegance by him, still in many cases we not only asserted the same things but also in almost the same words – it is thus the more pleasantly flattering to me, as if our minds were united with each other in thought by some secret force and harmony of kindred stars.

I congratulate him that he has such a fine post with his most reverend Cardinal.[8] I hope it will turn out that the favor of his Eminence will compensate for the adversity of Fortune, which is wont to be cruelest to those who deserve the best, and, as if envious of learning and excellence, to promote the ignorant and even the wicked by her benefactions. But the Cardinal (to whom the power of making anyone happy comes almost as easily as to Fortune herself) does credit to such a man, of such exceeding learning, by admitting him into his inner circle (where he will now shine even brighter than by the splendor of his own merit). The Cardinal will think it is not remarkable to be generous out of his own remarkable kindness, which cannot but have remarkable effect also for posterity.

Farewell, my dearest Erasmus, whom I hope to embrace in person very soon at Calais, at that meeting between the Kings.[9] Today the Emperor is under sail. The King will set out for the meeting tomorrow at dawn, indeed perhaps this very night which is now already at hand. You would not believe with what joy not only the King and court, but the people too, received the envoy who confirmed that the Emperor was coming. Farewell again from Canterbury, the first day of Pentecost.

There is one thing, Erasmus, about which, if I knew Vives, I would give him a word of counsel. Now, since I am not at all sure how he would receive so inconvenient a favor, perhaps you yourself could, on a favorable opportunity, offer a hint that there are in the *Aedes legum*,[10] and also in his *Somnium*[11] (which otherwise excels the most sleepless vigils of many others) certain things too abstruse to be accessible to any but the very learned, whereas it would be useful in the interests of literature for all of his work to be understood by as many as possible. This could easily be remedied either by an explanation in the text, or by the briefest notes added in the margin. In the same way the *Declamations* would be clearer if he prefaced them with a summary of the historical context in brief notes of even one small page.

Again, farewell.

THOMAS MORE - LETTER TO MARTIN DORP*

Nemini obscurum esse potest tua ipsius verba legenti, te ad hanc vniuersitatum mentionem sine vlla prorsus occasione descendisse, totumque hunc locum tibi copiose, ac perquam diserte sane, sed extra controuersiam tamen, esse declamatum, nec esse vlla responsione opus. Neque tamen ambigendum puto, quo in vniuersitates affectu Erasmus sit, in quibus et didicit et docuit, non ea modo quae tu Grammatica vocas, sed cum alia multa, multo magis Christianis omnibus vtilia, tum eas etiam ipsas (quas tu nunc tam magnifacis, quam posthac parui facturus es) questiunculas. Quis nescit quamdiu Parisiis ille, quantoque in precio fuit, tum Patauii, tum Bononiae preterea? (vt nihil interim de Rhoma dicam, quam ego tamen vel Principem achademiarum esse omnium duco.) Iam Oxonia Cantabrigiaque tam charum habent Erasmum, quam habere debent eum, qui in vtraque diu cum ingente scholasticorum fruge, nec minore sua laude versatus est. Vtraque eum ad se inuitat. Vtraque eum in suorum Theologorum numerum (quoniam eo honore alibi est insignitus) transplantare conatur. Sed tu quanti nostras vniuersitates facis, haud scio, qui tantum Louanio Parisiisque tribuis, vt caeteris videare mortalibus, presertim ex Dialectica, nihil omnino relinquere. Ais enim, nisi Louanienses ac Parisienses Theologi essent Dialectici, fieri videlicet, vt Dialectica toto exulet orbe exulaueritque multis iam saeculis.

Ego in vtraque Achademia fui abhinc septennium, non diu quidem, sed interim tamen dedi operam, quae in vtraque tradantur quisque sit vtrobique tradendi modus, vt scirem. Et profecto, quanquam vtramque suspicio, quantum tamen quiui vel presens audiendo, vel absens inquirendo, cognoscere, nihil hactenus vnquam accepi causae, quamobrem vel in Dialectica, meos liberos, quibus optime consultum cupio, in alterutra earum edoceri potius, quam Oxoniae aut Cantabrigiae velim. Non negabo tamen (neque enim libenter quenquam sua gloria fraudauerim) nostros permultum Iacobo Fabro Parisiensi debere, quem vt instauratorem verae Dialecticae, veraeque Philosophiae, presertim Aristotelicae, foeliciora passim apud nos ingenia, sanioraque iudicia

THOMAS MORE–LETTER TO MARTIN DORP

Bruges, 1515

[Dorp has criticised the Universities]

It must be clear to anyone who reads your letter that you stooped to 11.259–
this mention of the universities for absolutely no reason, and practiced 481
your rhetoric on this whole topic copiously and indeed very fluently; but still it has nothing to do with the subject, nor is there any need for a reply. And yet I do not think there can be any question of the esteem in which Erasmus is held in the universities where he has learned and taught not only what you call grammar, but many other things much more profitable for all Christians, as well as those same petty debating points which you now magnify as much as you will one day belittle them. Everyone knows how long and how highly regarded he was at Paris, and then at Padua and later at Bologna, not to mention Rome, which I still regard as the most distinguished university. Oxford and Cambridge are now cherishing Erasmus as he deserves; he has stayed for a time at both universities, with great benefit to scholars and equal renown for himself. Both are inviting him to join them; both are trying to attract him to their faculties of Theology, since he is distinguished by that title elsewhere. I am not sure how highly you regard our universities; you attribute so much to Louvain and Paris that you seem to leave nothing at all to the rest of mankind, especially in dialectic. For you say that unless the theologians at Louvain and Paris had been dialecticians, dialectic would surely have been banished from the world and exiled now these many centuries.

I was in both of those universities seven years ago, not long, to be sure, but while there I made it my business to know what was being taught, and the method of teaching in them both. And frankly, although I respect them both, still, knowing as much as anyone can either from listening in person or by inquiry from a distance, I have never so far had any reason to wish to educate my children, for whom I want only the best, at either one of them, even in dialectic, rather than at Oxford and Cambridge. Yet I will admit (for I would not like to withhold from anyone the credit due him) that our countrymen owe a great deal to Jacques Lefèvre of Paris; all of our more productive minds and sounder judgments warmly admire him as the restorer of true dialectic and true philosophy, especially Aristotelian.[12] Thus through him Paris seems to

consectantur, vt per eum virum Lutetia gratiam nobis referre quodammodo accepti olim beneficii videatur, quum per eum apud nos disciplinas instaurent, quas ipsi a nobis initio acceperunt: quod vsque adeo in confesso est, vt id Gaguinus quoque, nec detractator Gallicae laudis, nec buccinator nostrae, in annales suos retulerit. Atque vtinam et Louanienses et Parisienses quoque scholastici omnes, Fabri commentarios in Aristotelicam Dialecticen reciperent. Esset ea disciplina (ni fallor) et minus vtrisque rixosa, et paulo repurgatior.

Miror tamen cur Louanienses ac Parisienses in Dialectices commemoratione coniunxeris, qui vsque adeo inter se discordant, vt ne nomine quidem conueniant, quum alteri Realium, alteri Nominalium nomen affectent. Quanquam si Aristotelem vtrique recipiunt, si vtrique tradunt, si non alia de re quam de eius mente tot inter se rixas excitant, iam quum Parisienses aliter, aliter eum Louanienses interpretantur, nec aliter modo, sed contra quoque, qui scire possis, vtris potius accedendum censeas? Sin ad Dialecticen pertinent huiusmodi lites, sed nihil ad Aristotelem tamen, iam non Aristotelicam tantum Logicam (quod tu ais) sed aliam preterea, aut alteri aut vtrique profitentur. Sin autem, quae in tanta controuersia sunt, nec ad ipsam Dialecticam attineant, (nec attinent certe, si ad eum non attinent, modo is Dialecticam perfecte tradiderit) iam hoc aegregie fuerit absurdum, vt discatur Dialectica, de rebus ad eam rem neutiquam spectantibus tot annos digladiari.

Et profecto, Dorpi, propemodum adducor vt credam, magnam illam opinionum partem de quibus tam diu tanta contentione velut pro aris focisque dimicatur, aut ad Logicam parum pertinere aut ad eam perdiscendam non admodum conferre. Nam vt in Grammatica suffecerit eas obseruationes didicisse, quibus possis et ipse Latine loqui, et quae ab aliis Latine scripta sunt intelligere, non autem anxie innumeras loquendi regulas aucupari, litterasque inter ac syllabas consenescere, itidem in Dialectica satis esse crediderim, dictionum naturam, enunciationum vires, tum ex his collectionum formulas edoctum, Dialecticam protinus, velut instrumentum ad caeteras disciplinas accommodare. Atque hoc nimirum ipsum spectauit Aristoteles, quum Dialecticam suam decem illis summis, siue rerum siue nominum generibus, deinde enunciationum tractatu adiunctis, postremo collectionum formulis, et quae necessario demonstrant, et quae suadent probabiliter, et quae callide cauillantur,

return thanks to us in some measure for a benefit received long ago, since through him they restore to us the disciplines they received from us in the beginning.[13] This is now so generally acknowledged that even Gaguin, no disparager of French praise or trumpeter of ours, relates it in his *Annals.*[14] And I wish that all the scholastics at Louvain and Paris also would accept Lefèvre's commentaries on Aristotelian dialectic. That discipline would be, if I mistake not, both less contentious on both sides, and made somewhat clearer once more.

Yet I wonder why you connect Louvain and Paris in your mention of dialectic; they differ so between themselves that they do not even agree upon a name, since the one group calls itself realists and the other nominalists. Yet if both accept Aristotle, if both teach him, if they stir up so many quarrels among themselves over nothing but his meaning, while the Parisians interpret him one way and the Louvanians another, and not only differently but even contrariwise, how can one know? Which interpretation do you think should be accepted? If disputes of this kind relate to dialectic but not to Aristotle, then it is not so much Aristotelian logic, as you claim, but a still different one that one side or the other is professing. If, on the other hand, these great controversies do not relate to dialectic itself (and they do not, certainly, if they do not relate to Aristotle, considering that he handed down dialectic in its complete form), then it would have been surpassingly silly to learn dialectic just to fight as for life and death for so many years over matters that have nothing to do with the subject.

And really, Dorp, I am almost persuaded that a majority of the notions that have been fought over so long and so contentiously, as for hearth and home, have little to do with logic or are not very useful for learning it well. In the study of grammar, for example, it should be enough to learn the usages by which you can speak Latin yourself and understand what others have written in Latin, but not anxiously to track down innumerable grammatical rules and grow grey among syllables and letters. In the same way, in the study of dialectic, I should think it enough, once one has learned the nature of words and the force of propositions, and then from these the rules of syllogisms, to make immediate application of dialectic as an instrument for the other disciplines. Surely Aristotle had just this in mind when he set forth his whole dialectic in those ten supreme categories, the genera either of things or names, plus a treatise on propositions, and finally the rules for syllogisms, including those which demonstrate from necessity, persuade

absoluit. Ad haec tanquam aditum introitumque quendam Porphirius, quinque illas vniuersa complectentes, seu res seu voces appellari malis, adiecit. Porro eiusmodi questiones, quibus rudia adhuc, et aptioribus imbuenda, detinentur potius quam promouentur ingenia, neuter eorum proposuit, Porphyrius etiam ex professo abstinuit. At nunc absurda quaedam portenta ad certam bonarum artium nata perniciem, et luculenter ab antiquis distincta commiscuerunt, et ad veterum purissimas traditiones, suis adiectis sordibus infecerunt omnia. Nam in Grammatica, (vt omittam Alexandrum atque id genus alios, qui quanquam imperite tamen Grammaticam vtcunque docuerunt) Albertus quidam Grammaticam se traditurum professus, Logicam nobis quandam, aut Metaphysicam, imo neutram, sed mera somnia, mera deliria Grammaticae loco substituit. Et tamen hae nugacissimae nugae in publicas achademias non tantum receptae sunt, sed etiam plerisque tam impense placuerunt, vt is propemodum solus aliquid in Grammatica valere censeatur, quisquis fuerit Albertistae nomen assequutus.

Tantum authoritatis habet ad peruertenda bonorum quoque ingeniorum iudicia, semel ab ineptis tradita magistris, deinde tempore corroborata persuasio. Quo fit, vt minus mirer, ad eundem modum in Dialecticae locum nugas plusquam Sophisticas irrepsisse, que cultoribus suis argutiarum nomine tam vehementer arrident, vt mihi nuper his de rebus obiter loquenti quidam Dialecticus (vt ferebatur doctissimus) asseruerit, 'Aristotelem' (referam ipsius verba: nequeo enim aliter tam nitidum eloquentiae florem assequi) 'nisi grosso modo scripsisse. Et nunc sunt,' inquit, 'pueri in Paruis Logicalibus suis tam substantialiter fundati, quod bene credo certe, quod si Aristoteles a sepulchro suo resurrexerit et argueret cum eis, illi bene concluderent eum, non solum in Sophistria, sed etiam in Logica sua.' Reliqui hominem oppido quam inuitus, nisi quod aliquanto (vt tum res erat) occupatior fui, quam vt vacaret ludere.

Caeterum liber ille Paruorum Logicalium (quem ideo sic appellatum puto, quod parum habeat Logices) operaeprecium est videre, in suppositionibus quas vocant, in ampliationibus, restrictionibus, appellationibus, et vbi non quam ineptas, quam etiam falsas praeceptiunculas habet, vt ex quibus adiguntur inter has atque eiusmodi enunciationes distinguere, 'Leo animali est fortior,' et 'Leo est fortior animali,' quasi non idem significent: et profecto tam sunt ineptae, vt

by probability, and make clever use of fallacies. To these Porphyry added, as an approach and introduction, the five universal predicables, whether you prefer to call them things or words. But neither of them proposed, and Porphyry expressly avoided, disputatious questions of this kind, by which minds still unformed and needing instruction in more suitable things, are detained rather than advanced. Now they have mixed together certain stupid monstrosities that were clearly set aside by the ancient writers, and that spell certain ruin for the good disciplines; and they have corrupted everything by adding their own sordid inventions to the purest teachings of the older philosophers. For in grammar (I pass over Alexander[15] and others of that kind who did somehow teach grammar, however badly) a certain Albert[16] announced he would teach us grammar and a kind of logic or metaphysics; actually he did neither, but substituted pure dreams, pure delirium in the place of grammar. And yet these exceedingly trifling trifles are taken up in public universities, and many people take such extravagant delight in them that almost the only grammarian considered to be worth his salt is one who has earned the name of Albertist.

So much power does this nonsense have to pervert the judgment even of good minds, once it is taught by bad teachers and strengthened by time. And so I am not surprised that in the same way the more than sophistical trifles that entrance their admirers in the name of lively wit, have crept into the subject of dialectic. Recently while I happened to be speaking about these things a certain dialectician, most learned they tell me, declared (and I quote his very words, for I cannot otherwise achieve such full-blown eloquence): "Aristotle wrote only in a crude style. And now there are schoolboys," he said, "so substantially grounded in their *Little Logicals* – and I know this for a fact – that if Aristotle were to rise from his grave and argue with them they would easily out-syllogise him, not only in sophistry but even in his own logic." I parted from the man quite reluctantly and only because, as it happened, I was a little too busy to have time to play.

All the same, that book of the *Little Logicals* (so named, I think, because it contains but little logic) is worth the trouble to look into for suppositions, as they call them, ampliations, restrictions, appellations. It also contains some piddling rules, not so much foolish as false, through which boys are taught to distinguish among statements of this kind, 'The lion than an animal is stronger' and 'The lion is stronger than an animal' – as if they did not mean the same thing. Actually both

vtraque propemodum nihil significet, quanquam si quicquam, haud dubie idem. Tantundemque inter se differunt, 'Vinum bis bibi,' et 'bis vinum bibi': hoc est, secundum hos Logistas multum, sed re vera nihil. Iam si quis non assas modo, sed adustas quoque carnes ederit, eum volunt verum dicere si sic enunciet, 'Ego crudas carnes comedi,' non autem si sic, 'ego comedi crudas carnes'; tum si quis parte relicta mihi, partem sibi pecuniae meae sustulerit, mentiar, videlicet, si dixero, 'Spoliauit me denariis.' Sed ne desint mihi verba quibus apud iudicem querar, licebit dicere, 'Denariis spoiliauit me,' et in aliquo casu (vt aiunt) possibili posito, hec erit vera, 'Papam verberaui,' quum eodem manente casu hec erit falsa, 'Verberaui Pamam; nempe si is qui nunc papa sit, puer olim a me vapulauerit. Digni, hercle, qui talia iam senes docent, vt quoties pueros docent, toties ipsi vapulent. Quid quod hanc falsam aiunt, 'Omnis homo est pater, qui habet filium,' nisi omnes prorsus homines iam habeant filios, quoniam videlicet huic equipollet, 'Omnis homo est pater, et omnis homo habet filium.' At hanc interim veram affirmant, 'Pater erit Sortes, quando Sortes non erit pater': et hanc, 'Pater manebit Ioannes, quando Ioannes non manebit pater,' quod quis sic audire potest, vt sibi non interim credat enigma proponi? At hec verba, 'Sum et Possum' regnant plane, et quoniam (vt aiunt) ampliatiua sunt, pomeria sua vltra ipsas naturae fines longe lateque proferunt. Nam hanc veram astruunt, 'Omne quod erit, est,' sed eam tamen callide interpretantur; aiunt enin 'Omne quod erit, est' significare 'omne quod est, quod erit, est,' atque hoc pacto cauent ne Antichristus, qui olim erit, iam sit; nam quanquam omne quod erit, est, et quanquam Antichristus erit, tamen non sequitur, Antichritus est, propterea scilicet quod Antichristus non est ens quod erit. Quod nisi hanc plus quam subtilem propositionis huius expositionem circumspexissent acuti in Dialecticis argutiis Theologi, Rempublicam Christianam haud dubie iam olim Antichristus inuasisset non sine magno caeterorum omnium periculo. Nam ipsis non video quid possit imminere discriminis, quippe quum fateantur has etiam veras esse, 'Antichristus est amabilis' et 'Antichristus est amatiuus.' Quanquam profecto nec Antichristus, nec supremus ipse iudicii dies, rerum naturam magis poterit, quam hec Dialectica subuertere, que docet, has enuncia-

statements are so clumsy that neither of them means much of anything, but if they do mean anything they doubtless mean the same. And these differ just as much, 'Wine twice I have drunk' and 'Twice wine I have drunk'; that is to say, a lot according to those logickers but in reality not at all. Now if a man has eaten meat roasted to burning, they want him to be speaking the truth if he puts it this way 'I raw meat have eaten', but not if he says 'I have eaten raw meat'. Again, if someone should take part of my money, leaving some for me, it seems I should be lying if I said, 'He has robbed me of my money'; but so that I will not be without words to complain before the judge, it will be all right to say 'Of my money he has robbed me'. In another case, assuming, as they say, the possibility, this will be true, 'The Pope I have beaten', while under the same circumstances this will be false, 'I have beaten the Pope', if, of course, he who is now Pope was beaten by me long ago as a boy. By Jove, it would serve the old men right who now teach these things if they were beaten themselves every time they teach schoolboys!

Moreover they say this statement is false, 'Every man is a father who has a son', unless absolutely all men now have sons, since clearly it is equivalent to saying, 'Every man is a father and every man has a son'. However, they declare this is true, 'A father will be Sortes when Sortes will not be a father', and this, 'A father will remain John when John will not remain a father'. Who could hear this and not think a riddle was being put to him? The words 'I am' and 'I can' clearly hold sway, and since they are (as these say) ampliative,[17] they extend their boundaries far and wide beyond the very limits of nature. For example, they give this as true, 'Everything that will be, is,' but yet interpret it cleverly; for they say that 'Everything that will be, is,' means 'Everything that is that will be, is,' and by this means take care not to say that the Antichrist, who one day will be, already exists. For while everything that will exist does exist, and though the Antichrist will exist, it still does not follow that the Antichrist does exist, because of course the Antichrist is not a thing that will exist. But unless keen theologians by their dialectical cunning had figured out this more than subtle explanation of the proposition, there is no doubt that the Antichrist would long since have invaded the Republic of Christendom, not without great peril to all others. For I do not see how any danger can threaten *them*, since they admit that these, too, are true, 'The Antichrist is lovable', and 'The Antichrist is affectionate'. Though certainly neither the Antichrist nor even the Last Judgment could have more power to turn nature upside down than this dialectic

tiones esse veras, 'Viuum fuit mortuum, Futurum fuit preteritum,' quibus nimirum fit, vt mortuorum resurrectio, non (vt ipsi loquuntur) 'in fieri,' sed 'in facto esse' videatur. Iam istae non minus mirandae, sed sunt amenae quoque, ac plausibiles, quum sint verae scilicet, 'Virgo fuit meretrix,' et 'meretrix erit virgo,' et 'meretrix possibiliter est virgo.' Non facile dictu est, Dialecticis tam benignis, vtrae magis, virginesne an meretrices, debeant, debent certe vtraeque plurimum. Poetae ergo nugas, Dialectici seria tractant. Poetae fingunt ac mentiuntur, Dialectici nunquam nisi vera loquuntur, ne tum quidem quum hanc esse verissimam affirmant, 'Homo mortuus potest celebrare missam,' quod quanquam non audeo asserentibus eis, ac propemodum etiam iurantibus, non credere, (neque enim tot doctoribus tam irrefragabilibus fas est refragari), hactenus tamen (quantum memini) neminem vnquam repperi, qui se narraret mortuo celebranti ministrasse.

Hanccine Dialecticam docet Aristoteles? hanc Hieronymus laudat? hanc probat Augustinus? quam (vt ait Persius) 'Non sani esse hominis, non sanus iuret Orestes?' Miror hercle homines acutuli quonam pacto senserunt illas enunciationes sic intelligendas esse, quomodo nemo in toto orbe preter eos intelligit. Nec sunt artis illa vocabula, vt sint eis quasi in peculio, et ab eis si quis volet vti, sumenda mutuo; communis nimirum sermo est, nisi quod quaedam deterius reddunt, quam a cerdonibus eadem acceperunt. A vulgo sumpserunt, vulgaribus abutuntur. At regula quam vocant Logices, in eos sensus tales propositiones docet interpretandas. Quae (malum) regula in angulo quopiam ab his composita, qui vix loqui sciant, vniuerso terrarum orbi, nouas loquendi leges imponet? Grammatica recte loqui docet, nec ea tamen insuetas loquendi regulas comminiscitur, sed quae plurimum in loquendo videt obseruari, eorum loquendi rudes, ne contra morem loquantur, admonet. Nec aliter quicquam Dialectica facit, que sana est. Nempe hic syllogismus: 'Omne animal currit, Omnis homo est animal,' ergo 'Omnis homo currit,' non ideo syllogismus est, quia rite secundum Dialecticae normam colligitur ac formatur in barbara, sed quia postremam orationem ad praemissa consequi docet ratio, quae regulam ob id ipsum talem fecit. Alioquin aliter eam factura, quaqua versus ab ipsa rerum natura flecteretur. Ipsi

that teaches that these statements are true, 'The living was dead, the future was past', by which of course it turns out that the resurrection of the dead seems not, as they say, 'about to become' but 'to be accomplished'.

Now these are no less astonishing, but still pleasant and praiseworthy, since they are plainly true, 'A virgin was a whore' and 'A whore will be a virgin', and 'A whore is possibly a virgin'. It is not easy to say which owe the more to such obliging dialecticians, the virgins or the whores, but they certainly both owe much. Poets, you see, treat of trifles, dialecticians of serious matters. Poets make up things and tell lies, dialecticians never say anything but the truth, even when they say it is absolutely true that 'A dead man can celebrate Mass'. Although I dare not disbelieve them when they assert and practically swear to this (for it is not proper to contest so many incontestable doctors), yet so far as I remember I have never found anyone who said he had served Mass for a dead celebrant.

Is this the dialectic Aristotle teaches or Jerome praises? Is this what Augustine approves? – that, in the words of Persius, "a mad Orestes would swear to be the work of a madman"?[18] By heaven I wonder how rather intelligent men discerned that these statements should be understood in a way no one in the whole world except themselves understand them. These words do not belong to an art, its own private property, as it were, to be taken on loan by anyone who wishes to borrow them. Speech is truly common to all, except that these render back some words more corrupt than they received them from cobblers. They have taken their speech from the common people and misused the common meanings. But the rule they call logic says that such statements must be interpreted in those meanings. Can some damned rule made up in some corner by men who hardly know how to speak, impose new laws of speech upon the whole world? Grammar teaches correct speech; it does not invent novel rules for speaking, but sees what is commonly observed in speaking and advises people uncultivated in their speech not to violate ordinary usage. Dialectic that is sound acts no differently. Certainly this syllogism, 'Every animal runs, every man is an animal, therefore every man runs,' is not a syllogism because it is duly put together according to the dialectical norm and set in *barbara*, but because reason, which made such a rule on that account, tells us that the conclusion follows upon the premises. Should she make it any other way, reason would somehow deviate from the very process of nature. In the same way let them not say

quoque eodem modo in hac propositione, 'Meretrix erit virgo,' ne dicant sic interpretandam: 'Meretrix que est, vel que erit,' quia sic iubet regula, sed rationem afferant ab ipsa re, quare fieri debeat talis regula. Nam si recta est ea interpraetatio, necesse est eam aut ab ipsa re que enunciatur, aut ex proprietate sermonis emergere.

Ergo quum tam multis eorum qui Latine iam olim loquuti sunt, neque ingenium defuerit neque eruditio, nec sermonis proprii fuerit minor quam istis est (vti credo) peritia, quomodo euenit vt ex illis nemo potuerit intelligere hanc veram esse, 'Meretrix erit virgo,' aut inter has distinguere, 'Nummum non habeo,' et 'Non habeo nummum?' Quanquam nemo negauerit, transpositiones vocabulorum diuersum saepe sensum gignere. Neque enim idem est, 'Bibas priusquam edas' et 'Edas priusquam bibas.' Sed hoc affirmo, quando ita sensus variatur, omnes in idem mortales assentire, trahente videlicet ratione, non Dialecticorum iubente potius quam persuadente regula, quorum officium est, vt more nostro loquentes quouis nos veris rationibus impellant. Sophistarum vero, vt insidiosis eo prestigiis adducant quo nos peruenisse miremur. Nam hoc hebetissimum acumen est, et stultissima solertia, se disputando pronunciare victores, et triumphum sibi decernere, quia nos nescimus in quem sensum ipsi clanculum pacti sunt, sermones nostros contra communem omnium sensum accipere. At hec quum nec Sophistica dici mereantur, tamen non pro Sophisticis nugis ducuntur, sed inter abstrusissimos Dialecticae thesauros numerantur, nec a pueris tanquam dediscenda discuntur, sed a senibus quoque in ipsa Theologiae penetralia suscipiuntur. His quidam Theologicas perplexitates infarciunt, ex his propositiones tam ridiculas effingunt, vt ridenda materia nusquam oriri possit vberior, nisi quod multo malim eos, qui sic ineptiunt, ad sanitatem conuerti, quam ipse ex insanorum deliriis capere voluptatem. Quanquam quid hec dico tibi, Dorpi, cui non dubito has naenias non minus displicere, quam mihi, si posses mutare, et fortasse poteris, adiutus a tui similibus, modo ne statuas tecum, illorum obsequi ineptiis, quos multo magis par est tuo parere iudico.

that the statement 'The whore is a virgin' should be interpreted as 'The whore who is, or who will be,' because a rule requires it, but adduce the reason from the fact itself from which such a rule should be made. For if that interpretation is correct, it necessarily must issue either from the fact that is stated, or from the proper meaning of speech.

Therefore, since so many of those who spoke Latin long ago were not deficient in talent or learning, and their skill in their own language was just as great, I believe, as these men's, how does it happen that not one of them could have understood that this was true, 'A whore will be a virgin', or distinguish between these, 'A farthing I do not have' and 'I do not have a farthing?' And yet no one will deny that the transposition of words often produces a different meaning. It is not the same to say, 'You may drink before eating' and 'You may eat before drinking'. But this I do affirm, whenever the meaning varies in this way, men are unanimous in their agreement upon it, influenced of course by reason, and not more by the decree of dialecticians than by a convincing rule. It is the part of dialecticians, speaking according to our usage, to persuade us by any true reasons, but that of sophisters to lead us by artful deception to a point we are astonished to have reached. For it shows a very dull acumen and stupid skill to pronounce themselves winners in a debate and declare themselves a truimph because we do not know in what sense they have privately agreed to take our words, as opposed to the general common one. But while these things may not deserve to be called sophistic, yet they are not looked upon as sophistical trifles, but reckoned among the most secret treasures of dialectic; they are not learned by schoolboys to be forgotten, as it were, but taken up also by old men within the very sanctuary of theology. Into them some stuff theological perplexities; from them they make propositions so ridiculous you could find no richer source for fun – and yet I would much rather those who act so foolishly could be converted to sanity than myself take pleasure in the ravings of lunatics. But why I am saying this to you, Dorp, whom I am sure these incantations displease as much as they do me, is that if you can change them, and perhaps you can, you will be of service to your colleagues – unless you decide to go along with their foolishness, when it is much more fitting they should bow to your judgment.

[More has been castigating theologians who ignore the Scriptures and patristic literature, and devote themselves to 'disputatious logic'.]

Ex quo genere quum in multos inciderim, vnum saltem ex quo caeterorum indoles agnosci possit, non pigebit hercle velut speciminis loco referre. Cenaui olim apud Italum quendam mercatorem, non minus doctum, quam diuitem (erat autem ditissimus); forte aderat in cena religiosus quidam Theologus, disputator egregius, qui recens e Continente venerat, vt questiones aliquot quas premeditatus aduexerat, Londini disputaret, experturus videlicet in ea disceptandi palestra, quid Angli prestare possent, simul nomen suum iam apud suos celebre, apud nostros quoque propagaturus. Is quas conclusiones (vt vocant) affixerit, tum quam belle disputatio processerit homini, quanquam longum esset, non grauarer profecto narrare, si tam ad hanc rem pertinens foret, quam festiuum fuit. Caeterum in cena nihil a quoquam dici tam bene munitum aut libratum, tam circumspecte potuit, quod non ille vix prolatum aliquo statim syllogismo conuelleret, quantumuis res de qua sermo erat nihil ad Theologiam pertinens, ad Philosophiam tantundem, quantumuis denique ab vniuersa eius professione esset alienum, nisi quod initio cenae fecerat, ne alienum esse quicquam ab eius professione posset (professus est enim, sese in vtramque partem de re quacunque disputaturum). Paulatim coepit mercator ad questiones magis Theologicas descendere. De usura proponebat, de decimis quedam, de confessionibus, quae in aliena parochia fratribus essent factae. In omnibus nihil erat Theologo pensi, vtram sustineret partem, sed vtramcunque aliquis asseruisset, illam oppugnabat, ac vicissim quancunque alius negauerat, hanc ille protinus astruebat. Tandem per iocum mercator sermonem de concubinis iniecit, coepitque defendere, minus mali vnam quampiam domi habere, quam foris per multas discurrere. Ibi rursus Theologus instare, oppugnare ferociter, non quod vsque adeo concubinam videretur odisse, sed ne cum quoquam ei quicquam conueniret, siue quod hominem fortasse varietas oblectabat. Caeterum asserebat esse conclusionem famosam cuiusdam limpidissimi Doctoris, qui fecit illum singularissimum librum qui intitulatur Directorium Concubinariorum, plus eum peccare qui vnam domi concubinam, quam qui decem foris meretrices haberet, idque cum ob malum exemplum, tum ob occasionem saepius peccandi cum ea quae domi sit. Respondit mercator, docte mehercle, et acute, quae et longum recitare fuerit, et apud te superuacaneum. At

Since I meet up with many of this kind, I shall not mind recalling at 11.630–697
least one, by Jove, as an example by which you can recognise the quality of the others. I dined some time ago at the house of a certain Italian merchant as learned as he was rich[19] – and he was very rich. By chance there was present at dinner a certain reverend theologian, a surpassing disputer, who had recently arrived from the Continent to dispute in London a few premeditated questions he had brought along, and clearly test by disputing how well the English could acquit themselves in that arena; at the same time he was going to enlarge among us, as well, his reputation already well known at home. Which conclusions, as they are called, he fixed upon, and then what a splendid disputation issued from the man. Although it was long, I should certainly not be averse to recounting it if it were as related to our subject as it was amusing. Nothing could be said by anyone else at table so well defended or well balanced, or said so circumspectly, that he did not overturn it almost before it was uttered, with some prompt syllogism. It did not matter that the subject of conversation had very little to do with theology and equally little with philosophy, and was finally quite alien to his whole profession – except that at the beginning of dinner he did say that nothing could be alien to his profession, for he promised to dispute on either side of any subject. Gradually the merchant began to get down to more theological questions. He talked about usury, about certain tithes, about confessions which in some parishes could be made to friars. In all of these it was indifferent to the theologian which side he took; but whichever anyone defended, that he attacked, and in turn whatever another denied, he promptly supported. Finally, as a joke, the merchant brought the conversation round to the subject of mistresses and began to defend them, saying it was less wicked to have a single one at home than to run abroad after many. There again the theologian was insistent, and attacked his position fiercely, not because he had ever so far appeared to shun a mistress, but so as not to agree with anyone on any subject, or perhaps simply because it pleased the man to differ. In any case he asserted it was the conclusion of some pellucid doctor, who wrote that most singular book called *The Directory of Mistresses*, [20] that the man who had one mistress at home sinned more than one who had ten whores abroad, not only because of the bad example, but also because of the opportunity of sinning more often with the one who was at home. The merchant made a reply learned, by Jove, and to the point, which would be long to quote and superfluous for you. But when he detected that the

quum olfecisset, Theologum non perinde in Scipturis atque in questiunculis illis exercitatum, coepit hominem ludere, argumentarique interdum per locos ab authoritate. Effingebat enim ex tempore sententiolas quasdam breues, suae parti quae viderentur astipulari, quumque ipse omnes nusquam ante auditas, pro libito fuisset commentus, hanc tamen ex epistola quapiam diui Pauli, illam ex Petri, aliam rursus ex medio citabat Euangelio, idque tam diligenter, vt neque capitulum vnquam dum citabat omitteret, nisi quod si quis liber in sexdecim capita distinguebatur, ille data opera citabat ex vicesimo. Quid ille bonus Theologus interim? ad caetera certe strenue, et tanquam herinacius spinis sese suis obuoluit. At personatas illas authoritates vix hercle huc atque illuc vitabundus euasit, sed euasit tamen; tantum valet ars et exercitatio disserendi. Nam quum ille quid in sacris continebatur litteris, omnino nesciret, neque dubitaret, quin quod inde citaretur, ibi esset, non deferre vero cedereque authoritati Scripturae, nephas duceret, ac loco depelli, vincique turpissimum, tantis circumseptus angustiis, vide obsecro, qua astutia tandem Proteus ille e mediis retibus elapsus est. Statim vt aliqua sententia quae nusquam erat, tanquam e sacris litteris aduersus eum citabatur, Bene citas, inquit, domine, sed illum textum ego sic intellego, et iam interpretabatur non sine aliqua distinctione bimembri, quorum alterum pro aduersario stare diceret, altero ipse effugeret. Quod si quando mercator instabat molestius contendere, eius textus non illum verum esse sensum, quem Theologus affirmabat, iurabat homo tam sancte, vt quiuis possit credere, Nicolaum de Lyra eundem textum sic interpretari. Profecto, mi Dorpi, in illa vna coena plusquam viginti poculenti textus, totidemque poculenta glossemata, inter pocula, at adeo ex poculis tanquam e serpentis dentibus terrigenae illi fratres, et nati sunt et periere.

Neque profecto satis admirari queo quum ea verba lego, quibus eas ita magnifice attollis, tanquam vti (apud Poetas) in Atlantis humeros coelum, ita in perplexas huiuscemodi questiunculas, hoc est arundinem, vniuersa prorsus Ecclesia inclinata incumbat, alioquin videlicet periclit-

theologian was not as well versed in Scripture as he was in those petty debating points, he began to tease the man, and adduce proof sometimes by arguments from authority. In fact he made up extemporaneously certain short aphorisms which seemed to agree with his side, and though never heard before, since he made them up as he went along, he quoted this one from some Epistle of St. Paul, that one from Peter, still another from the middle of the Gospel, and all so diligently that he did not omit a single chapter when he quoted, except that if any book was divided into sixteen chapters, he cited the given passage from the twentieth. What of our good theologian meanwhile? As for the rest, of course, he covered himself quickly, like a hedgehog with his spines. But these resounding authorities, by gad, he barely evaded by doubling this way and that; still, evade them he did, so efficacious is the art and practice of debate. For while he had no idea what was contained in the Scriptures, and never doubted that what was quoted from them was there, he thought it impious not to defer and yield to the authority of Scripture, but ignominious to be dislodged from his ground and vanquished. Hedged round by such straits, observe now with what adroitness this Proteus finally slipped from the midst of the snares. As soon as some statement that never existed was quoted against him as from the Scriptures, 'You quote well, my dear sir,' said he, 'but I understand that text in this way'. And then he interpreted it with some bifurcated distinction, one part of which he said represented the adversary, while he escaped by the other. But if the merchant pressed him more insistently, contending that the real meaning of his text was not that which the theologian affirmed, that man swore so piously that anyone could believe him, that Nicholas of Lyra[21] had interpreted the same text his way. Indeed, my dear Dorp, at that one dinner there were more than twenty potable texts and as many potable glosses among the cups, and indeed from the cups, as from the serpents' teeth, these earthborn brothers both were born and perished.

[More has been discussing the excessive attention some theologians pay to the *Sentences*.]

I really cannot sufficiently wonder, when I read the words in which 11.800–980
you exalt these things as highly as the Poets' heaven on the shoulders of Atlas, that in the same way the whole Church rests leaning entirely on perplexed little debating points of this kind, that is to say, on a reed; without them she would be in clear danger of collapsing totally, once and

atura ne tota semel collaberetur in cineres. Ais enim, 'Alioqui qui sciemus quomodo sint sacramenta administranda, quaenam sint eorum formae, quando absoluendus peccator, quando reiiciendus, quid praeceptum sit restitui, quid seruari possit?' Itane putas, Dorpi, ista quae tu nusquam alibi quam apud Neotericos questionistas inueniri vis, antiquos omnes sanctissimos Patres nec minus etiam doctos ignorasse omnia? Hieronymus, Ambrosius, Augustinus ad Sacramentorum formas ac materias cecutiebant? Ergo tota Ecclesia plus quam mille annos (nam plusquam mille anni a passione Christi numerantur ad Petri Lombardi tempora, e cuius Sententiis, velut ex equo Troiano, vniuersum istud quaestionum agmen erupit), tot annos ergo, immo tot saecula, vniuersa Christi Ecclesia aut sacramentis caruit, aut ista non habuit? quando recipiendus peccator, quando reiiciendus, tam diu fuit incognitum? et item quid praeceptum esset restitui, nesciebant? Nam quid seruari posset, concesserim apud Veteres non fuisse tam acute, quam apud istos disputatum. Sed vt Zacheus veritus ne male parta parce redderet, quadruplum sese redditurum professus est, ita veteres illi Patres, vt vel plus satis quisque restitueret hortabantur. Non erant illi, fateor, hac in re, quam isti sunt, tam in diffiniendo ac distinguendo curiosi. Sed ego tamen illorum (vt Therentius ait) emulari malo necgligentiam potius, quam istorum obscuram diligentiam, apud quos anxie res disputatur, et queritur non tam quid restitui debeat, quam quid seruari possit, non quam procul a peccato sit abscedendum, sed quam prope ad peccatum sine peccato possit accedi. Iam qui consilium conuasatori dat, nimirum tanquam alienae pecuniae frugi dispensator, obseruat vt in reddendo citra subsistat potius vel mille passus, quam vltra latum (vt aiunt) vnguem promoueat.

Ego certe, mi Dorpi, nec te (vt puto) refragante contenderim, quaecunque sunt ad salutem necessaria, id est, sine quibus salui esse non possumus, ea primum ab ipsis sacris Litteris, deinde priscis corum interpretibus, ad hec communi ab antiquis Patribus quasi per manus tradita consuetudine, postremo sacris Ecclesiae sanctionibus, abunde nobis tradita. Quod si quid supra quam in his est, homines isti acuti curiosius addiderunt, vt multa concedam commoda esse atque vtilia, ita

for all, into ashes. For you say, "Otherwise how can we know how the Sacraments should be administered, what form they should take, when the sinner should be absolved and when denied absolution, what rule should be restored and what can be retained?" Do you really think, Dorp, that these piddling questions, which you would like never to have been discovered elsewhere than by the moderns, were not all known to all the ancient Fathers, as learned as they were venerable? Were Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine uncertain about the forms and materials of the Sacraments? Was the whole Church then, for more than a thousand years (because more than a thousand years elapsed from the Passion of Christ to the time of Peter Lombard, from whose *Sentences*, as from a Trojan horse, this whole swarm of questions burst forth), for so many years, indeed so many centuries, was the whole Church of Christ cut off from the Sacraments, or did she not have these particular ones? For how long was it not known when a sinner should be pardoned and when cast out? Did the Fathers likewise not know what rule should be restored? – for I would concede that what could be preserved would not have been so keenly disputed among the older writers as among the new ones. But just as Zacchaeus,[22] fearful that he might have short changed anyone, promised to restore the sum fourfold, so those ancient Fathers encouraged everyone to restore even more than was required. They were not, I confess, in this matter as scrupulous as these modern men are in defining and making distinctions. But I still prefer, as Terence says,[23] to emulate their carelessness, rather than the fumbling diligence of these others who anxiously dispute the subject and seek not so much what ought to be restored as what can be preserved, not how far one must desist from sin, as how close to sin one can come without actually sinning. Now a man who gives advice to a departing traveller, like a frugal steward dispensing foreign currency, surely takes care in dispensing it to stop a mile short this side, rather than go, as the saying is, a finger nail's breadth beyond.

Certainly, my dear Dorp, I would contend, and I think you would agree with me, that whatever things are essential for salvation, that is, without which we cannot be saved, have been abundantly taught us first by Holy Scripture itself and then by its earliest interpreters; further, by general custom passed on by tradition from the ancient Fathers, and finally by the holy ordinances of the Church. If there is anything beyond what these contain, our keen men have very painstakingly added it; and while I grant that many of these additions are convenient and useful, yet

plane eius esse generis puto omnia, vt sine eis viui possit. At fortasse dices, non omnia apud Veteres tam inuentu prompta, tamque in numerato esse, quam apud istos recentiores, qui omnia cognata quasique similia in capita quaedam, veluti in suam quodque tribum, descripserunt. In hac re, Dorpi, fortasse accedo tibi, fateorque nonnihil esse commodi, velut in domestica supellectile, sic in re litteraria quoque ita seorsum habere singula queque distincta, vt ad quodcunque velis, illico manum possis absque errore porrigere. Est istud quidem (vt dixi) commodum, verum hoc tanto commodo quidam tam abutuntur incommode, vt propemodum prestitisse videatur, hoc ipso etiam commodo caruisse. Neque enim aliud quicquam magis in causa fuisse puto, quare vetustissimus quisque sacrarum litterarum interpres a tam multis tam diu neclectui habeatur, quam quod infoelicium ingeniorum corrupta iudicia primum sibi, deinde aliis quoque persuasere, nihil vsquam esse mellis, quod non in illos summularum alueos congestum sit. Ideoque fit vt illis contenti solis, caetera omnia per incuriam contemnant. In cuius animi quendam etiam ipse iam olim in quadam bibliopolae taberna incidi; erat enim senex, qui alterum (vt aiunt) pedem habebat in sepulchro, et certe non multo post vtrumque, iam doctoratus (vt vocant) honore plusquam annos triginta fuerat insignitus. Dico forte apud eum, beatum Augustinum aliquando putasse, demones omneis substantias esse corporeas. Ibi ille statim supercilium contrahere, et temeritatem meam rugosa fronte compescere. Tum ego, 'Non dico,' inquam, 'hoc ipse, Pater, nec Augustinum in ea re defendo. Homo erat, errare potuit. Credo ei quantum cui plurima, sed nemini vni omnia.' Iam vero coepit homo excandescere, vel ob id precipue, quod tanto Patri calumniam tantam intenderem. 'Nam putas me,' inquit, 'non legisse Augustinum? Imo,' inquit, 'priusquam tu nascereris.' Me iam suis seuis dictis protelasset, nisi commode fuisset paratus elenchus. Nam vt erat in taberna, sumo in manus libellum Augustini de Diuinatione Demonum, verto ad locum, atque ostendo; vbi locum semel atque iterum legit, ac tercia demum lectione, me adiuuante, coepisset intelligere, tandem admirabundus. 'Certe,' inquit, 'ego valde miror de hoc quod Augustinus dicit sic in isto libro, quia certe non dicit sic in Magistro Sententiarum, qui est liber magis magistralis quam iste.' Qui sunt ex hac farragine, qui neque Veterum quenquam, neque Scripturarum quicquam legunt, nisi in Sententiis, et earum commentariis, hi perinde mihi videntur facere, ac si

I think they are all clearly the kind of thing it is possible to live without. But perhaps you will say not everything in the ancient writers is so easy to find, and in such ready form as it is in these newer writers who have described all related and, as it were, similar things under a certain heading, each to so speak, in its own category. In this, Dorp, perhaps I agree with you and confess that it is rather convenient in literary matters as in household furnishings to have everything separate and distinct so that you can instantly put your hand on whatever you want without fumbling about. That is indeed convenient, as I said; but some men have made such inconvenient use of this great convenience as almost to prove that it is without convenience. I do not think there is any greater reason for such long and general neglect of the earliest interpreters of Holy Scripture than that the perverse opinions of barren minds have persuaded first themselves and then others that there is no honey anywhere that is not packed into those hives of *Summulae*. This is why, satisfied just with these, they neglect everything else through lack of interest.

I myself came upon one of this persuasion not long ago in some bookseller's shop. He was an old man, with one foot in the grave, as the saying goes, and the other certainly not far behind; he had been distinguished by an honorary doctorate, as they call it, more than thirty years before. I happen to say to him, "St Augustine once thought that all spirits were corporeal substances". At once he contracts his brows and checks my brashness with a frown. I go on, "I am not saying, Father, that I defend this position, nor Augustine in this matter. He was a man, he was fallible. I believe he was a great genius, but no one is perfect." Then the man really begins to heat up, especially because I make so malicious a charge against such a Father. "Do you think that I", he says, "have not read Augustine? Yes indeed I have," he says, "and before you were born". And he would have driven me away with harsh words, except that the refutation lay at hand. For since we were in the bookshop, I picked up the little volume of Augustine *On the Divination of Spirits*,[24] turned to the page, and showed him. When he had read the passage once, and again, it was not until after a third reading (with my help) that he began to understand, full of wonder at last. "Well", he said, "I am very much astonished at what Augustine says in this book, because he certainly does not say it in the *Master of the Sentences*, which is a more magisterial book than this". Men of this mash, who never read any of the ancient writers, nor any of the Scriptures except in the *Sentences* and their commentaries, seem to me exactly like a man who skips all the authors

quis authoribus omnibus qui Latine scripserunt omissis, constructionum praeceptis ab Alexandro petitis, reliquum Latinae linguae ex Perotti Cornucopia, et Calepino conetur ediscere, quod persuasum habeat, in his omnia Latinae linguae vocabula sese reperturum, et profecto reperiet plurima, eademque electissima.

Nempe vt apud recentiores Theologos, priorum dicta authoritatis loco leguntur inserta, ita hic quoque veteres poetae atque oratores, aliquot etiam qui nunc ne extant quidem. Sed neque hec vnquam facient Latinum, nec illa, mi Dorpi, Theologum, si sola sint, etiam si decem millibus spinosissimarum questionum fuerit instructus, quibus miror quum sit talis, qua in re possit Ecclesiae esse vsui, disputando fortasse aduersus hereticos, (nam hoc nomine praecipue sese solent venditare). At hi aut docti sunt, aut indocti. Si indocti (vt est multo maxima pars) neque acumina ista, quibus iste solus valet, neque verba tam insueta, quibus iste solus assueuit, intelligent. Necesse est ergo talem disputationem tantum fructus consequi, quantum si quis Turcam quempiam patriae duntaxat linguae peritum, composita oratione, sermone Gallico (nam eum solum elegantem Galli putant) exhortetur ad fidem. Sin docti sint heretici, idque in illis ipsis questionibus (neque enim fere accidit vt alias sint heretici), quando iam redarguentur? Quis erit disputandi finis? quum ex illis ipsis questionibus, quibus oppugnantur, ipsis quoque referiendi ministratur inexhausta materia, vt propemodum eis accidere videatur, quod nudis inter aceruos lapidum pugnantibus, vt quo feriat neutri desit, quo se defendat neuter habeat. Nempe quidam, qui in scholis inter primos leguntur, et sunt non minus quam habentur acuti, vt omittam interim, quod quasdam questiones de Deo tam ridiculas excogitarunt, vt putes ridere, propositiones tam blasphemas, vt censeas irridere. Certe contra fidem tam gnauiter obiiciunt, tam segniter obiecta dissoluunt, vt preuaricatores agere, et fidem ioco tueri, serio oppugnare videantur. Heretici ergo cum talibus compositi, quales antea dixi Theologos, quum sint in eodem docti ludo, quando succumbent? non cito hercle opinor, si non vnum magis lignorum fasciculum vererentur, quam multos syllogismorum fasces pertimescerent.

Sed idoneus erit saltem qui concionetur ad populum. Hercules! hoc

who wrote in Latin, seeks grammatical constructions from the rules of Alexander, and tries to learn the rest of the Latin language from the Cornucopia of Perottus and from Calepino,[25] because he is convinced that all the words of the Latin language are to be found in them. And he certainly can find many, and those most choice.

To be sure, quotations from earlier writers are inserted into the writings of the modern theologians to lend them weight, and here too are the old poets and orators, including some who no longer even exist. But neither will the former, my good Dorp, ever make a Latinist, nor the latter a theologian, by themselves, even if he were provided with ten thousand of the thorniest debating questions. I wonder, since he is so provided, how he can be useful to the Church. Perhaps by disputing against the heretics, for on this count, in particular, such men usually pride themselves. But heretics are either learned or ignorant. If ignorant, as the great majority are, they will understand neither the subtleties in which he alone has expertise nor the unfamiliar words with which he alone is familiar. Necessarily therefore such a disputation is about as productive as if some Turk who knew only his native tongue, should be exhorted to Christianity in a speech composed in French (for the French think theirs is the only elegant language). But if the heretics are learned, and experienced in these same [doctrinal] questions (for they could scarcely be heretics in other matters), then when will they be confuted? What end will there be to wrangling? since out of those very questions with which they are attacked, inexhaustible material is also provided them for striking back; they are like naked men fighting among piles of stones; neither lacks weapons and neither has a means of defense. To be sure there are some singled out among the first in the schools who are no less brilliant than they are reputed to be, so that I shall overlook for the moment that they have worked out some questions about God so ridiculous you might suppose they were meant to laugh at, and propositions so blasphemous you would think they were in jest. Certainly they upbraid the faith so energetically, and refute criticisms of it so half-heartedly that they appear to act as sham defenders, defending the faith in jest and attacking it in earnest. When heretics are arrayed against theologians of the kind I just mentioned, trained in the same game, when will they give in? Not quickly, I suspect, by Jove, if they trembled at intimidating bundles of syllogisms no more than they feared a small bunch of twigs.

But at least this man will be capable of stirring the people in public

ipsum est quod aiunt, 'Bouem ad ceroma.' Nam quum nihil didicerit preter questiones, que sunt ad aures populi perquam insolentes, minimeque omnium idoneae, ediscendus est ei nimirum sermo quispiam ex sermonibus Discipuli, aut Veni mecum, aut Dormi secure, res per se ineptae, quas dum homo tractat ineptior, vtpote nec ad id munus assuetus, et qui totam illam verborum congeriem ex alieno stomacho declamet, necesse est vt contio tota frigescat. Quamobrem plane non video questiones istae quid faciunt ei quem solae possident, nisi quod eum ad caetera omnia reddunt inutilem, vt cui si quid ex his proponatur subtilibus magis, quam solidis disputationibus, in quibus se ante millies exercuit, iam domi suae est, iam cristas erigit, velut gallus, qui in suo sterquilinio superbit. At extra illa septa, si paulo producatur longius, illico ignota rerum omnium facies tenebras ac vertiginem offundit.

Nec iam Dialectica, rerum cecitate labanti, quantumuis fortis, quantumuis acuta succurrit, que vt cognita rerum natura, varias inde species, multas argumentorum formas elicit, ita rebus ignoratis ipsis necesse est sine vllo vsu obmutescat. Adde quod illas ipsas questiones, quas et penitus et solas per tot annos imbibit, quum sese iam senex e scholasticorum contubernio, vbi eadem assidue ventilantur, quapiam occasione subduxerit, iam intra biennium acumina illa vniuersa, numerosa nimium videlicet, euanida, nullo rerum subnixa pondere, tanquam nebula fumusque disparent, iamque ei nimirum vsu venit ipsi, quod de Anima Pueri ex Aristotele subinde citari solet, vt ipsius anima fiat denique, velut tabula rasa, in qua nihil omnino depingitur, et mirum in modum versa rerum vice contingit, vt qui prius omnes sapientiae numeros in argumentosa loquacitate posuerat, iam senex infantissimus omnibus risui foret, nisi stultitiae suae superciliosum silentium sapientiae loco pretexeret, imo potius hoc ipso ridiculus, quod qui fuerat Stentore modo clamosior, nunc vicio tam longe diuerso, taciturnior pisce reddatur, et inter loquentes sedeat, veluti caput sine lingua, atque (vt aiunt) personae mutae 'truncoque simillimus Hermae.'

Denique, vt quid ego de hac tota re sentio semel intellegas, neque Theologos omnes taxo, neque neotericorum questiones omneis condemno; verum eas que nihil ad rem pertinent, que sunt huiusmodi, vt neque quicquam eruditioni conferant, et multum impietati detrahant –

assembly? Jove! This, as the saying goes, is 'an ox on the wrestling mat'. For since the man has learned nothing but debating points utterly foreign to the ears of the people and completely inappropriate, he must of course memorise some style of speaking from the sermons of the *Disciple*, or the *Come with me* or the *Sleep Soundly*[26] – all so foolish in themselves that when an even more foolish man handles them, since he is not used to this role and declaims that whole heap of words from another man's throat, the entire speech inevitably falls flat. Therefore I do not quite see what these debating questions do for the man they are sole master of, except render him useless for everything else. If any one of these questions is proposed to him for disputations more subtle than solid he is right at home, he raises his crest like the cock taking pride in his dunghill. But beyond these limits, if the debate is drawn out a little longer, the unfamiliar aspect of everything soon covers him with gloom and vertigo.

Now dialectic, however strong and keen, does not come to the aid of anyone groping in the dark about nature. When the aspects of nature are known, dialectic draws from them the varied species and multiple forms of evidence, but when these same facts are unknown she needs must fall silent and useless. Furthermore, no matter how deeply and exclusively a man steeps himself in these petty questions over a period of years, if, when an old man, he has occasion to leave the companionship of the schools where these ideas are incessantly tossed about, then within a couple of years all those plainly too numerous subtleties, evanescent and supported by no substance, will dissipate like clouds and smoke; and now of course what is often quoted from Aristotle on the mind of a child, must happen to him; his mind will become at last a *tabula rasa* as it were, on which nothing at all is depicted. In a strange way a reversal takes place, so that a man who formerly set forth all the categories of wisdom with a loquacity teeming with proof, would now be a quite speechless old man and an object of general derision unless he used haughty silence in the place of wisdom to cloak his stupidity. Indeed he is the more ridiculous because he who was once more clamorous than Stentor is now become, through the opposite fault, more taciturn than a fish, and sits among the talkers like a head without a tongue and, as the saying goes, like a mute actor and a 'mere bust of Hermes'.

Finally, so that you may know once and for all my position on this whole matter, I am not criticising all theologians, nor do I disapprove all the debating questions of the modern writers. But I think questions that have no relation to the subject, the kind that confer no learning and

eas, inquam, non improbandas modo, sed despuendas quoque censeo. Ceteras vero, que tractant aut humana grauiter, aut diuina reuerenter, tum vtrumque adhibita modestia qua veritatem sese inuestigare magis quam altercari probent, modo ne quenquam sibi totum vendicent, ne quenquam nimis diu detineant, et suo se pede metiantur, neque se melioribus conferant, nedum anteferant – has, inquam, sic institutas, admodum libenter amplector, hactenus tamen, vt eas tales esse fatear, quibus non inutiliter exerceantur ingenia; tales esse pernegem, in quas salus vniuersae procumbat atque innitatur Ecclesiae. Iam Theologos non eos vitupero, qui has degustarunt, imo laudo etiam, qui ad altiorem sacrarum Litterarum peritiam, ad meliorem priscorum, at sanctissimorum, et doctissimorum Patrum eruditionem, has quoque non abiiciendas accessiones adiecerunt. Verum huiusmodi Theologos (vt ex animo dicam) non probo, qui questionibus cuiusque generis non insenescunt modo sed immoriuntur quoque, qui seu ingenii sterilitate quadam impediti, seu puerili scholasticorum incitati plausu, neglectis antiquorum omnium litteris, posthabitis etiam ipsis, quorum se doctores profitentur Euangeliis, nihil omnino preter questiunculas didicerunt, partim per se inanes, partim inanes his, qui caeterarum rerum omnium inanes ipsi sunt, idque iam senes, atque ideo deplorati, qui neque Scripturas commode tractare incognitis Veterum scriptis queant, neque ad ea cognoscenda (qua nunc sunt Latinae linguae penuria), pares esse possint.

At primum ex his ipsis Commentatoribus Aristotelis, quos tu in illa oratione commemoras, quam siue vt Laurentium vituperes, siue vt laudes Aristotelem (nam vtrumque acriter ex aequo facis) elegantissime certe scripsisti, Alexandro inquam, Themistio, Ammonio, Simplicio, Philopono, Olympiodoro, quotusquisque ex his, inquam, est, excepto vno Themistio, qui non adhuc sua tantum lingua legatur – nisi quod Alexandri problemata in Latinum venere sermonem! Ex reliquis si quid Latin[a]e legitur (neque enim ignoro, haberi et Alexandri, et Simplicii fragmenta) id totum eius generis est, ac tam parum Latinum, vt a Latinis

detract much through impiety, should be not only rejected but abhorred. But there are others that treat human matters seriously or divine matters reverently, or both, employing a moderation that shows they are seeking the truth rather than wrangling. So long as these do not take over anyone entirely or detain anyone too long, but measure themselves by their own rule and do not compare themselves with their betters, still less take preference over them – these, I say, thus regulated, I freely embrace to the limit, so far at least as I discern they are of a nature by which minds may profitably be trained. I should stoutly deny they were the kind of question upon which the salvation of the whole Church rests and reposes. Now I do not criticise the theologians who have become acquainted with these things; on the contrary I salute those who, to their practical knowledge of Holy Scripture and great erudition of the most venerable holy and learned Fathers, have also added these new accessions that should not be disparaged. But I do not approve of theologians of the kind (and I speak with feeling) who not only grow old but wither away among petty questions of this kind. These are men who, whether hampered by some barrenness of talent or excited by the childish applause of the scholastics, have slighted the writings of all the ancients and even neglected the very Gospels of which they claim to be teachers. They have learned nothing at all except trivial questions that are empty in themselves and useless to men who are empty of all the rest of knowledge. Old men now, and for that reason to be pitied, they can not discuss the Scriptures properly because they do not know the writings of the ancients, nor be equal to learning the things they should, because they are so deficient in the Latin language.

[More replies to Dorp's disparagement of Greek.]

But first, in your *Oration*,[27] which is certainly elegantly written, 11.1268–
whether you are criticising Laurentius[28] or praising Aristotle, which you 1346
do with equal zeal, you mention several commentators of Aristotle, Alexander, say, and Themistius, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, and Olympiodorus.[29] How few of these, with the sole exception of Themistius, are even now read in any language but their own! – except of course that the *Problems* of Alexander have been translated into the Latin language. If anything of the others is read in Latin (for I am aware that fragments exist from Alexander and Simplicius) it is all of such kind, and in such poor Latin, that it is almost less intelligible to Latins than the

propemodum minus quam ipsa Graeca intelligatur. Neque iam aut de Poetis aut Oratoribus dico quicquam, sed neque de aliis Philosophis, aut aliis etiam eiusdem Aristotelis Commentatoribus verbum facio vllum, quanquam vel vnus Ioannes Grammaticus tantum habet acuminis, tantum eruditionis, presertim Aristotelicae, vt si cum eo posses ipsius lingua loqui, reduceret te (satis scio) vnus ille Grammaticus, cum Grammaticis omnibus, quibus nunc parum propicius videris, in gratiam. At ex antiquis Christianae doctrinae scriptoribus, cum multo maximam partem Graece constet scripsisse, perpauci pro tanto numero versi sunt, quidam vero ita versi, vt potius videantur subuersi. Ad Aristotelem ipsum venio, quem et ego vt supra multos, ita cum multis amo, quem tu in memorata oratione tua videris non supra multos modo, sed pro multis quoque, atque adeo pro omnibus amplecti. Hic ergo ipse non poterit totus tibi sine Graecarum peritia litterarum innotescere.

Nam vt omittam illud, quod nihil eius tam commode versum est, vt non idem ipsum suis ipsius verbis acceptum in pectus influat potentius. Et illud item, quod quedam opera eius adhuc Graeca feruntur, quorum titulos nescio an Latini habeant. Certe ex his ipsis operibus, quae nunc habent, sic habent quaedam, vt etiam non habeant: aequa sorte ipsum etiam Metheorologicorum opus tam constat esse, quam dolendum est, quum nescio an vllus ex tam multis eius viri laboribus dignior scitu sit, aut ipsa rerum natura ab vlla sui parte mirabilior, quam ab ea, quae vt nobis proxima circumfusaque vndique, ita magis ignorata atque incerta est, quam astrorum positio, motusque siderum, quae tam porro semota sunt. Sed hoc opus tamen spero propediem fore, vt a Thoma Linacro nostrate, illustrissimi Regis nostri medico, Latinis donetur auribus, vtpote cuius iam nunc duos libros absoluit, perfecissetque nimirum opus, atque aedidisset vniuersum, nisi Galenus eum exorasset, vt quum ipse dux atque imperator Medicae rei sit, vel seposito interim Aristotele, Latinus eius opera, prior ipse redderetur. Prodibit ergo Aristoteles aliquanto serius, sed prodibit tamen nihil incultior preterea nec incomitatus. Nam Alexandri Aphrodisei commentarios, in idem opus vna vertit, initurus apud Latinos omnes immortalem gratiam, in quorum non vulgarem vtilitatem, Philosophi praestantissimi operi tam egregio, praestantissimum interpretem sic adiunxerit, vt eius labore demum ab Latinis possit intellegi, quod hactenus a nemine (vt ego certe suspicor)

Greek itself. I am not speaking now about the poets and orators, or about other philosophers or even other commentators of Aristotle. Though John the grammarian alone,[30] for example, had such acumen and erudition, especially about Aristotle, that if you could talk with him in his own language that single grammarian, I am sure, would restore your respect for all grammarians, whom you now seem to hold in low esteem. But though the great majority of ancient writers on Christian doctrine are known to have written in Greek, very few of such a great number are translated, and certain ones truly done in such a way that they seem rather to be undone. But I am speaking of Aristotle himself, whom I both love above many and together with many, and whom you in your memorable *Oration* seem to cherish not only above many but instead of many, and indeed instead of all others. Now even he could not be completely known to you without a knowledge of Greek.

For I need not remark that nothing of his is so suitably translated that it would not insinuate itself more forcefully into one's mind if it were read in his own words. And also that certain works of his are still extant in Greek of which the Latins may not even know the titles. Certainly among his works we now have, some are in such form that we still do not have them. It is as well known as it is deplorable that even the work on Meteorologics suffers the same fate, and yet I do not know that any of the numerous works of this author is more deserving to be known, or that nature itself is more wonderful in any of its parts than this subject that, nearest to us and surrounding us on every side, is more unknown and undetermined than the position of the stars and the motion of the celestial bodies that yet are so remote. Still, I hope that this work will soon be offered to Latin readers by our countryman Thomas Linacre,[31] the physician of our illustrious King; he has already completed two volumes and I am sure would have perfected and published the whole work had not Galen taken precedence as the leader and master of the medical art; thus he put aside Aristotle for the time being to translate Galen's works first into Latin. Aristotle will appear then a little later, but he will appear no less finely rendered and moreover not unattended. For Linacre is translating the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the same work, which will earn him immortal gratitude among all Latin readers; its uncommon usefulness lies in his thus joining to the exceptional work of a remarkable philosopher his remarkable interpreter, so that through Linacre's efforts the Latins can finally understand what up to now no one has understood, in my firm opinion,

qui Graece nescierit, intellectum est. Nam quum ipse iam olim idem Aristotelis opus audirem Graece, eodem mihi prelegente atque interpretante Linacro, libuit interdum experiendi gratia vulgatam etiam translationem inspicere, e cuius lectione mentem illico subiit eiusdem Philosophi de Physicis suis dictum. Nam vt illa sic ait aedita, vt tamen aedita non sint, ita hec quoque sic versa videbantur, vt nullo pacto versa viderentur, vsqueadeo, vt quae Graece callebam probe, eadem ipsa versa non intelligerem. Neque est quod a Latinis interpretibus sperari possit auxilium, quum Albertus quoque, quem ad emulationem Alexandri Magni, Magnum vocant, quique se Periphrasten Aristotelis profitetur, Paraphrastes verius in eo opere iudicari debeat; ita, quum eius officium sit Aristotelis sensum aliis verbis referre, affert prorsus (vt aiunt) ex diametro diuersa. At Gaitanus (nam is quoque facit commentarios) describit nobis, vnus terrae pugillus, in quot pugillos aquae liquescit, et aquae item pugillus vnus in quot pugillos aeris dissoluitur, et quo non vlterius ad eundem modum progreditur? Sed tamen dum has tam immensurabiles mensuras metitur, ad Aristotelis interim sensum ne gry quidem. Infinitum, mi Dorpi, fuerit explicare, quam multa desunt ei cui Graeca desunt. Neque tamen ignoro, et alios multos, et te imprimis ipsum, sine Graecis litteris, ipsam doctrinae arcem versus eousque prouectum, quo multi non possint etiam Graece docti sudantes atque anhelantes ascendere. Sed hoc vnum tamen ausim affirmare, si caeteris disciplinis tuis tu litteras praeterea Graecas adieceris, quantum nunc alios et Graece peritos exuperas, tantum tunc te etiam ipsum superabis. Sed de litteris hactenus.

who did not know Greek. I studied the same work of Aristotle in Greek some time ago with Linacre teaching and expounding it, and it amused us sometimes, for the sake of experiment, to look at the published translation; its reading immediately reminded me of the same Philosopher's remark about his *Physics*. He said it was published as if it were still unpublished; in the same way the *Meteorologica* seemed to be translated as if it were still untranslated, to the point where I could not understand in the translation passages I understood very well in Greek. And there is no help to be sought from Latin translators; even Albertus whom, in emulation of Alexander the Great they call Magnus, and who declared himself the *Periphrast* of Aristotle, ought more truly to be judged a *Paraphrast* in his work; thus, when his function is to render the meaning of Aristotle in different words, he conveys precisely the diametrically opposite meaning. Now Gaetano di Thiene, who also wrote commentaries, describes for us how many handfuls of water it takes to liquefy one handful of earth, and likewise how many handfuls of air it takes to evaporate one handful of water, and how much further may he not proceed in the same way? But yet, while he measures out these so immeasurable measures, there is meanwhile not a grain of Aristotle's meaning. It would be an endless task, my dear Dorp, to explain how many things one misses who lacks Greek. Yet I am not unaware that many others, and you above all, without the benefit of Greek, have exalted that defense of doctrine to a height where many, even trained in Greek, could not ascend puffing and sweating. Yet I venture to say just this, that if to your other disciplines you also add Greek, by as much as you now excel others trained in Greek, you will then surpass even yourself. But enough about learning.

APPENDIX II

GASPAR LAX – 'EXPONIBILIUM' 1512

De 'immediate'

[1a] Consequenter videndum est de expositione propositionum de ly 'immediate', quam expositionem materia de 'incipit' et 'desinit' praesupponit. Circa quam in primis videnda est aequivocatio de ly 'immediate'.

Unde ly 'immediate' multis modis capi potest. Primo enim capitur nominaliter, et hoc modo aequivalet huic termino 'coniunctum'; sicut quando dicimus 'Socrates est immediatus Plantoni', idem est dictu quod Socrates sit coniunctus Platoni. Non est cura si tunc secundum aliam significationem capiatur; non est sermo in proposito de ista acceptione.

Alio modo capitur adverbialiter, et apud aliquos hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo potest capi non exponibiliter, et tunc non coniungitur cum istis dictionibus 'ante' vel 'post'; vel saltem illud non oportet. Et hoc modo valet ly 'sine medio'. Et hoc modo capitur quando
[1b] dicitur 'Sphaera ignis est immediate super sphaeram aeris' – hoc est, sine medio. Et hoc modo etiam apud aliquos non capitur in proposito. Utrum tamen hoc modo capiendo aequivaleat ad ly 'immediate' captum ut in proposito capietur videbitur statim.

Alio modo capitur adverbialiter exponibiliter, et tunc semper construitur cum istis dictionibus, vel cum aliqua earum, 'ante', 'post', sequentibus illum terminum 'immediate' – sicut quando dicitur 'Immediate post instans quod est praesens erit instans', 'Immediate post istud punctum huius lineae est punctum'. Et hoc modo est sermo in proposito.

Verum est tamen quod solet adhuc apud aliquos capi alio modo quam adverbialiter, adhuc ipsum exponibiliter capiendo; quia potest capi categorematice, et tunc idem est dicere 'Immediate post istud instans Socrates curret' ac si diceretur 'In aliquo tempore vel instanti quod immediate post istud instans erit Socrates curret'. Non tamen sic capitur in proposito, sed capitur syncategorematice. Quia illo modo capiendo concedendum est quod Adam immediate ante instans quod est praesens fuit, et illo modo aequivalerent 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non

curret', 'Non immediate post hoc Socrates curret'; quia casu quo de hinc ad mille annos currat prima est vera et secunda falsa.

Capiendo tamen ipsum adverbialiter et syncategorematice et exponibiliter potest adhuc duobus modis exponi, secundum quod ly 'post' vel ly 'ante' cum quo construitur potest capi praepositionaliter et adverbialiter. Si capiatur praepositionaliter, tunc in exponentibus eodem modo debet capi; et si adverbialiter, adverbialiter utroque modo potest capi in exponentibus propositionum de 'incipit' et 'desinit' dummodo debite capiatur. Hoc patebit in processu.

Communiter tamen solent capi in illis exponentibus secundum quod ly 'post' capitur coniunctionaliter seu praepositionaliter, et non prout capitur adverbialiter. Tamen videndum est de utroque modo exponendi eius, et primo ubi ly 'post' capiatur adverbialiter.

Circa quod supponendum est quod quattuor sunt genera talium propositionum. Patet in his quattuor propositionibus: 'Immediate post istud instans Socrates curret', 'Non immediate post istud instans Socrates curret', 'Immediate post istud instans Socrates non curret', 'Non immediate post istud instans Socrates non curret'. Propositiones primi et tertii ordinis exponuntur copulative, aliae vero disiunctive.

Sit ergo prima regula: *Propositio primi generis de ly 'immediate' capto isto modo ubi ly 'post' capitur adverbialiter exponitur per unam copulativam cuius prima pars est praeiacens et secunda est una propositio negativa significans secundum exigentiam terminorum positorum in tali propositione.* Exemplum: Ista propositio 'Immediate post istud instans erit instans' sic exponitur: 'Post istud instans erit instans, et nullum erit instans quin inter illud et istud instans erit instans'. Et postquam ly 'post' in exponibili capitur adverbialiter, similiter capitur in exponente, et includit aliquam determinationem importantem tempus vel instans vel aliquid aliud secundum exigentiam aliarum exponentium seu exponibilium. Pariforma ly 'inter' quod capitur in ultima exponente ut includit similem determinationem sic quod sensus ultimae exponentis est 'et nullum erit instans post istud instans quin in aliquo tempore vel instanti inter illud et istud erit instans'. Et si ultra aequivalentem huius velis habere, erit haec: 'Nullum instans post hoc erit instans taliter se habens quod in illo tempore vel instanti inter illud et istud erit instans'.

Et ex consequenti patet qualiter debet exponi propositio secundi ordinis huic contradictiones. Et ex consequenti haec 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret' sic exponitur: 'Post hoc Socrates non curret, et nullum erit instans post hoc quin inter illud et hoc Socrates non curret'.

Et capiatur ly 'inter' et ly 'post' ut dictum est. Et prima exponens aequivalet huic: 'In aliquo tempore vel instanti post hoc Socrates non curret', et secunda huic: 'Nullum erit instans post hoc quin inter illud et hoc in tempore vel instanti Socrates non curret'. Proportionabiliter exponenda est contradictoria huius.

Et ex his sequuntur aliqua corollaria. Primum est quod istae non aequivalent hoc modo procedendo: 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret', 'Non immediate post hoc Socrates curret'. Quia casu posito quod hora sequens dividatur per partes proportionales, minoribus terminatis versus hoc instans, et in qualibet parte pari Socrates curret, et in alia impari Socrates curret, tunc ista est vera: 'Immediate post hoc
[2a] Socrates non curret' et alia falsa. Prima tamen infertur ex secunda, esto quod secunda exponatur disiunctive et prima copulative. Est tamen unum si ly 'inter' in secunda exponente non includeret determinationem importantem tempus vel instans, tunc prima inferret secundam et non econtra. Hoc patet intellegenti; non tamen sic est consuetum dicere.

Sequitur secundo quod istae 'Immediate post hoc Socrates curret', 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret' illo modo non sunt contrariae de lege sed potius subcontrariae, et earum contradictoriae contrariae.

Sequitur ultra quod ista propositio 'Immediate post hoc Socrates curret', ubi ly 'immediate' dicit abnegationem medii sic quod faciat istum sensum 'Sine medio post hoc Socrates curret', non aequivalet isti: 'Immediate post hoc Socrates curret', capiendo ut in proposito saltem gratia formae. Quia ista 'Immediate post istud instans aliquod erit instans' est falsa primo modo capiendo quemadmodum, et ista 'Sine medio post istud instans aliquod erit instans' tamen in alio sensu est vera. Verum est tamen quod primo modo capiendo inferret ipsam secundo modo capiendo, et non econtra – saltem naturaliter procedendo et supposita existentia temporis vel instantis. Et si probas illam 'Sine medio post istud instans aliquod erit instans' per descendentes sub ly 'medio', quod distribuitur, non admittam descensum – saltem immediate.

Et per hoc patet quod sit dicendum de oppositionibus istarum.

Ex quo ultra patet quod idem est dictu hoc modo procedendo 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret' ac si diceretur 'Immediate post hoc in tempore vel instanti Socrates non curret' sic quod ly 'tempore vel instanti' sit determinatio copulae. Et proportionabiliter dicendum est in aliis.

Qualiter supponant termini in his non est cura, quia eodem modo est dicendum sicut dicetur statim de aliis in quibus ly 'post' tenetur praepositionaliter.

Restat nunc videre de expositione talium propositionum in quibus ly 'post' et ly 'ante' tenetur praepositionaliter. Et quattuor sunt genera; et potest exemplificari ut prius.

Pro expositione talium propositionum primi generis sit talis regula: *Illae propositiones debent exponi proportionabiliter sicut aliae, dempto quod ly 'inter' et ly 'ante' vel 'post' capientur ibi praepositionaliter.* Facile potest patere per exemplum. Et ex consequenti patet de propositionibus de aliis generibus.

Est tamen advertendum quod potest poni differentia inter istas propositiones 'Immediate post hoc Socrates erit entia', 'Socrates immediate post hoc erit entia', tam quoad primas exponentes quam quoad ultimas, taliter quod ad veritatem primae requireretur quod Socrates immediate post hoc erit Socrates et non ad veritatem alterius. Prima tamen universaliter inferret secundam, saltem ubi non esset aliquis terminus infinitus, et non econtra. Et ubi esset terminus infinitus, non oporteret quod aliqua inferret aliam.

Ex his sequuntur aliqua corollaria. Primum est quod ista propositio est falsa: 'Immediate post hoc Antichristus non erit', posito quod Antichristus non erit ante mille annos sed post erit.


Sequitur secundo quod istae non aequivalent: 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret', 'Non immediate post hoc Socrates curret' illo modo, quia licet prima formaliter inferat secundam, non tamen econtra.

Sequitur ultra quod propositio primi ordinis capiendo isto modo aequivalet propositioni primi ordinis capiendo, ut statim dictum est – saltem copula uniente in ordine ad instans, vel secundum ultimum modum dicendi qui tangetur in sexto argumento in materia de 'incipit', secundum quem dummodo copula uniat utrobique, eodem modo aequivalent, sive sit in ordine ad tempus sive in ordine ad instans.

Sequitur ultra quod ista propositio 'Immediate post hoc aliquod erit instans' capiendo hoc modo non aequivalet ipsimet in sensu in quo ly 'immediate' dicit abnegationem medii, quia licet ex illa inferretur saltem loquendo naturaliter, non tamen illam inferet. Et ex consequenti non aequivalet huic saltem gratia formae 'Immediate post hoc aliquod erit instans' capiendo illam in hoc sensu: 'In aliquo tempore vel instanti quod immediate post hoc erit aliquod erit instans', quia ista 'Immediate post hoc erit Antichristus' in hoc sensu est vera et in alio falsa.

Adverte tamen pro istis quod ad veritatem huius 'Post hoc Socrates non curret' capiendo praepositionaliter requiritur quod numquam post hoc Socrates curret; et aequivalet huic: 'Non post hoc Socrates curret'.

Et ex his satis patet de oppositione istarum propositionum inter se, [2b] circa quod potest constitui figura quadrangularis. In cuius primo angulo ponendo hanc: 'Immediate post hoc Socrates curret', in secundo hanc: 'Immediate post hoc Socrates non curret', ex opposito primi hanc: 'Non immediate post hoc Socrates curret', ex opposito alterius hanc: 'Non immediate post hoc Socrates non curret'.



Primae duae sunt contrariae lege; ultimae, subcontrariae; prima et tertia, secunda et quarta, contradictoriae simpliciter; prima et ultima, secunda et tertia, subalternae lege.

De suppositione terminorum positorum in tali propositione de 'immediate' dico quod si fuerit terminus communis communiter tentus et non aliunde distribuatur, et praecedat ly 'immediate', non confundit confuse tantum. Circa quod est advertendum quod aliquando ponuntur duo termini communes, unus immediate post ly 'ante' vel ly 'post', alius immediate post copulam. Exemplum patet ibi 'Immediate post instans erit instans'. Et uterque illorum stabit eodem modo, vel saltem illud est sustentabile; immo ponendo eas immediate exponibiles, oportet illud dicere. Pro termino ergo communiter tento qui sequitur immediate ly 'post' potest dici quod non valet ascensus disiunctivus sub eo. Patet, quia ista consequentia non valet: 'Immediate post istud instans est vel erit vel fuit homo; ergo immediate post instans est vel erit vel fuit homo', saltem secundum modum exponendi quem insequemur. Forte secundum communem modum exponendi bene valeret.

[4a] Secundo arguitur: Si illud esset verum, sequeretur quod istae propositiones aequivalent: 'Immediate post *a* punctum est *b* punctum', et 'Ante quodlibet punctum post *a* punctum est *b* punctum'. Sed hoc est falsum; ergo illud quod sequatur notum est. Et quod illud sit falsum probo: Una illarum est vera et alia falsa in casu; ergo non aequivalent. Antecedens probatur. Pono casum quod *a* punctum ponatur in principio

huius lineae, et in medio, et in fine. Et volo quod eadem puncta omnino quae sunt in prima medietate lineae similiter sint in secunda, et nulla alia, dempto *b* puncto, quod ponatur in qualibet parte proportionali pari secundae medietatis illius lineae, minoribus terminatis versus primam medietatem. Tunc illa de 'immediate' est falsa. Tamen illa est vera: 'Ante quodlibet punctum post *a* punctum est *b* punctum'. Igitur propositum.

Si dicas forte quod etiam illa de 'immediate' est vera in illo casu – quia exponendo, ut dictum est, exponentes sunt verae – contra hoc potest argui; quia tunc in casu illa esset vera et postea falsa: 'Et *a* et *b* puncta omnino in eisdem locis non erant'. Sed hoc est falsum; igitur quod sequatur patet. Quia nunc illa est vera, et posito quod *a* et *b* maneant, sed illa puncta quae ponuntur in prima medietate deponentur, et ponentur alia illic, tunc illa esset falsa. Haec argumenta eodem modo possunt applicari contra modum exponendi datum superius de ly 'immediate'. Et propterea, si aliqui concludant contra hoc, etiam concludent contra modum exponendi.

[4b] Saltem pro maiori parte oportet igitur videre quid debeat intellegi per 'instans' more nominalium et more realium. Unde 'instans' more realium est quoddam indivisibile, existens in tempore, continuans ipsas partes temporis adinvicem; et in quolibet tempore sunt infinita instantia. Nullum tamen alteri est immediatum, licet quocumque dato immediate post illud sit, vel erit, vel fuit aliquod instans.

Sed secundum viam nominalium, loquendo phisice, isti duo termini 'instans' et 'tempus' pro eodem supponunt – ut, puta, pro primo mobili – aliter tamen et aliter connotant. De connotatione de ly 'tempus' non est cura pro nunc. Ly 'instans' ergo supponit pro primo mobile, connotando quod immediate ante movebatur et immediate post movebitur, et quod talis vel talis pars eius respiciat seu correspondeat alicui parti alicuius quiescentis verii vel imaginarii, sic quod medietas illius partis correspondeat uni medietati alterius, et altera medietas alteri medietati. Quia caelum est in continuo motu et non potest dari aliquod quiescens verum vel imaginarium, cuius uni parti aliqua pars caeli divisibiliter eodem modo et adaequate correspondeat, sic quod verum est dicere, nunc taliter correspondet et immediate ante taliter correspondebat, vel immediate post taliter correspondebit, saltem stante motu regulari primi mobilis. Propterea ad bonum sensum concedendum est, etiam in via nominalium, quod instans est indivisibile, non tamen sic quod sit res indivisibilis, sed quia indivisibiliter ad sensum datum dicitur taliter vel taliter se habere.

Sed logice loquendo, quaelibet res potest dici 'instans' vel 'tempus' aliter tamen et aliter. Unde ly 'instans' connotabit supra sortem quod habeat aliquam durationem non divisibiliter mensurabilem motu primi mobilis, seu habeat aliquam durationem in qua nihil partibiliter potest fieri – ut puta motus vel aliquid aliud. Et esset illa duratio qua Socrates durat quando haec pars caeli correspondeat huic parti terrae, taliter quod non immediate ante nec immediate post taliter correspondebit. Et quantumcumque primum mobile non moveretur, adhuc posset illud salvari – intelligendo illud conditionaliter.

Ex quibus patent aliqua corollaria. Primum, quod si primum mobile quiesceret, non diceretur 'instans' primo modo, nec aliquid esset instans phisice loquendo.

Sequitur secundo quod esto quod nihil moveretur, adhuc aliquid posset dici instans secundo modo.

Sequitur tertio quod sicut more realium concedendum est quod nullum instans est immediatum alteri instanti, pariforma illud est concedendum ad bonum sensum secundum viam nominalium phisice loquendo. Immo nullum potest esse alteri immediatum stante motu regulari caeli. Quod addo, quia si per partes proportionabiles horae sequentis, minoribus terminatis versus hoc instans, in quolibet primum mobile faceret unam revolutionem, tunc concedendum esset quod unum esset immediatum alteri.

Sequitur ultra quod concedendum est in via nominalium quod nunc est istud instans, et aliquando erit istud instans, et aliquando reproducetur istud instans – et hoc naturaliter, licet illud non esset concedendum secundum viam realium naturaliter. Verum est, tamen, quod in rigore non est concedendum quod istud instans reproducetur, quia hoc caelum non reproducetur naturaliter. Sed bene reproducetur istud instans, quia si nunc huic parti huius corpus [*sic*] quod non movetur correspondet haec pars primi mobilis taliter, ita correspondebit taliter de hinc ad unam diem – ut puta si per spatium unius diei suum motum circularem fecerit hoc caelum dummodo tale corpus quiescens maneat ut prius.

Sed quia imaginatio de 'tempore' vel 'instanti' clarior est secundum viam realium, licet omnia possint adeo bene deduci secumdum viam nominalium circa materiam de 'incipit' et 'deficit' [*sic*] – esto quod propter rigorem ampliationum vel appellationum aliquando difficultates possent impediri, et semper ad illud oportet respicere in via nominalium ubi difficultas argumenti ad illud non tenderet – propterea in hac materia et in toto processu de 'incipit' ed 'desinit', secundum imaginationem

realium de 'tempore' vel 'instanti' procedemus – supponentes omnes difficultates adeo bene posse deduci secundum viam nominalium licet non ita breviter – et ista imaginatione supposita, quia inter arguendum tangitur aliquid de reproductione temporis et instantis. Circa quod aliquae propositiones sunt concedendae quae non multum sunt in usu; propterea, illo supposito, ponuntur aliquae propositiones.

NOTES

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

I

[1] *Procesos Inquisitoriales contra la Familia Judía de Juan Luis Vives*, ed. by Pinta y Llorente and José de Palacio. For the effect on Vives of his Jewish background see Americo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History*.
[2] Henri d'Andeli, *La Bataille des VII ars*, ed. by L. J. Paetow.
[3] Logic and dialectic derive from the same Greek root, λόγος, whose primary meaning is 'the word, by which the inner thought is expressed'; derivatively, 'the inner thought itself'. Dialectic is from διαλέγομαι, 'to converse, reason, talk with' (Liddell & Scott), whence also 'dialogue'. Aristotle (*Top.* 1, i 100ª 25–30, and *An. Pr.* 1, i 24ª–24ᵇ 12) made the distinction between apodeictic logic "which demonstrates from premises that are true and primary", and dialectical reasoning which "proceeds from opinions that are generally accepted". In the *Soph. El.* (183ª 37–39) he defined dialectic as "an art (δύναμις) which could reason on the problem set before us from the most generally accepted premises that exist". As early as Cicero the words were used interchangeably: (*Fin.* i, 7, 22; ii, 6; *Fat.* i, i.)
[4] P. S. Allen and H. M. Allen, *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi*, (hereafter cited as Allen) IV, Ep. 1107.
[5] Sr. de Palacio (*op. cit.*, pp. 99–100) offers convincing evidence that Vives was born in 1493 and not, as has been assumed, in 1492.
[6] E.g., *Institutio foeminae Christianae*, written for the Princess Mary and dedicated to Queen Catharine of Aragon, and two treatises *De ratione studii puerilis*, all 1523.
[7] Andreas Schott, *De bibliothecis et claris Hispaniae viris*, 1608. Gregorio Majans y Siscar, *Vita Vivis*, in *Vivis Opera Omnia* (hereafter cited as V O), I.
[8] Two collections of *Declamationes*, Major and Minor, published in 1494 at Parma under Quintilian's name (they were known far earlier) were much admired during the Renaissance but are now known to be spurious. (Sandys, *Hist. Class. Schol.* II; *Oxford Class. Dict.*) V's *Declamationes Syllanae quinque*, Antwerp 1520, V O II, 315ff; Estelrich, *Vivès, Exposition.*
[9] On Vives's influence on English writers on education, see J. Parmentier, *Histoire de l'Education en Angleterre*; Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education.*
[10] Ben Jonson's posthumous *Timber* contains numerous paraphrases or direct translations of V without acknowledgment, e.g., [19–22] in the Castelain ed.
[11] R. Guerlac, 'Vives and the Education of Gargantua', *Etudes Rabelaisiennes*; K. Wolf, *Vives und Sturm*; A. Nebe, *Vives, Alsted, Comenius in ihrem Verhältnis zu einander.*
[12] F. A. Lange, 'Vives', in Schmid, *Encyclopädie des gesammten Erziehungs- und Unter-*

richtswesens; History of Materialism. E. Renan, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*; P. Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci* (hereafter cited as Duhem, *Etudes*); E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit*, v. I.
[13] *Erkenntnisproblem*, I, p. 135.
[14] Adolfo Bonilla y San Martin, *Luis Vives*, p. 351.

II

[1] For this section I am particularly grateful for the assistance of Professor Kretzmann.
[2] For the inception of the University of Paris, Rashdall, *Universities* I; Denifle-Chatelain, *Chart. Univ. Par.* For a description of the *logica vetus* and *logica nova*, see DCCA, III, n. 5 below.
[3] From which terminism took its name. "In the days of Ockham, who bases his nominalistic system on the *Logica modernorum*, the terms 'moderni' and 'terministe' came to specially refer to the nominalists." De Rijk, *Log. Mod.*, I, p. 17. This important association continued into the sixteenth century. See, e.g., de Wulf, *Hist. Phil. Méd.*, II, pp. 157–190; p. 268ff.
[4] So called from the compendia or 'summulae' they composed of grammatical and terminist rules.
[5] De Rijk, *Log. Mod.* II, Part I, pp. 20–22 and *passim*; M. Grabmann, 'Die Sophismaliteratur'; C. L. Hamblin, *Fallacies*, p. 115.
[6] On the character of sophismata, see Kretzmann, "Socrates is Whiter . . .", n. 10.
[7] "In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Arts Faculty dealt only with formal logic; epistemological and metaphysical questions were the province of the Faculty of Theology" (Moody, *Truth and Consequence*, p. 1). By Vives's time even schoolboys were discussing 'sacred syllogisms'. DCCA III, v.
[8] *Metalogicon*, IV, cap. 22.
[9] Kretzmann, 'Socrates is Whiter. . .'.
[10] For the theory of supposition, besides Kretzmann, 'History of Semantics', see Kneale, *Development of Logic*, pp. 276ff.
[11] De Rijk, *Peter of Spain, Tractatus*, p. lix, xxvii.
[12] Canto XII, 134–5.
[13] De Rijk, *Tractatus*, p. xcix (or p. lv where he says the *Exponibilia* attributed to Peter were found in no mss. before the fifteenth century). Exponibilia grew out of the study of syncategoremata in the first half of the thirteenth century. They were propositions that needed clarifying because of some syncategorema. "The exponibles did not involve fallacious reasoning, nor were they, strictly speaking, ambiguous. They were simply subjects for . . . an analysis that was to explicate the force of some syncategorema in some particular context." Kretzmann, 'Semantics', p. 374.
[14] *Tractatus*, p. c.
[15] Gaspar Lax, *Termini, Insolubilia, Exponibilia*, etc.
[16] The scholastic doctrine of the latitude of forms had to do with the variation of a quality with respect to some other variable, as a function of time and/or space, that is, increasing (*intensio*) or decreasing (*remissio*). It was originally an ontological, and then a logico-semantic problem. Peter Lombard (*Sententiae* I, 17, 1) said that "in man, love increases and decreases, and at different times it is more or less intense". (I owe this citation to Edward Rosen; see Section IV below, n. 13.) (Alexandre Koyré remarked in

conversation that the theory applied also to grace.) For similar examples see Anneliese Maier, 'La doctrine de Nicholas d'Oresme sur les "Configurationes intensionum" '.

In the fourteenth century the latitude of forms became the focus of investigation into geometrical and physical problems – intension and remission, the quality of motion, the configuration of intensities. See Maier, *op. cit.*, also *Zwei Grundprobleme*, I, 'Das Problem der intensiven Grosse in der Scholastik'; Clagett, *Mechanics*; Wilson, *Heytesbury*, pp. 18–21; Duhem, *Etudes III*, *passim*; Carl Boyer, *Concepts of the Calculus*, p. 73ff. More recently, E. Sylla, 'Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators', AHDLMA, traces the theory back to Galen.

[17] J. A. Weisheipl, 'Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century'; 'Oxford and Some Mertonians'; Clagett, *Mechanics*.

[18] *Anglicanas subtilitates, quibus palam detrahunt, vigiliis addiscunt. Philobiblon*, cap. ix, p. 89.

[19] Boyer, *Concepts of the Calculus*, ch. 3, 'Medieval Contributions'.

[20] On Oresme's work on the latitude of forms, Maier, 'La doctrine de Nicholas d'Oresme', and *Zwei Grundprobleme* I, Anhang.

[21] Wilson, *Heytesbury*, p. 21.

[22] For material on sophismata see N. Kretzmann, 'Socrates is Whiter . . .'; T. K. Scott, *Jean Buridan*; C. Wilson, *William Heytesbury*.

III

[1] But see Gilson, 'L'humanisme médieval et Renaissance'; also 'Notes sur une frontière contestée', part 2.

[2] The second half of the definition probably derives from Aristotle, *Topics*, I, 101ᵇ 3.

[3] *Etymologiae*, Migne, v. 82. *Grammatica est scientia recte loquendi, et origo et fundamentum liberalium litterarum.* I, cap. v . . . *Rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia, in civilibus quaestionibus eloquentiae copia ad persuadendum justa et bona.* II, cap. i (76) . . . *Dialectica est disciplina ad discernendas rerum causas inventa. Ipsa philosophiae species, quae logica digitur [sic], id est, rationalis, definiendi, quaerendi, et disserendi potens. Docet enim in pluribus generibus quaestionum quemadmodum disputando vera et falsa dijudicentur . . . Ideo autem post rhetoricam disciplinam dialectica sequitur, quia in multis utrique communia existunt. Ibid.* (98), (99).

[4] *Metaphysics*, 1006ᵃ 21. So was Isidore's reminder, *Dicta enim logica, id est rationalis, λόγος apud Graecos et 'sermonem' significat, et 'rationem'*. So for the humanists dialectic was less Isidore's *ars rationalis* than the Ciceronian *ars disserendi.* For a history of dialectic from the beginning through the thirteenth century, see Eleonore Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis.*

[5] Quintilian i, 6, 1–3. *Sermo constat ratione vel vetusta, auctoritate, consuetudine. . . . Consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est.*

[6] Kristeller, 'Humanism and Scholasticism'; Hannah H. Grey, 'Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence'.

[7] Literally, suicetical rubbish. *Quisquiliae* were the small droppings from trees to be swept up. Suicetical is derived from one medieval version of the name of Richard Swyneshead (Suiceth), whose *Liber calculationum* earned him the sobriquet of the Calculator.

[8] Eugenio Garin, 'La cultura fiorentina', pp. 183–84.
[9] Petrus Paulus Vergerius, *Epistolario*, p. 13.
[10] Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, 'De liberorum educatione', in Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre*, p. 155.
[11] Clagett, *Mechanics*, p. 650.
[12] Ermolao Barbaro, *Epistolae Orationes et Carmina*, I, pp. 87–90.
[13] This problem goes back to Aristotle's discussion in the *Physics*, Book VI, of the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of motion, that is, of beginning and ceasing. For a detailed discussion of this problem see N. Kretzmann, 'Incipit/Desinit'; also Wilson, *Heytesbury*, ch. ii.
[14] *Statuta artistarum Patavini Gymnasii*, 1465, *Reformationis circa secundum librum*, cap. xix, p. 142. See n. 18 below.
[15] J. Facciolati, *Fasti Gymnasii Patavini*, II, p. 114.
[16] *Loc. cit.*, p. 118.
[17] J. H. Randall, Jr., *The School of Padua*, 1.
[18] Strodus, Radulphus: *Consequentie Strodi cum commento Alexandri Sermonete...*; see Bibliography: Texts and Translations. For Strode and Ferrybridge see Emden, *Biog. Register*; for these and Paul of Pergula, Prantl, *Geschichte*, v. IV.
[19] Petrarch, *Le Familiari*, I, 7. Garin remarks ('La cultura fiorentina', p. 186) that Petrarch drew the expression from Aristotle, in Chalcidius's commentary on the *Timaeus. Hos Aristoteles senes pueros vocat, quod mens eorum a mente puerili minime differat. Chal. com.* ccix.
[20] *Fam.* XVI, 12.
[21] Virgil, *Eclogues*, I, 66.
[22] *Coluccii Salutati De Laboribus Herculis*, I, i (2).
[23] L. Bruni, *Ad Petrum Paulum Histrum Dialogus*, in *Prosatori Latini del Quattrocento*, pp. 58ff.
[24] C. Dionisotti, 'Ermolao Barbaro e la fortuna di Suiceth'; Garin, 'La cultura fiorentina'; *L'Educazione in Europa*; Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica*, ch. 1.
[25] See Jerrold E. Seigel, *Rhetoric and Philosophy*, esp. ch. vii; Roberto Weiss, *The Dawn of Humanism*.
[26] Giovanni da Prato, *Il Paradiso degli Alberti*; see Hans Baron, *Humanistic and Political Literature in Florence and Venice*, Intro. and ch. i, esp. n. 17, p. 33.
[27] *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, III, p. 318; Vasoli, 'Pietro degli Alboino da Mantova "Scolastico"'.
[28] Elia del Medigo. See n. 12 above.
[29] Vasoli, *La dialettica*, pp. 18–20. Baron, *loc. cit.*
[30] *Prosatori Latini*, pp. 58ff; Neal Gilbert, 'The Early Italian Humanists and Disputation'.
[31] Vasoli, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Garin, 'La cultura fiorentina', p. 192.
[32] Laurentius Valla, *Opera Omnia*, Basel 1540; fascimile ed., Turin, 1962; Camporeale, *Lorenzo Valla*; Gaeta, *Lorenzo Valla*; Vasoli, *La dialettica*, ch. ii.
[33] Gaeta, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[34] Reusch, *Der Index der Verbotenen Bücher*, I, p. 564. A number of passages in Vives's preface and commentaries were condemned by the Dominicans, largely for their Erasmianism. The Lisbon Index of 1624 explicitly stated, *Ejus scripta non parum obscuravit consuetudo cum Erasmo.*

IV

[1] For the College of Montaigu see Godet, *La Congrégation de Montaigu;* Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris*; Duhem, *Etudes III*, esp. ch. iv; Villoslada, *La Universidad de Paris*; Erasmus, *Colloquia*, 'Ichthyophagia'; Prantl, *Geschichte*, IV, p. 246ff; Noreña, *Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought*, ch. i.

[2] For Standonck, Godet, 'Jean Standonck et les Frères Mineurs'; Renaudet, *Préréforme*, also 'Jean Standonck, un réformateur catholique avant la Réforme'; Erasmus, *loc. cit.*

[3] Erasmus, *loc. cit.*

[4] Rabelais, *Oeuvres*, II, *Gargantua*, ch. xxxvii.

[5] Renaudet, *Préréforme*, p. 341.

[6] Erasmus, *loc. cit.*

[7] Duhem, *Etudes II* and esp. *Etudes III*, and Renaudet, *op. cit.*

[8] H. Elie, 'Quelques maîtres de l'Université de Paris vers l'an 1500'; Duhem, *Etudes II* and *III*; Feret, *La faculté de Théologie de Paris*, v. II; de Wulf, *Hist. Phil. Méd.*, I, pp. 157–190 on the Ockhamist-terminist school; II, p. 168ff; Clagett, *Mechanics*, p. 653.

[9] Petrus Ramus, *Oratio de studiis philosophiae et eloquentiae coniugendis*, in *Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes*, (1575), p. 6, cited from Ong, *Ramus*, iv, p. 335, n. 88. There is a sizable literature on Spaniards at the University of Paris at this period: García Matamoros, *Pro adserenda hispanorum eruditione*; Duhem, *Etudes III*, p. 167; Bonilla, *Luis Vives*, ch. ii, esp. p. 51 and n. 20; Elie, *op. cit.*, ch. iv, 'Ecole Ibérique', p. 311; Prantl, *Geschichte*, IV, xxii; W. Risse, *Logik der Neuzeit*, I, p. 311; Muñoz Delgado, *La Logica Nominalista*, also 'La obra logica de los españoles en Paris', in *Estudios*; Bataillon, *Erasme en Espagne*, 17–18; Villoslada and Noreña, *op. cit.*; Gregorio Marañon, 'Le docteur melliflu', in *Vivès humaniste espagnole.*

[10] For Pardo, see Elie, Prantl, Clagett, and works cited above.

[11] John Dullaert of Ghent (1470–1513). *Biographie Nationale de Belgique*, 1898, and sources listed above. Vives wrote an obituary notice for the posthumous publication of Dullaert's commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, Paris 1514. For Dullaert's contributions to the study of physics, see Clagett, *Mechanics*, 653–55.

[12] Clagett, *op. cit.*, 555, and 653–59. The quotation is from p. 658.

[13] See Edward Rosen, 'Renaissance Science as Seen by Jacob Burkhardt and his Successors', in Helton, ed., *The Renaissance.*

[14] E. J. Ashworth, 'Multiple Quantification'.

[15] V O, VI, p. 196. His words echo those of John Major, *Dialogue with J. Forman*, "Things possible for God, but which never happen". Duhem, *Etudes III*, p. 162.

[16] V O, VI, p. 201.

[17] V O, III, p. 261.

[18] *Physicae perscrutationes magistri Ludovici Coronel Hispani Segoviensis*, undated but acc. by a letter dated 1521. Duhem's translation, *Etudes* III, p. 144: "Il résulte clairement de là que l'on peut imaginer des cas ou une pierre jetée en l'air y demeurerait en repos pendant une heure, ou pendant deux heures, ou pendant trois heures. Mais, direz-vous peut-être, on ne perçoit point ce repos de la pierre en l'air. Cette objection ne conclut pas; la trop grande distance peut nous empêcher de percevoir ce repos; ou bien encore, il peut se faire que la pierre demeure seulement immobile pendant un temps imperceptible."

[19] Renaudet, Préréforme, p. 505.

[20] Lefèvre d'Etaples, Preface to his *Introductiones logicales*, in Rice, *The Prefatory Epistles*, p. 39: *A Gothica enim dudum Latinorum litteris illata plaga, bonae litterae omnes nescio quid Goticum passae sunt....*

[21] For Lefèvre d'Etaples, Renaudet, *Prérféorme*; 'La pensée religieuse de Lefèvre d'Etaples'; Eugene F. Rice, Jr., *op. cit.*; also 'The Humanist Idea of Christian Antiquity: Lefèvre d'Etaples and his Circle'.

[22] Ulrich Zasius, humanist and jurist, in a letter to Boniface Amerbach, *Amerbach Korrespondenz*, II, Ep. 923, pp. 429–31: *Theologi nostri ille Matheum, hic Paulum legit; silent Sententiarum libri, immo reiecti sunt... Aristotilem redegerunt in ordinem; siquidem nec legitur nec exercetur. Petrus Hyspanus abiit, abiit omnis logica,* (the rest of the passage is worth quoting) *nisi quod aliqui Melanthonis brevicula, alii Rodulphi Agricolae libros profitentur (utinam ex justo profiterentur!) et ita velut nova nostrae universitatis admutata est facies.*

[23] *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*, ed. by F. G. Stokes.

[24] Old style. Published two months later in April, 1520.

[25] Allen, IV, Ep. 1106. See Appendix I.

V

[1] Adrian van Barland taught Latin and later rhetoric at Busleiden's College (See Appendix I, n. 5). Francis van Craneveldt, jurist and patron of the arts, was one of Vives's closest friends. See n. 5 below.

[2] Henry de Vocht, *Monumenta Humanistica Lovaniensis*, p. 231.

[3] E.g., the *Triumphus Iesu Christi*, 1514, and the *Fabula de homine*, 1518, in V O, VII and IV respectively, the latter tr. by Nancy Lenkeith in Cassirer, Kristeller, Randall ed., *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man.*

[4] Vocht, *History of the Collegium Trilingue*, v. I.

[5] Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education*, p. lxx. For Vives's life in the Low Countries at this period, Vocht, *Literae Virorum Eruditorum ad Franciscum Craneveldium.*

[6] Allen, IV, Ep. 1082, *c.* March 1520 to Hermann, Count of Neuenahr.

[7] The work is commonly referred to as *In pseudodialecticos, but* the title page of the first (Selestat) edition uses the word *Adversus*. V O III.

[8] Of Fortis, to whom Vives also dedicated one of his earliest works, an edition of the *Astronomicon poeticon* of Hyginus, nothing more is known.

[9] For the Tritheism of the eleventh-twelfth century nominalist Roscellinus see de Wulf, *Hist. Phil. Méd.*, pp. 102–106, 117, 134–5; Rashdall, *Universities*, I, pp. 46, 49–50.

[10] Ashworth, 'Multiple Quantification'.

[11] Wilson, *Heytesbury*; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, IV, *Distinctiones* iii, iv, v, vi, Migne, v. 192.

[12] Valla, *Dial. disp.* Proemium to II, , *Opera* p. 693.

[13] V O, VI, p. 113.

[14] *Das Erkenntnisproblem*, I, p. 124. Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method*, ch. 3.

VI

[1] Froben, Basel, 1522. Estelrich, *Vivès, Exposition.*

[2] Allen VII, Ep. 1830.

[3] *De subventione pauperum*, Bruges, 1525, V O, IV, 416.

[4] Vocht, *Mon. Hum. Lov.*, IV, p. 17; P. S. Allen, 'Ludovicus Vives at Corpus', *The*

Pelican Record, Dec. 1902.
[5] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. xxxvi.
[6] *Ibid.*, Introduction and translation of *De tradendis disciplinis.*
[7] E.g., Lefèvre d'Etaples, Preface to Bruni's *Hecatonomies of Plato's Republic and Laws*, 1506, in Rice, *Prefatory Epistles*; Charles de Bovilles, *De constitutione et utilitate artium humanorum*, Paris. 1506.
[8] Noreña, *Vives*, p. 276.
[9] V O, VI, 373ff.
[10] Vives often refers to the *Academica, De natura deorum, De finibus, De fato*, and the pedagogic oratorical works that also influenced Valla and Agricola. See Lisa Jardine, 'Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist Dialectic'.
[11] V O, VI, 347–8.
[12] *Ibid.*, 348.
[13] Preface to *De disciplinis*, V O, VI, 6; Ben Jonson, *Timber*, [19–22] Castelain. Compare this passage with *De inv. dial.* I, 3.

VII

[1] Quintilian, iii, 5, 2; Cicero, *Brutus*, xlix, liii.
[2] Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*; *In Ciceronis Topica*, in Migne, v. 64. Eleonore Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis.*
[3] For Agricola, see Woodward, *Studies in Education*; Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue*; Vasoli, *La dialettica*, pp. 147–182, 249ff.
[4] *De inv. dial.* I, i. This recalls Isidore of Seville. Agricola's concept of dialectic is close to the early Spaniard's definition of rhetoric and the function he believes the two arts have in common.
[5] From an early draft of Lisa Jardine's, 'Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist Dialectic'.
[6] V O, III, p. 84.
[7] V O, III.
[8] Vasoli, *op. cit.*, pp. 234–239, pays them cursory attention.
[9] See Ong, *op. cit.*; Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method*, pp. 129–163; Vasoli, *op. cit.*
[10] Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Majans, *Vita Vivis*, pp. 105–109, gives a review of sixteenth to eighteenth century judgments on Ramus's debt to Vives and others.
[11] Cited from Majans, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

VIII

[1] V O, VI.
[2] *Brutus*, xli; V O, VI, 112.
[3] For the sake of his argument here, Vives overlooks Cicero's *De inventione* and *Topica.*
[4] *Academica*, ii, 91; V O, VI, 113.
[5] V O, III, pp. 25–27; Estelrich, *op. cit.*
[6] V O, VI, p. 31.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 34. For Aristotle's selections from the work of his predecessors, see Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy.*
[8] V O, VI, p. 31.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 36.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 117. Nizolius quotes this passage at length, *De veris principiis*, Breen ed., II, 129.
[11] The inclusion of true and false among the modes is much older than Buridan.
[12] V O, VI, p. 119.
[13] Vives shows some confusion here, in including differentiae among Aristotle's predicables. *Topics* 101^{b} 11–25.
[14] Porphyry (3rd c. A.D.) added 'species' to Aristotle's four predicables: definition, property, genus and accident, and substituted differentia for definition; his resulting doctrine of the *quinque voces* became a standard medieval logic text-book. See the two chapters on dialectic in Stump, *op. cit.*
[15] V O, VI, p. 130. For a clear exposition of the Maxims, Stump, *op. cit.*
[16] De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, p. 2.
[17] Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought* II, p. 11.

NOTES TO *ADVERSUS PSEUDODIALECTIOCS*

[1] *nihil vanius . . . stultius.* A common complaint against the terminists, in contrast to the *gravitas* admired by the humanists. Vives, below, p. 50.
[2] Cicero, *Orator*, xv, 58.
[3] *Nugacissimas nugas.* More below, p. 170.
[4] Perhaps rhetorical, bùt the history of the University of Paris shows numerous instances of expulsion of one school or another, e.g., De Wulf, *Hist. Méd. Phil.* (1909) III, p. 428: "The Paris Faculty of Arts banished from its chairs the Ockhamist doctrine three times within seven years, 1339–1406". "In 1387 a quarrel between the Dominicans and the University led to the temporary expulsion of the Dominicans". See Denifle-Chatelain, *Chart. Univ. Par.*
[5] Syncategorematic words; see Introduction II. Donkeys – *asini* – were a favorite subject for sophismata.
[6] Perseveration of scholastic training another common complaint of humanists. Erasmus, *De ratione studii*, 521 B: *Quid stultius, quam magno labore discere, quae postea majori cogaris dediscere*? Ramus, *Petri Rami Defensio pro Aristotele adv. Jac. Schecium* (Lausanne, 1571): *Tandem in ea sophismata incidi; quae cum maximo labore didicissem, moerore multo majore dedidici, aliosque et meipsum praecipue quoad licuit, dedocui.* p. 121.
[7] Timotheus the musician of Miletus (c. 450–360 B. C.). Cicero, *Leg.* ii, 15, 39. Quintilian ii, 3, 3, says T used to charge double fees to teach forgetting.
[8] Cicero, *Academica*, ii 1, 2; *Fin.* ii, 32, 104.
[9] For these, and Vives's other examples of sophismata in the *Adv. pseudodialecticos*, see Introduction II, p. 9. For the use of letters in sixteenth-century supposition theory see E. J. Ashworth, 'Multiple Quantification'.
[10] A common epithet in humanist writers. Valla, *Eleg.* Praef. III, *Op. Om.* I, p. 80. See also Lefèvre, n. 22, Intro. IV.
[11] *farina – furfuris.* A colloquial play on words common in Erasmus and More.
[12] *Da casum.* The *casus* is the hypothesis without which a sophisma cannot be interpreted.

[13] Cicero, *Div.*, ii, 64.
[14] *supploderet, sibilis, clamoribus.* A reply in kind to the *garrulitas* of the terminists. See below, p. 93, "the most clamorous, the most loquacious . . . in the schools".
[15] Another humanist commonplace, said also of Aristotle and Greek. See More, p. 171.
[16] Quintilian, iv, 1, 61; Erasmus, *Adagia*, col 211, *In portu impingere.*
[17] Erasmus, *loc. cit.*, *Cantherius in porta.*
[18] *Ibid.*, col. 317, *Bibe elleborum* and 318, *Naviget Anticyras.* For a compendium on hellebore and Anticyra see Thomas Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy.*
[19] Quintilian i, 6, 1–3. See Introduction III, n. 5.
[20] Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* i, 21, 4. Polybius iii, 23.
[21] Of negations, John of Salisbury (*Metalogicon* i, cap. 3) says listeners used to bring dried peas and beans to use as counters to keep track of them.
[22] 'Sortes' is a medieval corruption of 'Socrates'.
[23] The use of letters to designate variables in physico-mathematical studies goes back to Aristotle (*Physics* VI). For the medieval period, e.g., E. A. Moody and Marshall Clagett, *The Medieval Science of Weights*, and Clagett, *Mechanics.* For the sixteenth century, see Ashworth, *op. cit.*
[24] Compare More, p. 181.
[25] *Leg.* i, 17. Tr. C. L. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library.
[26] Facciolati/Forcellini: *Grammatica est ars emendate loquendi, et scribendi, idest sine soloecismis, barbarismis, erroribus pronunciatis, etc.*
[27] [Daphyta?]. Plato, *Euthydemus.*
[28] *De sophisticis elenchis* was formerly divided into two books.
[29] *Ad placitum.* Arist., *Soph. el.* x, 170^b, 12–32. Peter of Spain, *Tractatus, De introductionibus*, pp. 2, 4: *Vox significativa naturaliter est illa que apud omnes idem representat, ut gemitus infirmorum, latratus canum . . . vox significativa ad placitum est illa que ad voluntatem instituentis aliquid representat, ut 'homo'. Idem, De suppositionibus*, p. 79. Buridan, *Sophismata*, cap. iv, *De hac quod voces significant ad placitum.* Lax, *Termini*, sect. 1–3.
[30] Pliny iv, 80.
[31] *Fat.* xi, 24. Vives may be quoting from memory here, or from a text other than the one we accept today, for he omits a clause, and *dicitur* in the second part of the quotation should be *dicamus.* In connection with this passage see also Peter of Spain, *Tractus*, on Restrictions.
[32] For a full discussion of these terms see Kretzmann, 'Incipit/Desinit'.
[33] The essential syncategorematic term for the discussion of *incipit* and *desinit.*
[34] See Introduction II, n. 13.
[35] The name of a mood of the second figure of the syllogism, and a perhaps contrived adverbial form of *festinus*, 'hasty'.
[36] Vives seems to mean that a statement is false if its predicate is lower than its subject in a Porphyrian tree, but the 'rule' really applies only to universal affirmatives. For details on the Porphyrian tree (a classificatory scheme beginning with the most general at the top and descending to the most specific), see Stump, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
[37] See DCCA III, vi, below on acceptance of terms.
[38] Scythia was the Renaissance symbol of the most remote and utter barbarism. Gellius, *N. A.* ix, 4, on Scythian cannibals. Also Pliny vi, 22.

[39] A classical proverb. Pliny xxxv, 20, 36.

[40] On the origin of terminist logic, De Rijk (*Log. Mod.* I, p. 18) indicates "the line of this development in the so far almost entirely unprinted works of the, mostly anonymous, twelfth century logicians".

[41] *parum logicalibus*. A favorite word-play with Vives and More.

[42] A good debater, Vives here uses an argument he derides in *De causis* I, where he ridicules men afraid to go beyond what Aristotle said.

[43] More, p. 169.

[44] *Prior Analytics* 25ª 9.

[45] More, 177.

[46] *Ibid.*, 146–47. In a similar vein, *The Praise of Folly*, 53.

[47] An illustration of Vives's (and Petrarch's) complaint that terminist sophismata had invaded the field of theology. For other such 'Christian paradoxes', *The Praise of Folly, loc. cit.*

[48] Here a burlesque on the rules for baptism set down in the *Sentences* (IV, *Distinctiones* iii, iv, v, vi) (Aug. *Verbo baptisma consecratur, detrahe verbum, et quid est aqua, nisi aqua*?), according to the terminist discussion of Heytesbury, *Reg.* V, *De maximo et minimo*. See Wilson, *Heytesbury*. In a similar vein, both More and Erasmus.

[49] John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), William of Ockham (d. 1349), Adam Woodham (Goddam) (d. 1358) were Franciscan friars; William Heytesbury, Richard Swyneshead (Suiceth), and Thomas Buckingham were fourteenth-century fellows of Merton College, Oxford. Paul of Venice (d. 1429), an Augustinian, probably spent three years at Oxford; his 50 sophismata are drawn from Heytesbury, and his *Logica magna* and *Logica parva* remained influential throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358) taught among other places at Padua.

[50] Vives's biographer Majans says V fulfilled this pledge with the *De disciplinis* twelve years later.

[51] For the comparison, see the *Ad Herennium*, iv, 4, 16. Qintilian, II, 3.9

[52] The humanists claimed, with some justice, that the terminist dialecticians did not know Aristotle except through his translators and commentators; in Vives's day the study of Greek was forbidden in the College of Montaigu. See More to Dorp, pp. 191–95.

[53] Cicero, *Topica* ii, 6; R. McKeon, 'Methods of Rhetoric and Philosophy'; W. S. Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric*, chs. 1 and 2.

[54] *Corruptrice garrulitate. Ad. Her.* ii, 11: *ut huius infantiae garrulam disciplinam contemneremus.*

[55] Perhaps a reminiscence of Montaigu, 'Colliège de pouillerie'.

[56] Quintilian xii, 2, 14; More, below, p. 189; *Folly*, 11.

[57] Juvenal 2, 14.

[58] Quintilian, *loc. cit.*, More, 189.

[59] *Nat. deorum* ii, 2.

[60] Time wasted on logic, another familiar theme of the humanists. See Neal Gilbert, 'The Early Italian Humanists', p. 126.

[61] Citerians were chattering puppets carried in parades in ancient Rome. Facciolati/Forcellini, *Tot. Lat. Lex.*: *Efficies quaedam arguta et loquax ridiculi gratia, quae in pompa veti Romae solebat; quasi pica loquax.*

[62] Peter Gratian Lalous (Laloo) of Middelbourg (Elie), apparently directed by Vives to

Oxford, B. Civil Law 1523 (Vocht); Toussaint Hosey (Hocedius), mentioned by Erasmus in a letter to Conrad Goclenius; Nicholas Wotton (1497–1567), Secretary of State, diplomat, and Dean of Canterbury and York, "one of the ablest and most experienced of Tudor diplomats" (DNB); Nicholas Valdaura, later Vives's brother-in-law, friend and probably pupil of Juan Fortis, and later a physician at Bruges.

NOTES TO *DE DIALECTICA*

[1] Cicero, *Topica* ii, 6.
[2] Aristotle, *Topics*. Cicero, *loc. cit.*, says that Aristotle was the founder of both branches of argumentation, invention and judgment, and that the Stoics developed the art of judgment, neglecting that of invention. Medieval logicians tended to absorb the art of finding into the art of judging the validity of arguments. E. Stump, *op. cit*, p. 25.
[3] Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*, *In Topica Ciceronis*, Migne, 64.
[4] A Ciceronian phrase: *loc. cit.*, *Fin.* iii, 13,
[5] The old logic (*logica vetus*) consisted of the books of Aristotle known before the twelfth century, i.e., the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry (See Intro. VIII, n. 13) (which is doubtless what Vives here refers to as the *Praedicabilia*), and several treatises of Boethius. The new logic (*logica nova*) comprised the newly recovered *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and *De sophisticis elenchis*, and Gilbert de la Porrée (see n. 10 below). In Vives's enumeration here he leaves out Boethius in the *logica vetus* and *De sophisticis elenchis* in the *logica nova*. The old and the new logic came to be known as the *logica antiqua* upon the development of the *logica moderna*. See Introduction II.
[6] The *parva logicalia*, which was supplemented by the *tractatus syncategorematum*.
[7] See n. 10.
[8] Antisthenes (c. 445–c. 360 B.C.), founder of the Cynic sect.
[9] Porphyry. See Intro. VIII, n. 14.
[10] Gilbert de la Porrée (Porretanus) (1071–1154). His *Liber de sex principiis*, composed around the middle of the twelfth century, supplemented Aristotle's *Categories* by dealing with points Aristotle had not discussed in detail.
[11] Virgil, *Aeneid*, iii, 193.
[12] See Introduction, p. 54. "The theologians studied the *Posterior Analytics*, and the *Organon* as a whole, in the context of Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of knowledge". (Moody, 'Medieval Logic', p. 529.)
[13] These terms apply to forms of supposition.
[14] 'Offensive to pious ears' was a technical term, a mild form of ecclesiastical censure. (Betty Radice in Penguin ed., *Praise of Folly*, n. p. 162.)
[15] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1030^a 7, ff; *An. Post.* II, 92^b 32.
[16] Horace, *Ars poetica*, 174, speaking of Helen: *gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ovo.*
[17] *Ibid.*, 72. V. may be quoting from memory; Horace assigns this right to the *usus loquendi*.
[18] For Gregory of Rimini, see Elie, *Le Complexe significabile*, Section 1, *passim.*
[19] *De int.* 19^b 18ff.
[20] *Ibid.* 19^b 14.
[21] *Ibid.* 20^a 5–15.
[22] See Introduction III, n. 18.

[23] *Soph. el.* 176[b] 1–7.
[24] Quintilian ii, 17. 17.
[25] From the *Consequentie* of Ralph Strode, *op. cit.* Kneale, *Dev.* p. 292.
[26] Kneale, *Dev.*, pp. 275–6, attributes the first paradoxical thesis to Abelard, and both to Robert Kilwardby (d. 1277) commenting on the *Prior Analytics.*
[27] *De int.* 19[a] 22ff.
[28] *Soph. el.* 166[a] 25ff.
[29] *Adv. pseudo.* p. 61; More, p. 181.
[30] John 12:8.
[31] *De int.* 17[b] 3–16; 32. A's sentence number one is not a true universal; the second one is.
[32] *Acad.* xlvi, 142.
[33] Vives's sentence is historically false, apart from its semantic meaning. David begat King Solomon. The point is the same as with the others in this series: the embryo was not King.
[34] Introduction II, n. 7.
[35] Pliny vii, 11. *Praeter mulierem pauca animalia coitum novere gravida.*
[36] *Ibid.*, vii, 53. Rackham's translation reads, "Diodorus the professor of logic died of shame because he could not at once solve a problem put to him in jest by Stilpo".
[37] Vives seems to be referring here to *Soph el.*, 180[a] 8 ff.
[38] Cicero, *De inv.* i, 6, 8; McKeon, 'The Methods of Rhetoric and Philosophy'.
[39] *De oratore* iii, 23, 87–89. Translation modified from Rackham, LCL.
[40] *Topics*, i, 104[a], 5–7.
[41] Publilius Syrus in Macrobius, *Saturnalia* ii, 7, 11.
[42] *Soph. el.* 165[a] 22–24.
[43] *Ibid.* 165[b] 13–23.
[44] Quintilian ii, 17, 33-4. Vives, either from memory or from a different text, substitutes 'pirates' for 'pilots'.
[45] *Dialecticae disputationes.* See Introduction III, p. 23.

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

[1] For Dorp, see Vocht, *Mon. Hum. Lov.*, pp. 121ff.
[2] *Oratio de laudibus sigillatim cuiusque disciplinarum*, published 1519.
[3] Allen, IV, Ep. 1082. As early as July 1516 Erasmus wrote cordially to Dorp from Brussels (Allen II, Ep. 438): *Audivi non sine animi voluptate, mi Dorpi charissime, quae nobis de te narravit communis amicus Paludanus; quanto pectore in praefatione tua damnaris istos qui, neglectis divinis literis, anxiis ac frivolis quaestiunculis insenescunt, et qua tuba tuos auditores ad divinae Scripturae studia sis adhortatus. Macte animo virtuteque* βαλλόντως, '*sic itur ad astra!*' (*Aeneid* ix, 641.)
[4] Antony, son of John of Bergen, who was the brother of Erasmus's old patron, Henry of Bergen, Bishop of Cambrai. Antony had already been a pupil in Louvain of Vives, who dedicated to him his *Fabula de homine* and his *Praelectio* on the *Georgics.* Antony returned to England in 1520 to be a cup-bearer at the court of Henry VIII.
[5] Adrian Aelius Barland, who had been teaching Latin at Busleiden's College, accompanied Antony of Bergen to England as tutor; he subsequently returned to Louvain.

[6] Cicero, *Leg.* ii, 19; Quintilian, xii, 10, 6; xii, 11, 8.

[7] Erasmus wrote a preface for Vives's *Declamationes Syllanae*, Antwerp, April, 1520, in the form of a letter to Hermann, Count of Neuenahr. (Allen, 1082) See n. 8, Intro. I above.

[8] Vives had just become tutor to William de Croy, at the age of eighteen Archbishop-designate of Toledo and a Cardinal of the Church. The young Cardinal died in a fall from his horse at the age of twenty-three.

[9] The Field of the Cloth of Gold, 7 June 1520. Charles, embarked from Spain 22 May, stopped in England to detach Henry, through Wolsey, from his alliance with France; he then proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle for his coronation as Emperor, 23 October.

[10] *Aedes legum* (*The Temple of the Law*), 1519, V O, V, pp. 483–493.

[11] *The Dream of Scipio* (Africanus Numantius, 185–129 B.C.) related by Cicero in Bk. VI of the *De republica*, and fortunately preserved for us in the commentary on it by Macrobius. Since it dealt with immortality as well as astronomy it was a popular subject for medieval and renaissance writers. Vives's treatment of it appears in V O, V, pp. 64–163.

[12] Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples published in Paris between 1492–1506 paraphrases or commentaries on almost the whole Aristotelian corpus.

[13] Alcuin of York (730–804) was entrusted by Charlemagne with the educational organization of his Empire. See Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge*, pp. 187ff.

[14] Robert Gaguin (1425–1502), French humanist, theologian and historian, author of *Annales rerum Gallicarum, seu compendium usque ad annum 1499.*

[15] Alexander de Villa Dei, 13th c. grammarian, composed the *Doctrinale puerorum*, a grammar in verse that dominated the schools for three centuries.

[16] Albertus Magnus. See Introduction, p. 5–6.

[17] Buridan, cap. v on Ampliation (Scott, p. 33), "A term occurring either before or after the verb 'can' . . . is ampliated to stand for possible things, whether or not they exist or have existed".

[18] Aulus Persius Flaccus, *Satire* 3.

[19] Probably More's friend, the Italian merchant and scholar, Antonio Bonvisi.

[20] *Directorium aut potius Castigatorium Concubinariorum*, published by Ascensius Badius in Paris, 1513.

[21] Nicholas of Lyra (c. 1270–1340) wrote commentaries on the Old Testament in which he made use of the Hebrew texts.

[22] Luke, 19; 1–10.

[23] Terence, *Andria*, Prologue, 22ff.

[24] Augustine, *De divinatione daemonum*, caps. iii–iv, Migne, 40.

[25] Nicholas Perottus, fifteenth c. philologian, wrote a *Cornucopia, sive commentaria linguae latinae*, Venice 1489. Ambrogio Calepino (1435–1511), an Augustinian monk, published (1502) a polyglot dictionary, reprinted 18 times by the Manutius family alone. By 1586 it listed words in ten languages.

[26] The *Discipuli*, the *Veni mecum* and the *Dormi secure* were outlines of sermons used by parish priests.

[27] Dorp's *Oratio in laudem Aristotelis*, Louvain, February 1514.

[28] For Valla's resolute opposition to Aristotle.

[29] Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. early 3rd c. A.D.), the ablest of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, also composed two books of *Problems of medicine and physics.*

Themistius fl. Constantinople turn of 5th c. and wrote Paraphrases of Aristotle.

Ammonius Hermiae fl. Alexandria turn of 6th c. A commentator on Aristotle's logical works, he was the teacher of:

Simplicius, who commented upon the *De anima*, *Categories*, *De caelo*, and *Physics* (Galileo used him as the Aristotelian in his *Two Chief Systems* (*Dialogo*) and *Two New Sciences* (*Discorsi*)); and of

John Philoponus, an extensive commentator on the logical books, *Meteorology*, *Physics* and others.

Olympiodorus of Alexandria the younger, first half 6th c., commented upon A's *Meteorology*.

[30] John of Alexandria, 'The Grammarian' and physician, fl. c. 627–640, wrote commentaries on Hippocrates and Galen.

[31] Thomas Linacre (1460–1524), humanist and physician. His translation of the *Meteorologica* was never completed.

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